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Abstract 
The focus of this thesis by publication is the response of the settler-colonial state, 
criminology and the wider academy, to two inter-related wicked problems confronting 
the policy sector, firstly the over-representation of Indigenous peoples in the formal 
criminal justice system and second, Indigenous peoples’ critique of the response of the 
state and the Academy to the issue of continued Indigenous over-representation in the 
criminal justice system. 
 
The author was motivated to undertake this thesis due to the following: 
 that the over-representation of Indigenous peoples in the formal criminal justice 
system has been a statistical fact in settler-colonial societies (e.g. New Zealand, 
Australia, Canada and the U.S) for close to thirty years; 
 the persistence of this situation despite significant political, media, academic and 
policy attention to this issue over that time period; 
 a significant amount of the material produced on the issue of Indigenous over-
representation has been completed without direct input from Indigenous peoples; 
and 
 the Indigenous voice has been particularly silent (or silenced) in the work 
produced by criminologists working in settler-colonial contexts. 
 
The thesis is made up of eight published articles that have been placed in three inter-
related three sections.  Section one is made up entirely of one published work.  This 
paper (Paper 1) offers a broad theoretical discussion of the colonial projects, the policy 
levers and interventions developed and utilised by state functionaries in response to the 
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two broad wicked problems discussed above.  Section two contains Papers 2, 3, 4 and 5.  
The papers in this section provide an empirically-informed critique of the various ways 
through which the discipline of criminology has contributed to the state’s colonial and 
neo-colonial processes.  The original contribution of this material lies in the fact that 
Paper 4 provides one of the first empirically informed analyses of the impact of 
increasing globalisation of crime control policy on Indigenous peoples, while Papers 2, 
3, 4 and 5 combine with Paper 1 to expose the range of projects through which the 
discipline has, to paraphrase Agozino (2003), continued to support the settler-colonial 
state’s criminalisation of Indigenous peoples. 
 
In Section three the focus moves to the role of the state and is made up of Papers 6, 7 
and 8.  Each of the papers offers a case study that highlight way(s) in which the settler-
colonial states nullifies Indigenous input into the development of crime control policies 
for issues of concern to Indigenous communities.  The intent of this section is to identify 
and analyse the range of strategies deployed by the state to placate Indigenous dissent, 
and maintain its hegemony over responses to social harm.     
 
Keywords 
Authoritarian criminology, colonial projects, colonialism, counter-colonial criminology, 
criminology, evidence-based policy, Indigenous peoples, Indigenous emancipatory 
methodology, Indigenous standpoint, informal justice, Māori, myth, policy industry, 
research ethics boards, ritual, settler-colonialism, Waitangi Tribunal, youth gangs. 
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Every colonised people – in other words, every people in whose soul an inferiority 
complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality – 
finds itself face to face with the language of the civilising nation: that is, with the 
culture of the mother country.  The colonised is elevated above the jungle status in 
proportion to his adoption of the mother country’s cultural standards.  He 
becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness, his jungle. 
                                                                                                                           Franz Fanon (1968: 18). 
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PART I 
 
Overview of the Research 
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Motivations 
The principal motivation for this thesis is the author’s concern at the lack of attention 
given by state policy makers and administrative (authoritarian) criminologists, to 
indigenous experiences of crime control as practised in settler-colonial contexts (see 
Tauri, 2013c; 2015).  Although growing steadily, the academic lexicon that privileges 
the Indigenous experience is relatively small, especially when compared with the 
material generated by western criminology over the past century (Agozino, 2004).  
Unfortunately, as Agozino (2003; 2004) and Tauri (2013c; 2015) demonstrate, much of 
what is published about us has rarely been created with us, and  meeting the needs is 
designed to meet the needs of the state and the non-Indigenous members of the 
academy.  In many instances the data used to inform criminological commentary on 
Indigenous peoples is gathered ‘from afar’ through the use of statistical analysis and 
other forms of non-engaging methods (see Deckert, 2014; 2015).  In contrast, a majority 
of the material included in this thesis was generated from direct engagement with the 
experiences and views of Māori and other Indigenous peoples.  Some of the contributors 
work in the Academy, others for government agencies, and still others work directly 
with their communities as social service providers.  It is hoped that in privileging the 
experiences and perspectives of Indigenous peoples, this thesis will assist the 
development of a critical Indigenous justice scholarship that offers an empowering 
alternative to the hegemony the settler-colonial state, aided by western criminology, 
currently holds over the development of ‘legitimate knowledge’ about Indigenous 
peoples’ experiences of crime control.     
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The lack of Indigenous voices within the cacophony of noise that emanates ceaselessly 
from the discipline of criminology, is made obvious in the contemporary moment by the 
frequent neglect by administrative and/or authoritarian criminologists to investigate 
the impact that the globalisation of crime control is having on Indigenous peoples 
(Tauri, 2013c; Tauri, 2014a).  As demonstrated in Paper 4 (see Tauri, 2014a), the 
critical study of the globalisation of crime control is especially important to Indigenous 
peoples because of its close association with the recent, rapid expansion of the 
restorative justice industry.  Of particular concern  to Indigenes is the industry’s 
marketing of boutique products such as youth conferencing and sentencing circles as 
Indigenous-inspired products; a strategy that has facilitated the successful cross-
jurisdictional transfer of these products, while also negatively impacting moves by 
Indigenous peoples to develop their own justice processes (ibid). 
 
Another neglected issue is the role the Academy itself plays in disempowering 
Indigenous peoples, especially in the realm of knowledge construction.  In response, the 
thesis includes material produced to challenge the hegemony the academy holds over 
institutional research ethics processes, and frameworks for determining what is/is not 
appropriate knowledge in relation to Indigenous experiences of crime control (Tauri, 
2013c; 2014b). 
 
Any thesis that claims to offer a critical analysis of the impact of crime control on 
Indigenous peoples cannot do so without engaging with the processes utilised by the 
settler-colonial state to formulate policy.  For this reason, the thesis contains three 
papers designed to address the politics of settler-colonial policy construction (Tauri, 
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2013c; 2015; Tauri and Webb, 2012).  Collectively, the papers demonstrate that far 
from being an ‘evidence-based’ process, the crime control policy process utilised in 
settler-colonial contexts like New Zealand is heavily impacted by the politics of necessity, 
including silencing (or redirecting) critical voices, especially those emanating from the 
Indigenous perspective (Tauri, 2009b). 
 
Before launching into a thorough overview of the key themes of the papers contained in 
the thesis, it is important to set out the epistemological and methodological frameworks 
that underpin the authors approach to research. 
 
The Epistemological Stance of the Researcher 
In his ground breaking work ‘Counter-Colonial Criminology: A Critique of Imperialist 
Reason’, the Nigerian scholar Biko Agozino (2003) entered the criminological 
knowledge wars that developed during the 1970s and 1980s about what did/did not 
constitute valid criminological knowledge.  Employing a rather crude binary, the debate 
occurred between the hard scientists of administrative criminology - those who follow 
the precepts of scientific research (marked by adherence to specific ‘scientific’ research 
principles such as objectivity, distance from research subjects, etc) and who tend to 
“believe that commitment is undesirable in social sciences” - and on the other side, 
‘standpoint’ researchers who argued that “objectivity is impossible or undesirable” 
when pursuing knowledge through social research (Agozino, 2003: 157).  Agozino 
offers a slightly different formulation of the researcher/participant relationship to these 
two positions, one that exhorts the researcher to move from “[the] false dichotomy 
between objectivity and commitment”.  Instead Agozino (ibid: 157) endorses committed 
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objectivity as a position that “capture[s] the inextricability of the articulation of the 
processes of commitment and objectivity” that are key to meaningful social inquiry.   
 
In one of his last significant works, ‘The Criminological Imagination’, the late Jock Young 
(2011) provided a potent critique of both the power of the scientific discourse to 
dominate social inquiry and its many shortcomings when confronted with the often 
messy arena Schoen (1973) refers to as the ‘social context’.  Young (2011: 62) argues 
“how can it be, in a hyper-pluralistic world where creativity and self-invention is a 
priority, where the solidity of the world is increasingly shaky, and where reflexivity is 
the order of the day, that such a mechanistic ideology [such as the ‘scientific method’ in 
social inquiry] can flourish”?  More pointedly, Young charts the rise of a fundamentalist 
positivism within social inquiry “which attempt[s] to generate fake objectivity by 
postulating a yawning gap between the observer and the observed” (ibid: 65).  Young 
(ibid: 65) further argues that the creation of the tyranny of distance between the 
knowledgeable, distant (scientific) observer and the ‘othered’ (the observed, analysed, 
critiqued and controlled research population) is “unique in the annals of othering”.  
While at face value this position offers a powerful statement of the link between the 
scientific method and the process of othering, it is a highly contestable statement when 
considered against the extensive literature exposing the othering practices deployed by 
colonial (and now, neo-colonial) states during the colonising processes; many of which 
are arguably being deployed extensively in the settler-colonial moment (Agozino, 2003; 
Fanon, 1967; Smith, 1999).  Putting this important point aside for now, we are able to 
accept that Young’s critique of the distancing techniques favoured in administrative 
criminology’s preference for external observations and numerical analysis is profound.  
18 
 
It was also highly impactful for the methodological framework employed in this thesis – 
a rejection of non-engaging methodologies (in particular quantitative approaches 
devoid of any engagement with Indigenous peoples with regards design, data gathering, 
analysis and dissemination) that mirrors the sentiments expressed in the following 
quote, in which Young (ibid: 66) states that: 
 
It is usually – although not always – underpinned by the notion of deficit – but as it 
aspires to a scientific rendering of reality, it conceives of such an othering in a 
numerical fashion.  Notably it attempts to project onto human reality an underlay 
of numbers, a quantifiable frame on which human action can be seen to hang.  
Further it claims that such a depiction in number and equation, in graph and in 
Greek symbolism gets down to the heart of the matter – portrays the true nature 
of what is actually going on in human conduct. 
 
Importantly, for the construction of the Indigenous emancipatory methodology 
employed by the author (as discussed in detail below), Young’s critique involves the 
recognition of difference as key to critiquing the researcher as outsider basis to 
positivistic notions of researcher objectivity, in particular his argument (ibid: 66) that 
“[s]ociological investigation occurs in a world which is stratified by class, gender, age, 
race and ethnicity.  At the very least it involves relations of class.  The poor are not some 
inhabitants of a distant island, they are an integral part of our (middle class) material 
existence”. 
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If a fundamental rationale for the importance of objectivity in social inquiry is the need 
to accurately describe social experience and social context, then one can argue that our 
methodology must be such that it privileges the perspectives and experiences of the 
(Indigenous) Other (Cohen 1988; Smith, 1999).  It should strive to be emancipatory; 
supportive of those groups marginalised and/or subjugated within the settler-colonial 
context (Agozino, 2003).  For this reason the empirical research that informed the thesis 
was based on a set of epistemological principles designed to enable me to undertake an 
Indigenous emancipatory methodology, the key principles of which are set out in the 
following section:   
 
The Underlying Principles of an Indigenous Emancipatory Methodology 
Objectivity is the process of taking a position 
Nagel (1986: 7) argues that “[t]he limit of objectivity... is one that follows directly from 
the process of gradual detachment by which objectivity is achieved”.  In comparison, 
Agozino argues that to ensure objectivity within social inquiry presupposes 
positionality, which Agozino (2003: 163) described as “the procedure of taking a 
position without concealing or distorting oppositions to the position taken”.  Thus, 
within Agozino’s schema, the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity, in terms of how 
one positions themselves in the research context, are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.  As Deutscher (1983: 2) explains, “[e]very detachment is another kind of 
involvement – the idea of complete objectivity as complete detachment is a complete 
fraud”.  Rather than seeking gradual or even total detachment (if that is indeed possible) 
from the social context within which my research took place, instead I sought to speak 
with empirical authority about the life-world of Indigenous peoples by purposely 
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standing within the social context of their lived experience.  Objectivity was ‘achieved’ by 
the fact that I, as a criminologist and social researcher, was an ‘outsider’ through the fact 
that I was not Stolo, was not a practitioner or Stolo justice, or indeed was not of the 
same Iwi (tribe) of the majority of Maori interviewed, or worked for the social service 
organisations to which they belonged.  ‘Positionality’ came from choosing to engage 
directly with my participants in the design phase, the engagement phase and the data 
collection phases of the research.  The position taken was of a researcher politically 
committed to the cause of enhancing Indigenous peoples’ self-determined practice 
within the realm of justice (see below).  
 
Objectivity does not preclude advocacy or politics 
As Agozino (2003: 166) states “[i]t is always good for those who have a voice to speak 
up for the silenced rather than hide behind the mask of scientific objectivity to speak 
only about silences”.  He further indicates that the process of advocacy must involve 
engagement with the Other because “... it will be even more commendable for scholars 
to speak in solidarity with the oppressed rather than simply speak for them as their 
silence implies voicelessness” (ibid: 166, emphasis Agozino’s).   
 
All research is political 
The committed objectivity upon which this thesis is based recognises the political bases 
of all research.  As Agozino (2003: 167) argues “[s]ocial scientists may pretend that they 
are studying race relations... with point-of-viewlessness, but their findings eventually 
inform political practices of different tendencies”.  The empirical material contained in 
this thesis is political in that it 1) derives from my own preconceived bias, namely as a 
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Indigenous political activist and as an Indigenous scholar who rejects the notion that 
social inquiry must derive from a ‘pure objectivity’, 2) privileges the perspectives, 
experiences and issues of Indigenous peoples, 3) critically analyses the activities of the 
powerful, such as policy makers, criminologists, and criminal justice institutions; and 4) 
offers solutions to criminological and policy praxis that empowers Indigenous peoples 
in their struggle for self-determination.   
 
The Focus of the Research 
The methodology discussed in the following section was designed to enable the 
researcher to explore the following broad questions: 
1. What techniques of neutralisation and control if any, are employed by the policy 
sector in its attempts to deal with the wicked problems of Indigenous over-
representation and resistance? 
2. What part does criminology/the academy play, if any, in the settler-colonial state’s 
war of manoeuvre against Indigenous self-determination in the realm of justice? 
3. How has the settler-colonial state responded to Indigenous challenges to, and 
resistance of, its hegemony over justice? 
4. What effect, if any, is the expansion of a globalised crime control market having on 
indigenous peoples in neo-colonial jurisdictions?   
 
Methodology and Methods 
The process of engagement 
A number of methods were employed to support the development of the thesis.  In line 
with the principles of an Indigenous Emancipatory Methodology outlined previously, the 
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methods employed were designed to facilitate in-depth engagement with Indigenous 
justice practitioners, researchers, scholars and programme providers.  The material is 
also informed by significant correspondence (via phone, email and skype, as well as 
face-to-face meetings) with a number of non-Indigenous, critical scholars from various 
countries, colleagues with long histories of researching with Indigenous peoples.  As 
such, much of the work contained in the thesis was informed by participants’ first-hand 
experiences of the workings of the criminal justice systems deployed in settler-colonial 
societies.  Their views and experiences were also sought on the Academy’s response to 
Indigenous justice activism, knowledge production, and of Indigenous justice processes, 
both ‘traditional’ and/or imported from external, globalised sources.   
 
It was not the purpose of the research to focus on the performance of state functionaries 
in developing Indigenous-specific crime control policies or interventions.  The focus 
instead was on general issues that arise from the politics of crime control, namely the 
impact of the globalisation of crime control interventions on Indigenous peoples 
residing in settler-colonial societies; and the role of criminology and the wider academy, 
in the continued subjugation of Indigenes through their ongoing support for 
authoritative criminal justice (Tauri, 2014a).   
 
The engagement setting 
The participants 
The views and experiences of research participants from Canada (specifically, the Stó:lo 
First Nation of the Fraser Valley, British Columbia), New Zealand, Australia and the US 
informed the eight papers included the thesis.  Research participants were selected 
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either by the researcher or a relevant organisation, such as an Elders’ Council.  The 
selection criteria was based on their knowledge of and/or involvement in Indigenous 
justice practice, Indigenous political activism, and/or the state’s policy development and 
implementation process. Overall, up to 60 participants took part in the study. 
 
Participants were drawn from three principle ‘justice communities’, namely: 
 Members of Indigenous communities/Iwi (tribes) especially those involved in 
responding to social harm in indigenous communities, including practitioners, 
providers and activist/academics (32 individuals in total).  For example, the paper 
on the globalisation of restorative justice was directly informed by the experiences 
of members of the Stó:lo First Nation, in particular the impact of the inter-
jurisdictional transfer of the Family Group Conferencing (FGC) forum on their 
justice aspirations and practices as they sought to resurrect their own traditional 
processes.  Similarly, the experiences of Indigenous and critical, non-Indigenous 
academics and researchers from New Zealand and Canada were canvassed to 
inform development of the critical analysis of the impact of the academy’s ethics 
processes on the development, ownership and dissemination of Indigenous 
knowledge.   
 Members of the academic community and researchers from Canada and New 
Zealand whose research and activism focuses on state delivery of criminal justice 
services to Indigenous communities, and state responses to Indigenous justice 
activism and scholarship (18 individuals in total).  Engagement with this 
community focused on their experiences of the development of crime control 
policies and interventions and transfer between jurisdictions and the impact of 
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this activity on Indigenes; and the impact of academic research ethics processes on 
the development and dissemination of Indigenous knowledge.   
 Government officials: involved in the development of policies and interventions 
focused on Indigenous offending and victimisation were interviewed to inform the 
papers on authoritarian criminology and the globalisation of crime control 
products, such as the FGC (10 individuals in total).  Interviews were carried out 
with policy workers in New Zealand and Canada.  Engagement with this group 
focused on: 
 the rationale behind the development of crime control policies and 
interventions, particularly those aimed at Indigenous peoples; and 
 their views on, and/or experiences of the transfer and importation of crime 
control products across jurisdictions. 
 
Research methods 
A number of research techniques will be utilised to enable information related to the 
key questions/themes of the project: 
 
Individual, unstructured qualitative interviews:  Were used to record the experiences of 
key informants who preferred to be engaged with as individuals (as opposed to 
participating in hui/focus groups).  The interviews were conducted using a narrative 
style based on a semi-structured schedule built upon key themes, rather than a list of 
closed, restrictive questions.  This technique is considered more appropriate for 
engaging with Indigenous elders, academics and practitioners (see Smith, 1999), 
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although altered slightly for interviews with non-indigenous public servants.  In total 26 
individual interviews were carried out during the research from 2010 to 2013. 
 
Focus group/hui: Were employed where necessary and appropriate.  Engagement with 
Indigenous participants combined individual interviews (in the case of academics, 
researchers and political commentators) and hui (for engagement with providers, 
practitioners, Elders’ Councils, etc).  The engagement with the Stó:lo First Nation 
followed the tikanga (values or rules) set by elders/elder councils and, therefore, 
privileged a hui-type form for gathering data (see Haig-Brown and Archibald (1996); 
Rigney (1999) for discussion of the development of appropriate, empowerment-focused 
research engagement techniques with Canadian and other Indigenous peoples).  In all, 
twelve focus groups/hui were held with Indigenous Elders’, practitioners and 
community members.  Some of the focus groups were purposely arranged for the study, 
while others were arranged for other reasons (Indigenous business, conferencing 
related to social harm, etc), and to which the researcher was invited to participate. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is made up of three parts that contain the substantive materials (Parts II, III 
and IV), and an appendices (Part V): 
 
Part II – Conceptual and theoretical discussion 
This section provides an introduction to the primary conceptual and theoretical 
framework for the thesis.  It brings together the key arguments and findings into a 
coherent whole and analyses in detail the colonial projects formulated and utilised in 
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settler-colonial societies that impede the ability of Indigenous peoples to achieve a 
measure of self-determination in the justice sphere.   
 
Part III – Published papers 
This section presents the eight published papers that make up the thesis; including: 
 
Paper 1: Criminal Justice as a Colonial Project in Contemporary Settler-Colonialism 
This paper offers an Indigenous-centred, critical perspective on the colonial projects 
(Thomas, 1994) employed in settler-colonial contexts to negate, or at the very least 
nullify, the negative impact of two inter-related wicked problems that are deemed 
peculiar to these jurisdictions: the high levels of Indigenous over-representation in the 
criminal justice system, and the impact of Indigenous resistance to the hegemony of the 
imposed, criminal justice systems deployed by settler-colonial states.  The paper is 
comprised of three inter-related parts; the first two outline the construction and 
deployment of colonial projects in the colonial and neo-colonial contexts, wherein it is 
argued that the matrix of criminal justice was foundational to the state’s attempted 
eradication of, and eventual socio-economic marginalisation of Indigenous peoples.  The 
final part offers an argument that the continued success of criminal justice as a 
(neo)colonial project, stems from its parasitic relationship with the discipline of 
criminology.  Together, these supportive colonial projects deployment against 
Indigenous peoples demonstrate that structural violence continues to be a significant 
component of social control in the neo-liberal, neo-colonial context.   
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Paper 2: Indigenous Critique of Authoritarian Criminology 
Biko Agozino (2010: i) has described the discipline of criminology as “a ‘control-freak’”; 
one whose imperialist reasoning is most evident when supporting “the [contemporary 
states] exercise of internal colonialism and neo-colonialism” within settler-colonial 
societies.  In recent times the development of supposed evidence-based crime control 
policy throughout Western jurisdictions appears to have reinvigorated administrative 
criminological formations to the extent that they once again dominate policy discourse 
relating to the issues of Indigenous over-representation and critique of the operations 
of criminal justice.  This paper seeks to explore this state of affairs by firstly, providing a 
critical examination of the role criminology plays in the continued neo-colonial 
subjugation of Indigenous peoples and secondly, the role that myth construction and 
maintenance plays in the hegemonic activities of a particularly authoritarian form of the 
discipline.  A critical analysis of two articles from a recent Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Criminology special edition on Aboriginal violence (2010) highlights the core 
features and, arguably, the key failings of this authoritarian criminology in relation to its 
response to Indigenous justice issues: namely a preference for undertaking research on 
instead of with Indigenous peoples, the privileging non-engaging research 
methodologies and the potent use of myth to promote practitioners’ views of the world 
and silence the Indigenous voice.   
 
Paper 3: A Critical Appraisal of Responses to Māori Offending 
This article critically analyses the role that criminological theory and specific policy 
formulations of culture play in the New Zealand state’s response to the over-
representation of Māori in the criminal justice system.  Part one provides an overview of 
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the changing criminological explanations of and responses to, Māori offending in New 
Zealand from the 1980s onwards and how these understandings continued colonialist 
approaches to Māori and crime, into the neo-colonial context.  In particular we chart the 
shift in policy development from theorising Māori offending as attributable to loss of 
cultural identity, to a focus on socio-economic and institutional antecedents and finally 
through the risk factors, assessment and criminogenic needs approaches that have 
gained prominence in the current policy context.  In part two the focus moves to the 
strategies employed by members of the academy to elevate their own epistemological 
constructions of Māori social reality within the policy development process.  In 
particular, the critique scrutinises recent attempts to portray Indigenous responses to 
social harm as unscientific and in part responsible for the continuing over-
representation of Māori in New Zealand’s criminal justice system.  The purpose of this 
analysis is to focus the critical, criminological gaze firmly on the activities of policy 
makers and administrative criminologists in relation to Māori as Indigenous peoples 
 
Paper 4: An Indigenous, Critical Commentary on the Globalisation of Restorative Justice 
The study and impact of the globalisation of crime control policies and interventions has 
recently begun to receive significant attention from critical indigenous scholars.  
Reasons for the increased focus on this issue include the restorative justice industry’s 
increasing utilisation of so-called indigenous philosophies and practices in the design of 
its various products; the pervasive use of indigenousness imagery, and emphasis on the 
supposed 'indigenousness' of the industry's products, as displayed in much of its 
marketing material.  A further motivation is the increasing popularity of supposedly 
indigenous-inspired restorative justice initiatives, in settler-colonial societies and 
29 
 
increasingly throughout Western jurisdictions experiencing significant over-
representation of minorities in their criminal justice systems.  The purpose of this paper 
is to provide an Indigenous critique of the globalisation of restorative justice and the 
industry’s utilisation of indigenous practices, symbols and philosophies.  The paper 
focuses on the impact that the international transfer of restorative products is having on 
relationships between Indigenous peoples and central governments in neo-colonial 
jurisdictions, particularly New Zealand and Canada, especially Indigenous peoples drive 
for greater self-determination in these jurisdictions. 
 
Paper 5: Resisting Condescending Research Ethics in Aotearoa New Zealand 
Indigenous commentators have long expressed concerns with the impact upon them 
and their communities, of the research-related activities of government agencies and 
academic institutions.  More recently, the critical Indigenous gaze has focused upon the 
activities of Research Ethics Board’s (REB) and their members.  Specific concerns 
include the preference of REBs for Eurocentric conceptualisations of what does/does 
not constitute ethical research conduct, and the privilege accorded liberal notions of the 
autonomous individual participant at the expense of communitarian approaches to 
ethical conduct and knowledge construction.  Informed by the author’s reflections on 
the REB process, those of Indigenous Canadian and New Zealand research participants, 
and the extant literature, this paper begins by critiquing the processes employed by 
New Zealand REBs to assess Indigenous-focused or Indigenous-led research in the 
criminological realm, before ending with a call for Indigenous peoples to resist the 
condescending ethos of the Academy’s ethics processes, by developing REBs that work 
for the self-determination for their peoples.   
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Paper 6: Ritual and the Social Dynamics of Policy Making in New Zealand 
This paper focuses on the activities of the Policy Industry for the following reasons; i) 
the industry has the ability to significantly impact on our lives through its close 
relationship with Cabinet, the development of legislation and access to extensive 
budgets for policy development and implementation; and ii) to demystify the 
mythological world policy makers encapsulate themselves within.  I attempt to do this 
by referring to specific case studies based on inter-agency projects I participated in over 
the past decade in the crime control policy sector.  
 
Paper 7: The Waitangi Tribunal and the Regulation of Māori Protest 
Much of the current academic and political discourse related to the development and 
operations of the Waitangi Tribunal over its first twenty years portray it as a forum that 
provided Māori with a meaningful avenue for settling Treaty grievances compared to 
the formal legal systems performance in the preceding 100 years.  In contrast, we argue 
that from its inception and throughout much of the 1980s, the Waitangi Tribunal 
functioned primarily as an informal justice forum that assisted the New Zealand state’s 
regulation of Māori Treaty activism during the transition from a Fordist to a Post-
Fordist mode of capital accumulation.   
 
Paper 8: The Politics of Gang Research in New Zealand 
Like many other Western jurisdictions over the past sixty years, New Zealand has had to 
contend with episodes of moral panic regarding the activities of youth gangs.  The most 
recent episode occurred in 2005-2007 and was spurred by a perceived escalation in 
inter-gang conflict and violence in the Counties Manukau areas within greater Auckland, 
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New Zealand.  This particular episode was unique in the New Zealand context for the 
level of attention given to youth gangs by the government and policy makers.  This 
paper reports on the authors’ experiences of carrying out research on the youth gang 
situation in Counties Manukau as part of an inter-agency project to develop a response 
to gang-related violence.  Particular attention is paid to the ways in which government 
officials attempted to mould the research process and findings to suit an already 
emerging policy framework, predicated on supporting ‘business as usual’, at the 
expense of research participants  stated desire for great autonomy to develop and 
delivery appropriate youth services to their communities. 
 
Part IV – Discussion 
This section provides an overview of the linkages between the eight papers and how, 
collectively they meet the aims of the thesis. 
 
Part V – Appendices 
This part provides evidence of permission to include published papers, of peer review, 
and statements from co-authors.   
 
Significance of the Thesis 
The significance of this thesis can be summarised as follows: First, the thesis examines 
topics that were previously unexplored, underdeveloped, or analysed using research 
that did not involve direct engagement with Indigenous peoples and their experiences.  
For example, to date, little of the criminological literature on globalisation explores the 
Indigenous experience.  As such, this thesis offers one of the first empirically informed 
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works on two interrelated issues with the contemporary globalisation of crime control 
policy, and the increasing development of markets for crime control products.  
Employing an Indigenous Emancipatory Methodology the paper utilises the real world 
experiences of Indigenous peoples to demonstrate the nefarious impacts of the 
globalisation of crime control policies and products, especially those emanating from 
the expanding restorative justice market.  Despite the fact that most of those involved in 
this industry and plying their policies and franchised programmes on the globalised 
market are not Indigenous, nevertheless they regularly use Indigenous cultural artefacts 
in the design and, most importantly, to market their products (Tauri, 2009b; 2014c). 
 
Second, another original feature of this thesis is its attention to the intersection of the 
criminal justice sector and academic criminology, and the impact this relationship has 
on Indigenous peoples residing in settler-colonial jurisdictions.  Again, little literature 
has been developed, especially from within the discipline, that focuses critically on this 
important policy intersection.  As one of the few criminologists to write on this subject, 
Biko Agozino (2003; 2004) has demonstrated that not only is the relationship parasitic 
and self-serving but also rarely is it of value to Indigenous peoples.  And perhaps more 
importantly, the discipline has a significant historical blind spot, namely its lack of 
acknowledgement of the role it played in the colonial subjugation of Indigenous 
peoples.   
 
The papers contained in this thesis titled ‘Indigenous Critique of Authoritarian 
Criminology’ and ‘Criminal Justice as a Colonial Project in Contemporary Settler-
Colonialism’, carry on the key theme of the intersection of the justice system and the 
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human sciences in developing what Thomas (1994) called colonial projects; 
technologies of social control deployed by the state that facilitate the ongoing 
subjugation and criminalisation of Indigenous peoples in the settler-colonial context.  
The papers further demonstrate that the discipline itself has an important, and 
potentially damaging contemporary blind spot, namely the role many of its 
practitioners play in silencing the Indigenous experience of criminal justice, through the 
privileging of Eurocentric theories, and control of academic institutions of the research 
context, especially what does/does not constitute appropriate research ethics.   
 
And thirdly, a further significance of the thesis might at first glance appear to be more of 
a weakness, namely the seemingly eclectic range of issues covered in the eight papers.  
In fact the eclectic range of issues covered throughout the papers is purposeful, for it 
demonstrates the array of colonial projects, technologies of control, policies, strategies 
and so forth, that are arraigned against Indigenous peoples in the settler-colonial 
context, and especially within the grand colonial project of criminal justice.   
 
The papers are grouped into three interrelated sections: the first, represented by Paper 
1, provides a theoretical and conceptual argument that the criminal justice system, in 
partnership with the discipline of criminology produces a range of colonial projects that 
further the settler-colonial states subjugation of Indigenous peoples.  Section two is 
made of Papers 2, 3, 4 and 5.  The common conceptual thread linking them is a critical 
focus on the strategies of disempowerment deployed against Indigenous peoples and 
their knowledge by the academy, ranging from criminology’s silencing of the Indigenous 
voice by restricting access to the policy making process, through to attempts to 
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delegitimise Indigenous knowledge by controlling definitions of right and ethical 
conduct through institutional (western) research ethics processes that sideline 
communitarian approaches to determining ethical conduct and informed consent, and 
finally to the use of Indigenous cultural artefacts to sell Eurocentric crime control 
products on globalised crime control markets.  Lastly, section three offers papers 6, 7 
and 8, all of which provide case studies that demonstrate how the state sector 
subjugates Indigenous peoples through the process of policy development; whether 
through the construction of judicial processes that corral Indigenous critique within 
informal justice mechanisms, or deploying ritual and myth to control policy 
development for social issues of significance to Indigenous peoples, such as youth 
justice and gang-related crime.  The criticism of eclecticism, if made, has some validity.  
In response we argue that they appear eclectic because of the very fact the state and the 
academy deploy a range of colonial projects to ensure their domination of the definition 
of and response to, the social issues facing Indigenous peoples.  
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PART II 
 
Conceptual and Theoretical Discussion 
 
Criminal Justice and the Academy’s Response to Indigenous Peoples: A 
Counter-Colonial Critique 
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Introduction 
 
Security?  Culture?  The rule of law?  In the meantime, I look around and wherever 
there are colonisers’ and colonised face to face, I see force, brutality, cruelty, 
sadism, conflict, and, in parody of education, the hasty manufacture of a few 
thousand subordinate functionaries. 
                                                                                                                        Caesaire (1972: 21). 
 
It has been argued that law and justice in contemporary western societies reflect the 
subjectivity and epistemology of the dominant culture, or more specifically of white, 
wealthy men (Ramsley and Marchetti, 200).  This dominant subjectivity has also been 
presented as both the object and the subject of the law/justice nexus.  It is the object in 
that it is he whose behaviour and sensibilities that the law has in mind when it 
assembles its proscriptions and remedies.  It is his perception of what constitutes a just 
response to a social harm that dominates the development of policies, legislation and 
‘effective’ interventions.  And, perhaps most importantly, it is this subject who 
constructs the law itself (Fitzpatrick, 1992; Hudson, 2006).  Some have argued that 
through its discourse, practices and mythologies, criminal justice in Western, settler-
colonial contexts continually invokes and reproduces white, masculine subjectivity of 
both ‘the law ‘and the proper maintenance of social order (Agozino, 2004; Fitzpatrick, 
1992; Naffine, 1990).   
 
The case that western criminal justice is white man’s justice (or at least the white, 
middle class male perception of ‘it’) is sufficiently well established in criminology and 
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legal scholarship that it need not to be re-litigated in detail here.  Suffice to say that the 
general charges brought against conventional western criminal justice systems with 
regards responses to the issue of difference, (be it related to cultural practices, ethnicity 
and so on) is that they all too often fail to protect members of minority ethnic groups 
and Indigenes from harms they experience by virtue of their ethnicity and/or their 
colonised status (Cunneen, 2005; Jackson, 1992; Tauri, 2011b).  Furthermore, 
considerable evidence exists that demonstrates that settler-colonial justice systems are 
significant players in the ongoing subjugation of Indigenous peoples, minorities, 
immigrants, and other groups defined by the state as sufficiently ‘Other’, or potentially 
menacing to the social fabric, to warrant significant surveillance from the institutions of 
crime control (Anthony, 2013; Tauri, 2013c; Wacquant, 2009).  It is further argued that 
minorities, immigrants and Indigenous peoples are discriminated against because they 
are often over-penalised for indiscretions compared to non-Indigenous groups 
(Cunneen, 2006; Harris, 1999; Kitossa, 2014).  A primary cause of this discriminatory 
practice are the influence of historical, but still powerful perceptions that Indigenes lack 
the core characteristics of white, middle class masculinity (Cunneen, 2005) in much the 
same way that feminist theorists have argued that women are (see Drucilla, 1991; 
Smart, 1990). 
 
Critics of western criminal justice systems point out that law treats Indigenous peoples 
in the same way that dominant society treats them: law cannot be expected to remedy 
injustices legally before they are recognised as injustices socially (Jackson, 1992).  We 
might view this process at work in the length of time it has taken for racialised or 
ethnicised harms to be taken seriously by law.  More often than not, legal/criminal 
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justice progress occurs in response to demands from Indigenous social movements, and 
the commentaries and actions of Indigenous organic intellectuals, those individuals who 
straddle the academic and political contexts and seek to provide empirical gravitas to 
Indigenous radicalism (Poata-Smith, 1996).  While law/justice can be on the side of 
progressive social movements, and while one could point to some instances where 
law/justice has achieved some success in bringing about progressive change, the 
law/justice processes applied in settler-colonial contexts have rarely led progressive 
movements, but simply acted upon or reacted to them (Fitzpatrick, 1992).   
 
Moving from documenting injustices to looking at the roots of these injustices in the 
constructions of law/justice and the liberal philosophies on which western law is based, 
reveals the closures of law/justice and the limits of justice that can be expected.  With 
regard to the situation of women, MacKinnon (1991) has argued that liberal justice only 
provides redress for women who can demonstrate that they are ‘the same’ as men, or at 
least the same as white, middle class men.  Women who are ‘like men’ will be treated 
equally with men by law when it is asked to redress harms or claim rights to those 
aspects in which they have established themselves as the same.  For example, 
professional women doing the same work as male colleagues have a reasonable chance 
of success in bringing complaints against unequal pay.  On the other hand, aspects of 
their lives and personalities in which they are not perceived as the same as men will not 
receive equal treatment or redress for harms.  Thus, it has been more difficult for 
women to gain rights relating to their bodies rather than to property or life in the public 
sphere.  Abortion rights, fertility rights, maternity rights, and rights that provide redress 
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for sexual and other forms of gendered violence, remain contested and only partially 
available (Lacey, 1998, Savell, 2002).   
 
The response of law/justice systems to Indigenous peoples residing in settler-colonial 
contexts is comparable in many ways to the treatment of (white, western and other) 
women in this regard: in order to gain the rights and remedies for wrongdoing they 
have to demonstrate that they are ‘the same’ as white men.  And, in recognition of the 
class-based foundations of capitalist law, they must be the same (or near enough) to 
white, middle class men in attitude, conduct and ‘breeding’ (Barak et al, 2001; Mann, 
1993).  Again, professionals or property-owners who suffer harms or injustices in 
relation to these attributes (for example, discrimination in the work place, burglary and 
robbery) will find themselves supported by the law (at least in principle).  However, 
when Indigenous demands for justice concern acts or omissions directly related to their 
indigeneity and status as Indigenous peoples, these demands are more often than not 
contested, marginalised or ignored (Fitzpatrick, 1992; Tauri and Webb, 2011).  Justice 
is, therefore, too often confined to issues or episodes in which Indigenous claimants are 
‘like white men’ in their mode of being in the world.  
 
For Indigenous peoples and other ethnic minorities residing in Western jurisdictions 
such as the United States, this means that there were no rights extended to slavery 
because the conditions of slavery were unlike the conditions of white male free citizens 
(Agozino, 2003).  Law specified and regulated the rights of slave-owners, but as Patricia 
Williams (1991: 154) remarked, “the legal system did not provide blacks, even freed 
blacks, with structured expectations, promises or reasonable reliance’s of any sort”.  In 
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the colonial context, the laws protecting the land rights of free white men were not 
extended to Indigenous peoples whose customary land ownership practices were 
undermined by an economic system designed to finance individuals.  Disregard for 
Indigenous peoples’ beliefs and practices relating to land tenure was the norm, and laws 
enabling settlers to take land at will were passed with regularity in the colonial contexts 
of New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the US (see, Belich, 1995; Churchill, 1997 and 
Pratt, 1992).   
 
As demonstrated in Papers 2 and 6 of this thesis (Tauri, 2013c and Tauri, 2015), as 
western societies supposedly became more responsive to Indigenous demands for self-
determination, attempts to remedy these have further demonstrated the white-
maleness of law and criminal justice, and therefore the importance of this sphere of 
policy for the continued hegemony of settler-colonial government.  These responses 
further highlight the limits of the justice that can be obtained by subordinated social 
groupings in the settler-colonial context.  Criminal justice responses to sexual and 
domestic violence, for example, reveal the dependence of law on stereotypes of male 
and female sexual roles (rape/consensual sex); and dependence on the idea of the 
behaviour of ‘the reasonable man’ (provocation/self-defence) further illustrates the 
(white)maleness of criminal law (O’Donovan, 1993).  Similarly, wavering over 
definitions of racial crimes and differences in sentencing attributable to the ethnicity of 
victims further demonstrate the entrenched whiteness of criminal law in settler-
colonial (and most other western) jurisdictions (Cunneen, 2006).  Critical race theorists 
have demonstrated that the racialisation of crime, the criminalisation of, and the 
discriminatory sentencing and lack of serious legal response to attacks on the persons 
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and property of minorities, are, at base, structural.  In other words the racialised 
practices of crime control agencies do not emanate from individual jurists’ racist beliefs 
or the actions of ‘a few bad apples’ within the police, but primarily from the ideological 
constructs that drive institutional culture and practice (Hall 1980; Jackson, 1988; 1992; 
Schur, 2002). 
 
In the following section we discuss the processes through which white man’s law was 
imposed upon Indigenous peoples in the colonial context and seek to uncover the 
various colonial projects utilised by policy makers - and criminologists - to impose the 
colonial will upon the Indigenous context.  In turn this section lays the foundation for 
identifying the colonial projects that form the basis of the role played by contemporary 
criminal justice in the continued subjugation of Indigenous peoples residing in settler-
colonial societies.   
 
The Imposition of Criminal Justice and Settler-Colonial Subjugation 
 
Colonisation is always lethal to the colonised. 
                                  Oliver (1995: 19). 
 
Prior to colonialism and the insertion of a capitalist mode of production within 
Indigenous contexts, the unification of social production and social cohesion was 
achieved within relatively small, localised communities (Fitzpatrick, 1992).  During the 
growth of capitalism this organic unity was dissolved through the destruction of pre-
capitalist production units and relations of dependence.  In time they were replaced by 
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the laws of the market and the phantom objectivity of the capitalist state and western 
modes of law (Spitzer, 1982).  It was this centralised form of legality and mode of 
production that was forced upon Indigenous peoples during the colonisation process 
(Agozino, 2004).  The part played by the imposition of European law and criminal 
justice on the process of colonial subjugation of Indigenes cannot be overstated.  By the 
end of the nineteenth century Indigenous control of traditional justice processes had all 
but ceased across all colonial contexts (Griffiths, 1993; Pratt, 1992; Rogers, 1987; Ward, 
1995).  During the European and American imperialism of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, Eurocentric legal systems were superimposed on large regions of 
Africa (Abel, 1979; Chanock, 1978; Okoth-Ogenda, 1979), the Americas (La Prairie, 
1992) and the Pacific region (Brennan, 1993; Cunneen, 2005; Fitzpatrick, 1980; 
Hazelhurst, 1995; Pospisil, 1979 and Ward, 1995).  We might refer to this era as the first 
wave of the globalisation of Western crime control.  The second, which is taking place 
now, provides the focus for the fourth paper included in this thesis (see Tauri, 2014a).   
 
The imposition of European law and institutions of crime control played a significant 
part in the colonisation process, especially as they were often deployed to “civilise and 
enlighten colonised peoples; to reshape their family lives, work habits, land ownership 
practices, and ways of handling conflicts” (Merry, 1992).  European law and criminal 
justice were, therefore, important projects in the colonialist drive for hegemony over 
the settler context (see Tauri, 2014c; and discussion below).  Later, they provided 
significant support for the attempted eradication of cultural and social differences as 
various settler societies moved into the assimilationist era of ‘late colonialism’ (Gadacz, 
1987). 
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While each colonising power inevitably wants its form of governance, its hegemony, to 
prevail, there was no one colonial response to existing indigenous processes for dealing 
with social harm.  Responses varied according to time, location, and the people who 
were driving colonisation and those being colonised.  As some exponents of post-
colonialism contend, the colonial process is not a fixed one.  It is a process is by 
necessity, malleable; able to be altered or redirected to suit the prevailing socio-political 
and geographical conditions.  Indeed colonialism, and its successor neo-colonialism, is 
best described as “a structure[s], not an event”  (Wolfe, 1999: 163), one that is made up 
of hegemonic projects that arise from the ensuing conflict between the forces of 
colonisation and Indigenous peoples resistance to it (Proulx, 2001; Tauri, 2014c; see 
discussion below).   
 
The negative other - the colonialist construction of Indigenous criminality 
One of the significant features of the colonialist the imposition of supposedly ‘liberal’ 
western crime control systems, was the degree to which Indigenous peoples and their 
justice processes were excluded.  Critics of liberalism point out that the exclusions and 
closures of liberal justice are not accidental oversights, but are inevitable because of the 
impact of liberal political philosophy.  Said (1978, 1993) and Gilroy (1993) point out 
that liberalism needs the irrational, uncivilised, black, oriental and Indigenous Other 
who is delineated by their lack of everything that supposedly distinguishes the 
reasonable ‘man’ of Western socio-legal mythology.  The Other is defined by their lack of 
democratic governance, their religious, custom-centred rather than rational legal 
systems, their lack of adherence to Western notions of human rights and their lack of 
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scientific achievement: in other words, they are distinguished by their lack of 
enlightenment (Smith, 1999).  The narratives which construct this Otherness, these 
‘natives without rational law’ were crucial for justifying hegemonic planned acts of 
subjugation, such as colonialism and slavery (Fitzpatrick, 1992).  They were also 
important for the constitution of the Western subject’s idea (ideal) of (his/her) self-
identity.  As argued earlier, liberalism recognises claims to justice made by those who 
demonstrate their possession of the qualities of the liberal (white, middle class male) 
subject.  Each subject must suppress his/her inherent traits of Otherness (the child 
and/or the savage within) to demonstrate that he/she is one of the civilised, and not a 
‘native’ (Velverde, 1996). 
 
Arguably, the creation of the Other, he/she who sits outside the constituency of justice 
because of his/her supposed racialised deficiencies, is a linguistic necessity.  The binary 
structure of our language means that we tend to recognise or define one thing by 
contrast with it’s supposed opposite.  The imperative of the negative (Indigenous) Other 
demonstrates that liberal societies are constantly producing and reproducing divisions; 
between the rational and irrational, the deserving and undeserving (welfare recipient, 
victim, etc), the civilised and the uncivilised1.  As settler-colonial societies move, 
theoretically at least, towards more equal citizenship in broad notions of ethnic, gender 
and sexual difference, new distinctions may open up between groups within populations 
residing in the nation-state.  Immigrants or refugees who accept the Australian, 
                                                          
1  Durkheim (1985) makes a similar argument when he talks of the necessity of crime for the positive 
functioning of modern society.  According to Durkheim, crime is a sign of a healthy society, one based on 
mutual obligation and recognition of a set framework of norms.  Legitimation of these norms is aided by 
the construction of outsiders; deviants who, through society’s negative response to their rule breaking, 
highlights for all, the negative ramifications of breaking social norms.   
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Canadian, New Zealand, or more broadly the Western, civilised way of life are 
distinguished in positive terms from those who do not: followers of non-Christian 
religions are divided into the moderate and the fanatical and, in the post-9/11 era, 
foreign nations are divided into the democratic and the anti-democratic (‘for US’, or 
‘against US’).  To move beyond white man’s justice, new models must be able to dissolve 
the logic of identity; the logic by which justice will only be possible if claims are based 
on being the same as the mythological white, male, reasonable person of law.  To begin 
this process, we must start by critiquing white man’s law and related Eurocentric 
conceptualisations of what is/is not social harm and how best to/not to respond to ‘it’.  
And, as criminal justice is a fundamental ingredient in the construction of the social 
Other (see Becker, 1963 and Dotter, 2004) in the colonial context, any critical analysis 
of settler-colonialism must be informed by an Indigenous critical standpoint at injects 
the Indigenous perspective into the process. 
 
Until now, much of the critique of liberalism, and the law, has come from critical schools 
of (Western) theory; radical criminology, left realism, Marxist criminology and various 
forms of feminist criminology.  To date there has been little concentrated critique of 
liberalism, or law and of criminal justice based on a critical Indigenous perspective.  
Because of this, other, mostly non-indigenous voices have spoken on our behalf about 
‘our’ experiences and perspectives (see Tauri, 2013c for a thorough discussion of this 
issue)2.  Some, including Chris Cunneen, Thalia Anthony and Harry Blagg in the 
Australian context, have produced exemplary work that demonstrates the power of 
                                                          
2  Tauri (2013c, 2015) contends that much of the criminological literature on indigenous/ethnic minority 
issues originates from government sponsored research.  More often than not indigenous participants 
have had little input into the development of the methodology, analysis and dissemination, and rarely 
do they have direct input into policies and interventions that result from said research.   
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emancipatory research, especially when our experiences form the basis of the work.  
Unfortunately, more often than not the work of non-Indigenous scholars is created 
without our input, with the resulting material reflecting the views of the white middle 
class academics and the policy sector of the supposed Indigenous problem (see Deckert, 
2014; Tauri, 2013c).  Sometimes the approach and resulting publications take what 
Tauri (2013c) and Tauri and Webb (2012) call an authoritarian criminological stance, 
an epistemological and methodological position seemingly driven by a colonialist, 
paternalistic sense of duty to protect the native, mostly from ourselves.  Unfortunately, 
while practitioners are willing to uncover the psycho-social determinants of Indigenous 
crime (especially of the violent kind), they too often ignore the structural, violent, 
disempowering actions of the settler-colonial state to which they often lend their 
expertise.  To counter the white maleness of so much criminological musings on the 
Indigenous problem, we must construct our own theory of colonialism and analysis of 
the colonial projects that make the hegemony of white law possible in this, the settler-
colonial context.   
 
Constructing a Theory of Social Control in Settler-Colonial Contexts 
 
The dominant discourse on globalisation is the history of the winners, told by the 
winners. 
                          de Sousa Santos (2006: 395).  
 
In support of the Indigenous emancipatory methodology that drove this thesis, theory 
must be made to work for the Other, and utilised in such a way as to give authority to 
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the experiences of those too often silenced.  Such as approach sits in contrast to the 
grand theorising of the European academy where: 
 
The Other is cited, quoted, framed, illuminated, encased in the shot/reverse shot 
strategy of serial enlightenment.  Narrative and the cultural politics of difference 
become the closed circle of interpretation.  The Other loses its power to signify, to 
negate, to initiate its own historic desire, to establish its own institutional and 
oppositional discourse.  However impeccably the content of an ‘other’ culture may 
be known, however anti-ethnocentrically it is represented, it is its location as the 
closure of grand theories, the demand that, in analytical terms, it be always the 
good object of knowledge, the docile body of difference, that reproduces a relation 
of domination and is the most serious indictment of the institutional powers of 
critical [Eurocentric] theory (Bhabha, 1994: 46). 
 
Building on Bhabha’s argument, the purpose of this section is to provide the theoretical 
foundations through which contemporary Indigenous experiences of the imported 
criminal justice ‘systems’ that dominate settler-colonialism can be fully expressed.   
 
Colonialism or neo-colonialism? 
Throughout a number of the papers that make up this thesis, the author refers to the 
current relationship between Indigenous peoples and settler-colonial states as one that 
reflects a settler-colonial context.  In order to preface descriptions/definitions of this 
term, we must first untangle it from the on-going debate within colonial studies and 
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critical race theory with regards the relevance of the term ‘post-colonial’, as opposed to 
‘neo-colonial’, to describe the current socio-political status of settler-colonial societies. 
 
Despite limitation with the term itself, the body of work emanating from the 
Postcolonial School has had a significant impact on Indigenous scholarship.  As Paolini 
(1999: 50) writes: 
 
… one of the principle moves of postcolonialism has been to deconstruct the 
Eurocentrism of Western scholarship… in the process, postcolonialism has 
empowered the so-called subaltern or postcolonial subject in a reinscribed 
narrative of imperialism and colonialism in which [Indigenous] identity is 
recovered.  
 
Osterhammel (1997: 16-17) presents colonialism as a process through which a foreign 
power rules or seeks to rule over a particular, demographic majority, which entails: 
 
... a relationship of domination between an indigenous (or forcibly imported) 
majority and a minority of foreign invaders.  The fundamental decisions affecting 
the lives of the colonised people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers 
in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis.  Rejecting 
cultural compromises with the colonised population, the colonisers are convinced 
of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate to rule. 
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However, not all colonial contexts evolved in the same manner.  Recent scholarship 
demonstrates significant variations in the formulation of the socio-economic 
domination of Indigenous peoples (see Hopkins, 1999; Osterhammel, 1997; Veracini, 
2010).   
 
For example, Hopkins (1999: 215) differentiates between colonialism and control from 
afar (post-colonialism) compared to colonisation from within (neo or settler-
colonialism) when he writes that “... where white settlers became numerically 
predominant, colonial rule made peoples out of new states; where indigenous societies 
remained the basis of government, the state was fashioned from existing peoples”.  The 
settler-colonial phenomenon is predicated upon the domination of the Indigenous Other 
from within.  In this situation the colonisers cease being colonisers from afar and 
become ‘indigenous’ at the point that demographic majority is achieved and control of 
government and governance is attained (Veracini, 2010: 5).  Hence we have the 
colonialism at a distance model prevalent in the sub-continent and Africa (minority rule, 
Home Office policy interspersed with native social control mechanisms, administration 
via Subaltern’s) versus the settler-colonial model where colonial rule  is facilitated in 
part through imported institutions of social control such as courts, law, the legislative 
process and institutionalised policing (Wolfe, 1999).  The importation of these 
institutions is supported through the developing capitalist mode of resource extraction 
and economic regulation, and the systematic eradication of indigenous life-worlds and 
their core institutions (Braudel, 1986; Venn, 2006).  The contention here is that the 
way(s) in which social order is achieved and maintained reveals that there are clear 
distinctions between jurisdictions resulting from the form of colonialism they were 
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subjected to.  Differences are also present in the overall attitude towards Indigenous 
peoples, with colonialism at a distance characterised by an indispensability of 
indigenous bodies, in particular their labour – a master-servant relationship - compared 
to an attitude of dispensability within the settler-colonial domain emphasised in the 
following quote by Wolfe (1999: 163): 
 
The primary object of settler-colonisation is the land itself rather than the surplus 
value to be derived from mixing native labour with it.  Though, in practice, 
Indigenous labour was indispensable to Europeans, settler-colonisation is at base 
a winner-takes-all project whose dominant feature is not exploitation but 
replacement.  The logic of this project, a sustained institutional tendency to 
eliminate the Indigenous population, informs a range of historical practices that 
might otherwise appear distinct – invasion [and domination] is a structure not an 
event [emphasis added]. 
 
From the moment of first contact between Indigenous peoples and colonisers, various 
technologies of power were deployed to expedite European control of the Indigenous 
context.  During the initial phases of colonialism, military action and religion were the 
dominant strategies in the pursuit of colonial domination (de Silva, 2001).  Through 
religious conversion Indigenous peoples could be transformed from innocent but 
savage beings into “knowledgeable (proper) subjects” (ibid: 427) made ready for 
participation in a European dominated post-colonial, capitalist society (see also Tauri, 
2014b).  Moving into the latter stages of colonialism, the impact of the Enlightenment 
saw science, or more accurately the racialised application of scientific knowledge, 
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displace religion as a key strategy of colonial subjugation.  Evoking Foucault, de Silva 
asserts that power over the colonial social context requires the manipulation, 
classification and identification of bodies, and as such “…. a whole new field of science 
emerged within the ‘empty souls’ of slaves, the Indigenous, the ‘oriental’ were 
transformed into ‘racial bodies’” (ibid: 427).  It is through these technologies of power 
that the ideological authority of the coloniser over the colonised moved from 
emphasising differences in the sou,l to Darwinist-inspired ‘natural’ differences in 
biology, genetics and intellect.  While the technologies of power resulted in the 
development of different strategies of control (the church, moral-related laws, vs. anti-
association laws and the like – see discussion below of colonial projects), their socio-
political aims were similar: to provide the ideological justification for the subjugation, 
and in some instances the physical genocide, of Indigenous peoples (Tauri, 2013c; 
2014c).  
 
Colonial and settler-colonial attempts at dominating the Indigenous Other rely on a 
range of technologies, or what Thomas (1994) refers to as colonising projects (see 
Tauri, 2014c).  According to Bhabha (1994: 94-120) one such technology or project is 
stereotype, which entails the use of language and signifiers (linguistic or symbolic) that 
denote a fixity in the ideological construction and (re)presentation of the Indigenous 
Other (or indeed, of any identified ‘problem population’): “it connotes rigidity and the 
unchanging order as well as disorder, degeneracy and daemonic repetition... [it is] a 
form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is always ‘in place’, 
already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated...”.  Thus we read of 
various stereotypes of Indigenous peoples that primordialise them; representing them 
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as having unalterable states of being, whether of mind, physicality and/or social mores.  
These stereotypes are exemplified in ideological constructs such as ‘the savage Red 
Indian’, the ‘drunk Aboriginal’, the ‘sexually insatiable Black slave’, the ‘happy (but dim, 
guitar strumming) Māori’, and so on (Kidd, 1997).  The colonial project of stereotype 
transcends the physicality and intellectual boundaries of the Indigenous Other, and 
provides fixity of their supposed uncivilised beliefs, social behaviour and institutions, 
exemplified in the child-like nature of our nativistic and/or pan-theist religious systems 
(Fitzpatrick, 1992), or the quant, myth-based processes we use for responding to social 
harm (Jackson, 1992).  The part that colonial projects like stereotype play in the 
negative Othering of Indigenous peoples cannot be overestimated, for as Bhabha (1994: 
100) maintains: 
 
... colonial discourse [is] an apparatus of power and its predominant strategic 
function is the creation of a space for a ‘subject peoples’ through the production of 
knowledges in terms of which surveillance is exercised whilst seeking 
authorisation for its strategies by the production of knowledges of coloniser and 
colonised which are stereotypical but antiethically evaluated.  The objective of 
colonial discourse is to construe the colonised as a population of degenerate types on 
the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of 
administration and instruction (emphasis added). 
 
The localised and partial nature of colonial projects allows for the different impacts of 
colonialism on Indigenous peoples in settler-colonial societies, where the impacts may 
vary relating to different projects, whilst allowing for the overall impact – social and 
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cultural dislocation – to manifest (Proulx, 2003; see also Tauri, 2014c for full discussion 
of the concept of colonial projects).   
 
Historical examples of colonial projects 
As reported in Paper 1 (Tauri, 2014c), a significant project in the colonial context was 
the ‘civilising mission’, a key driver of which was the purposeful destruction of the 
native residing within the Indigenous person, and his/her replacement by the civilised, 
‘westernised’ Christian (Cunneen, 2011: 5).  The civilising mission in colonial contexts 
like New Zealand and Australia involved an ideological and policy-based pincer 
movement involving education and religious institutions.  Over time, colonial education 
policies forbade the teaching of Indigenous culture and language, policies given 
particular potency with the advent of Mission Schools and the forced removal of 
Indigenous children to these establishments (Cunneen, 2011; Milroy, 1999).  In the 
Canadian context the residential school system began in the 1870s and lasted as an 
official component of Federal education policy until the 1980s.  The policy involved a 
network of schools nationwide, run by Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian and United 
Churches.  Many thousands of Indigenous children were removed and spent their 
formative years in these schools.  Milroy (1999) relates how the system was a church-
state partnership, with the Department of Indian Affairs providing the funding, setting 
of standards and practices and exercising direct legal control over the Indigenous 
children who were considered wards of the state.   
 
Similarly, Cunneen (2011) relates that in the Australian context, Australia Aboriginal 
children were forcibly removed from their families and communities in a purposeful 
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policy of assimilation that lasted sixty years or more.  In some states and territories of 
Australia, Aboriginal children were placed in church-run establishments, while in 
others, such as New South Wales, the institutions were the responsibility of the colonial 
state.  However, regardless of the source of authority, church or state, the focus of 
pedagogy and curriculum was the same – to kill the ‘native within’ (NISATSIC, 1997), as 
Cunneen (2011: 5-6) relates when he writes that: 
 
Both the Canadian and Australia authorities saw the removal process as part of a 
civilising mission and spiritual duty to uplift the ‘natives’.  By today’s standards 
the assimilationist ‘civilising’ process would be condemned as ethnocide or 
cultural genocide and properly considered as a state crime. 
 
Combined with criminal justice policy and practice, modes of domination such as 
residential schools and forced removal of children provide further examples of how 
colonial discourse and practice “organised social existence and social reproduction” in 
the colonial context (Proulx, 2002: 42; see also Foucault, 1977).  And, as demonstrated 
in papers included in this thesis (Tauri, 2013c; Tauri, 2014c), they also provide concrete 
processes for the continued subjugation of Indigenous peoples within the settler-
colonial context. 
 
Contemporary (settler) colonial projects 
Proulx (2003: 43-51) describes how some of the key colonial projects of the 
assimilationist phase of colonisation, such as the residential school program in Canada, 
have either ceased to be used or had their form and delivery significantly altered.  
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Albeit, while the education and child care and protection processes remain important 
social control institutions, it can be argued that the form in which these colonial projects 
are delivered has altered (see later discussion).  In both the New Zealand and Canadian 
context we can measure the cessation of specific colonial projects such as residential 
schools in Canada, and the legal assault on Māori cultural transmission, with the move 
from assimilationist discourse and policies towards integrative, then multicultural, and 
of late, self-determination/reconciliation rhetoric and policy (Tauri, 1999).   
 
The fact that specific colonising projects and strategies went out of style or were 
refashioned is to be expected: every colonial epoch produces projects designed to shore 
colonialist hegemony in order to contain and control Indigenous peoples.  However, 
what is more permanent is the interconnected nature of colonial (and neo-colonial) 
governance; a highly sophisticated, layered process involving interrelationships 
between the state (made up of the legislature, Cabinet, the policy-making and service 
delivery institutions), and civil society.  Within the state edifice Woolford imagines the 
process of colonial government as a highly sophisticated mesh made up of inter-locking 
levels, from the outer meta-level, to meso and micro levels, each containing colonial 
projects of varying complexity and interconnectedness.  The former are key edifices of 
the colonial context and provide the superstructure upon which settler-colonialism 
survives.  At this level we find the institutions of social control, including education, 
child care and protection, and health services.  It is also the level at which we find a 
colonial project of particular potency, the criminal justice system.  The potency of this 
macro-level colonial project comes from the authority it derives from being the site of 
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the contemporary, neo-liberal states deployment of legitimised violence to facilitate 
social order within the body politic (Haleh Davis, 2011).   
 
The implementation of a Western European legal jurisdiction and criminal justice 
system, were central platforms for the subjugation of Indigenous peoples in all colonial 
contexts.  These edifices were especially important for supporting the civilising mission 
that was foundational to colonial policy (Merry, 2000; Proulx, 2003; Tauri, 1998).  As a 
sub-component of the law, criminal justice was a powerful (civilising) colonial project in 
two specific ways: 1) it ensured that the definitions of what constitutes crime and social 
harm were based on Eurocentric definitions of those terms; and 2) it provided a ready 
platform for the deployment of structural violence by the state against Indigenous 
peoples who did not adhere to Western standards of behaviour - those who dared 
challenge the hegemony of the colonial state, or who were simply residing on good 
pastoral and mining land (Tauri, 2013c; 2014c).   
 
Other powerful colonial projects intersect, feed off and support one another in this 
manner.  For example, Fridieres (2000: 215-219) describes the intersections between 
government and economic policies supportive of corporations, as well as the activities 
that created and maintain welfare dependency on Indigenous reserves.  These activities 
provided significant stimuli for the urban migration that occurred amongst many 
Indigenous communities from the 1950s onwards.  In turn, this phenomenon brought 
with it the social, cultural and economic dislocation of Indigenous communities, the 
results of which are summarised by Proulx (2003; 53; see also Sinclair, 1997) who 
writes that: 
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The colonial and postcolonial colonial context... has destroyed Aboriginal social 
orders, stability and cultural integration leading to a disjunction between ends and 
means within Aboriginal cultures resulting in crime and social disorder.  
Assimilationist social policy and laws, coupled with culturally different judicial 
philosophies and practices, are central to this process. 
 
The Settler-Colonial State/Criminology Nexus 
 
[W]e live in an era of postmodern imperialism and manipulations by shape-
shifting colonial powers; the instruments of domination are evolving and 
inventing new methods to erase Indigenous histories and senses of place.  
Therefore, ‘globalisation’ in Indigenous eyes reflects a deepening, hastening and 
stretching of an already-existing empire. 
                                                                                             Alfred and Corntassel (2005: 601).   
 
The rise of the industrial revolution in 19th century Western Europe saw the parallel 
development of the human sciences based on empiricist methodology.  The human 
sciences placed in the hands of the propertied, moralising classes, the tools to identify, 
name and (arguably) combat the moral sewage that continuously threatened to spill out 
from the geographic space of the damned (see Christie, 2000).  One key science of 
morality was, and remains, criminology, the conception of which can be pinpointed 
during this historical, intellectual epoch (Agozino, 2003; Foucault, 1977).  Traditional 
criminology, a discipline joined at birth to the developing Western, capitalist state, 
58 
 
continues to thrive through its sustained focus on the behaviours and attitudes that 
fuelled its conception – emotionality, incontinence and contamination (Guarino-Ghezzi, 
2002; Messerschmidt, 1986).  Referring to the intellectual and moral foundations of 
‘traditional’ criminology, the Italian theorist Ruggiero (2000:1) states that: 
 
“[t]here are imaginary geographies which place imperfect minorities in 
marginalised locations: in a social elsewhere.  These locations consist of protected 
zones which ensure the reproduction of those who inhabit them, who are 
separated from the majorities living outside.  These geographies of exclusion 
associate elsewhere with that which is contaminated, filthy, offensive to morality 
and olfaction” (emphasis Ruggiero’s). 
 
Furthermore, Ruggiero (ibid: 1) argues that traditional criminology “makes filth, 
sewers, and excrement, in brief that ‘inferno’ delimited by imaginary geographies, its 
main terrain of analysis and development”.  Ruggiero is locating the theoretical 
development of criminology and reason de jure, in a specific historical context, namely 
the rise of the state as arbiter of social control in the developing capitalist context.  He 
argues that criminology has always been a keen supporter of state dominated social 
control and a significant contributor to the maintenance of capitalist social order 
(Agozino, 2003; Becker, 1963).  Indeed, we might argue that from conception 
criminology was an intellectually bankrupt discipline, one that was (and still is) focused 
on the geographical space inhabited by the socially damned.  At the same time its 
adherents, at least those of the administrative and authoritative varieties, too often 
avert their gaze from the corruption and immorality of the propertied and political 
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elites of western, neo-liberal societies.  Of course Sutherland (1949), Merton (1938) and 
others eventually turned the critical gaze of the discipline toward these social factions.  
And it must be recognised that the rise of critical, Marxist, feminist theorists, and of late 
counter-colonial criminologists has further problematised the behaviour and morality 
of ‘God’s chosen’ (see Agozino, 2003; Simpson, 1989; Spitzer, 1974; Taylor, Walton and 
Young, 1973).   
 
However, despite these critical developments, much of the discipline of criminology’s 
energy is still focused on the social elsewhere, the sewers, the damned, and their 
offspring.  This is the case despite the fact that, as Ruggiero so eloquently argues, we can 
no longer definitively pinpoint the boundaries that mark the social geography of the 
damned, or indeed of the saved.  Nor is the perimeter able to be measured and mapped 
as conclusively as was once theorised by western criminologists3.  And so, eventually 
the gaze of the discipline moved exclusively from the sewers, the social spaces 
supposedly marked by impurity and contamination, and discovered that not all was well 
in those spaces long thought moral, just and socially cohesive.   
 
This may be the case, but I, along with other critical commentators argue that the 
discipline is still heavily wedded to its wet nurse, the state, and much of its activity 
serves the state’s criminal justice apparatus.  While we might agree with Ruggiero that 
the boundaries of the damned may not be so clear cut geographically, if indeed they 
ever were, the discipline continues to create symbolic boundaries through its 
                                                          
3  One might argue that the new technologies of the developing crime science, such as data mapping, 
represents another chapter in illuminating the borders of social deviance (see Leipnik and Albert, 
2003).   
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theoretical and foundational precepts: offender/victim, exclusion/inclusion and 
punishment/reintegration.  Furthermore, criminologists sometimes advance 
Indigenous subjugation through the physical act of being a criminologist; particularly 
when they choose to job for the state by accepting contracts to carry out research on 
Indigenous peoples, or on Indigenous issues that are formulated without the meaningful 
involvement of Indigenous peoples.  This issue is compounded when they choose to 
proselytise from afar on the state of hell through surveys and statistical analysis of the 
social context, while rarely moving the manhole cover and descending into the sewer to 
observe what is going on (Tauri, 2013c; Young, 2011). 
 
There are specific communities and groups of individuals who continue to be privileged 
with the gaze of traditional criminology.  In many respects they are the same folk devils 
that have dominated the historical development of social and criminal justice policy, 
namely those living in the social elsewhere and who threaten to pollute society with 
their immorality, emotions and lust.  These reformulated, contemporary folk devils who, 
arguably, brought about the neo-liberal ‘risk society’ (Garland, 2001), include the 
unemployed, the indigent, travellers, women of low moral character, religious 
fundamentalists (of all faiths), working class youth, and ethnic minorities.  In the 
colonial/neo-colonial context, one such group has always been, and remain, the 
Indigenous peoples (Cunneen, 2008; Palys, 1993 and Tauri, 2009).     
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Criminology and the Colonial Enterprise 
 
As if to show the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation the settler paints 
the native as a sort of quintessence of evil. Native society is not simply described 
as a society lacking in values, but also the negation of values… the enemy of 
values… the absolute evil… corrosive… destroying… disfiguring… 
                                                         Fanon (1968: 31-32). 
 
This thesis is focused as much on exploring the discipline of criminology’s role in the 
settler-colonial states continued subjugation of Indigenous peoples, as it is about the 
role of the criminal justice system and its policy functionaries in this process (see 
Papers 1, 5, 7 and 8 in this thesis).  The reason for this is that the two entities, the policy 
industry and the academy, are heavily interlinked, with the academy often providing the 
intellectual silage that nourishes the development of crime control policy and 
legislation.  In the meantime, the policy industry exerts philosophical and analytical 
control over the academy through heavily prescribed research contracts and ideological 
exhortations that we strive to be ‘of utility’ to the state and its policy functionaries by 
producing knowledge that equates with their understanding of the social context 
(Brickey, 1989; Tauri, 2009; Walters, 2003).  Given the depth of this symbiotic, parasitic 
relationship, one cannot analyse the policy sector’s role in the continued subjugation of 
Indigenous peoples in settler-colonial contexts, without analysing the role of supportive 
disciplines such as criminology (Tauri, 2013c).  The work of Lynch (2000), Beirne 
(1993) and Foucault (1977), the humanist-psychologist, Seymour Halleck (1967) and 
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Agozino (2003; 2004), is instructive for analysing the historical and contemporary role 
of criminology in the settler-colonial subjugation of Indigenous peoples.   
 
In his influential work on the development of criminology, Piers Beirne (1993: 5), 
talking of the intent of one of criminology’s founding fathers, Beccaria, writes that: 
 
Beccaria’s chief objective in [On Crimes and Punishment] was the application to 
crime and penal strategies of the ‘science of man’, deterministic discourse 
implicitly at odds with conventional assumptions about the exclusively humanist 
and violitional bases of ‘classical criminology’. 
 
Beirne’s assessment of Beccaria’s intentions countered what had been a long trend in 
criminological reflection on the discipline’s historical roots, where much of the focus 
was on the conception and birth of the discipline within the wider context of humanist 
and Enlightenment thinking.  A standard creation myth of the discipline is that Beccaria 
and his contemporaries were driven to develop criminology through their adherence to 
humanist ideals borne of the Enlightenment movement.  Through the development of 
the discipline its early practitioners sought to relieve society from the suffering caused 
by crime, and reconstruct western systems of justice to reflect the enlightenment ideals 
of rationality, scientific method and objectivity (Carrabine, Cox, Lee, Plummer and 
South, 2009).  In contrast, Agozino, Beirne and Lynch challenge the established origin 
myths by presenting the critical determination that criminology is largely an oppressive 
construct; or as Lynch (2000: 146) contends “… up to this point the history of 
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criminology has been the story of humanly created methods of oppression told from the 
oppressor perspective”.   
 
According to Lynch (2000: 147), from its inception criminology has been defined by two 
characteristics: to generate scientific knowledge about crimes and criminals that would 
enable society to control crime; and concern for humanity and humanitarian issues, 
“especially those associated with rectifying the brutal, inhumane and arbitrary 
conditions of punishment”.  In contrast, Beirne et al contend that criminology is not just, 
nor ever solely concerned with ‘curing crime’ or advancing humanitarian causes.  Yes, 
criminologists have written about these issues, but the focus is about much more than 
providing the discipline with methodological rigour; it is also useful for insulating the 
discipline from external criticism of its Eurocentric orientations.  Instead, they build on 
the work of Foucault and Halleck and argue that during the rise of capitalism, 
criminology emerged as a part of the apparatus of the science of oppression established 
by Enlightenment philosophy.   
 
Of course, this is not usually the way the Enlightenment movement and its intellectual 
endeavours are depicted.  More often it is presented as a revolutionary rupture from 
past theorising on the human condition; an intellectual paradigm that generated an 
enlightened view of human beings and human social organisation that in turn, produced 
a positive progression in human social and intellectual development (Dupre, 2004; 
Rabinow, 1984).  However, Lynch (2000: 148-149) contends that there is a dark side to 
the Enlightenment, from which criminology was born.  This element of the 
Enlightenment, especially the move from theory (of crime causation) to practice 
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(developing scientific responses to crime and testing policies and interventions), is 
where we expose the connection between criminology, crime control policy and the on-
going subjugation of Indigenous peoples in the settler-colonial context described in 
Papers 1 and 2 (Tauri, 2013c and 2014c). 
 
The Enlightenment and the darkness of the (colonial) criminological enterprise 
In their critique of Enlightenment, Agozino, Beirne, Foucault and Lynch argue that it is 
no accident of history that Enlightenment scholarship arose along with capitalist 
systems of production.  Indeed, Enlightenment theorising of the social context can be 
regarded as a mechanism that supported and legitimised capitalist social relationships; 
in particular the uneven distribution of political authority and access to resources 
(Bratton and Denham, 2014; Meiksis Woods, 2002).  From a social control perspective, 
the Enlightenment can be viewed as driven in part by two contradictory, albeit inter-
related concerns revealed by Lynch (2000: 148: Lynch’s emphasis ) in the following 
quote: “[o]n the one hand, Enlightenment scholarship concerns the conditions of human 
freedom.  On the other hand, and quite ironically, it is also about those conditions of 
control necessary to maintain freedom”.  According to this perspective, controls on 
human behaviour are a necessary component for establishing and maintaining freedom, 
based on the utilitarian precept of the greatest good for the greatest number.  Individual 
freedom, in other words, is subservient to the conditions for the broadest degree of 
social freedom of the majority (Gaus, 1999).   
 
From a critical Indigenous perspective, what is at issue here is the meaning of the ideal 
(or idea) of social freedom and how this freedom is to be defined and attained and by 
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whom.  The marriage of Enlightenment perspectives and capitalism provides insight 
into the historical emphasis of criminology on the geographies of disadvantage so 
eloquently expressed by Ruggiero.  The subservience of individual freedom to social 
freedom (to the greater good) was a key foundational precept of Enlightenment 
scholarship, and it was later to become a (if not the) principle philosophical construct of 
the discipline of criminology (Ferri, 1901).  What constitutes social freedom is defined 
by and based on rules, largely rules of law, which contained a definition of rights.  The 
definition of rights these rules contained presupposed an array of social, economic and 
political relationships that “privileged the rights of property holders over others” 
(Lynch, 2000: 148).  Consequently, the specific rules and rights that criminologists since 
the classical theorists have endorsed, have advantaged property holders over others – 
or perhaps more accurately in the colonial context, European settler communities 
seeking to strip land from Indigenes and maintain their right over that land and the 
resources it held (Jackson, 1992).   
 
Lynch (2000: 148-149) argues that given its roots in Enlightenment philosophy, it 
should come as no surprise that the history of western criminology has focused on 
efforts to: 
i) legitimise control of the dangerous classes that had spread rapidly throughout 
Europe during the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, and in the U.S. in the late 19th and 
20th centuries.  In the contemporary era, criminology continues to focus its efforts 
on controlling the dangerous classes.  Over time, there has also been “a tendency to 
expand the idea of the marginal classes to include racial and ethnic minorities” 
[emphasis added]; 
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ii) spread conditions conducive to inculcating discipline and related work habits, or, 
as Foucault suggest, methods for rendering the body (politic) docile.  These 
practices, which show up in a variety of criminal apparatus, target the dangerous 
classes and problem populations like Indigenous peoples, migrants, the un-
employed, and so forth; and 
iii) regain control over the penal process and power structure that had gradually 
begun to be eroded by mass-responses toward public corporal punishments 
during the Middle Ages (Foucault, 1977).  In the contemporary period, the 
problem is somewhat reversed, as crime control has come to cater to the desires 
of the public who, over time, have internalised the ideology of capitalism.  
 
There were many and varied mechanisms constructed from Enlightenment philosophy 
to facilitate social control and uphold the rights of propertied classes.  Criminology 
developed as one (although perhaps the most important) of those intellectual 
paradigms concerned with controlling the free and unfettered creativity of the criminal 
(read dangerous) class (Halleck, 1967).  According to Lynch (2000), criminology can be 
viewed as a method of legitimising mechanisms of oppression that target the dangerous 
class, which I argue, includes Indigenous peoples residing in contemporary settler-
colonial contexts: 
 
In short, criminology is one of the disciplines that establishes the conditions 
necessary for maintenance of the status quo of power.  It can only do so by 
oppressing those who would undermine the status quo.  In this sense, criminology 
must be viewed as a ‘science of oppression’ (ibid: 149; emphasis added]. 
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Criminology as a science of oppression  
The Enlightenment and the rise of the capitalist mode of production can be understood 
only through reference to each other.  Enlightenment scholarship emphasised the 
principles of rationality, objectivity, individualism, efficiency (of production and 
maintenance of social order) and the sanctity of property rights.  Each in itself is a key 
principle driving the expansion of capitalist modes of production in Western Europe, 
and later in the colonising contexts of the third and fourth worlds (Agozino, 2003; 
Lynch, 2000).  Viewed this way, the Enlightenment was not the distinct fissure from a 
past intellectual, economic and social epoch that it is sometimes described, but 
“[r]ather, it was more simply a means of stating and organising the materialist 
groundings now propelling society following the Middle Ages” (ibid: 149).  A key set of 
intellectual systems provided the impetus for the propulsion of capitalism, in the first 
instance the ‘body sciences’, including biology, chemistry, dietetics and others.   
 
According to Foucaultian analysis, the human sciences, with their focus on classification, 
division and ordering, provided invaluable knowledge of the (potential labouring) 
population esssential for the continued expansion of the capitalist mode of production 
(Foucault, 1970; 1977).  These sciences of counting, classifying and knowing populations 
consciously adopted the methods of the hard sciences, thus conceptualising the social 
context as a subject appropriate for scientific analysis.  This process of adaptation 
helped spread scientific rationalisation through the developing human (social) sciences 
and in turn expanded throughout the new discipline a propensity for treating human 
subjects, and their social contexts as mathematical abstractions.  According to Young 
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(2011), this development came at a cost, in that the more human behaviour was 
quantified and abstracted from the social, the more we became dehumanised, stripped 
of our subjectivity, and turned into objects of investigation that could then be better 
manipulated and controlled. 
 
We might ask ‘what specific role did criminology play in this process’?  Lynch (2000: 
150) begins to answer this question by arguing that: 
 
Criminology is a device – as both a structure and a discourse – which has enacted a 
very powerful mechanism not only for repressing/oppressing the deviant 
(criminal justice apparatus), but also for turning people into deviants to be 
controlled and feared. 
 
The sciences of the Enlightenment established the intellectual conditions that 
legitimised the criminological focus on the dangerous classes when the discipline began 
its intellectual evolution from the mid-19th century onwards (Agozino, 2004).  The 
importance of criminology for the development of capitalism comes from the key role it 
played in identifying, classifying and, ultimately developing responses to individuals 
and groups considered a threat to the hegemony of the capitalist mode of production.  
Lynch identifies the importance of criminology, and criminal justice, for capitalism, 
thus: 
 
These attacks centred on the populations that most threatened those who 
Enlightenment philosophy benefited: the newly emergent property classes.  It was 
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during the late 1700s that criminology, guided by the glow of Enlightenment 
scholarship, most fully emerged as the science of oppressing the marginalised. 
 
Criminology and the ‘Othering’ of the Indigenous 
In his inaugural Professorial lecture at Queen’s University, Belfast in 2005, Phil Scraton 
(page 3) wrote “[n]o group conceives itself as the One, the essential, the absolute, 
without conceiving and defining the Other.  The Other is the stranger, the outsider, the 
alien, the suspect community: Otherness begets fear, begets hostility, begets denial” 
(emphasis Scraton’s).  There have been many ‘others’ throughout the relatively short 
histories of what are now referred to as social democracies, such as African-Americans 
in the USA, proletarians residing in capitalist economies, travellers throughout western 
Europe, and women and girls throughout patriarchies (Scraton: 2005: 3-4).  To this list 
we can add Indigenous peoples in the settler-colonial societies of Canada, the US, 
Australia and New Zealand (Tauri, 1996).   
 
The process of othering is well and truly established in criminology, linked as it is to the 
process of defining what and who is criminal and/or deviant.  Criminalisation as a 
process does not occur in a vacuum but derives from and sustained within a climate of 
historical and contemporary politics, economic conditions and dominant ideologies, 
evolving within the determining contexts of social class, gender, sexuality and race 
(Cunneen, 2011).  As a process, criminalisation is consistent with a politics of otherness, 
of economic marginalisation, social exclusion (Wacquant, 2009), and, in the case of 
Indigenous peoples, socio-cultural genocide (Churchill, 1990).  To gain legitimacy as a 
process supportive of exploitation and marginalisation, criminalisation requires 
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ideological sustenance.  As Cohen (1972) and Hall et al (1978) have demonstrated, the 
ideological framework supporting the process of criminalisation centres on identifiable 
individuals and groups, folk devils were constructed and represented as a threat to the 
maintenance of social order.  The criminalisation of an identified problem population is 
in part fuelled by moral panic, an overreaction to perceived criminality or social danger 
that sustains the economic and political hegemony of specific ethnic groups and/or 
classes (Goode, 1994).  
 
However, it is short sighted to think of moral panics and the process of criminalisation 
as simply ideological constructs: for the individuals and communities at the centre of 
their construction and deployment, they result in real, tangible experiences.  They often 
result in concrete responses and actions from the agencies of social control such as 
targeted policing and increased surveillance (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994).  The 
process of criminalisation, therefore, produces social, political and material 
consequences for individuals and communities on the receiving end of the attentions of 
the agents of crime control.  And we can state with certainty that one of the groups 
consistently targeted for such attention in settler-colonial contexts, are Indigenous 
peoples (Tauri, 2014c).  
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Criminology, Settler-Colonialism and Indigenous Peoples 
 
If criminology ever is to decrease inequalities in justice, the field must first come 
to grips with whether criminology itself contributes to discrimination, social 
inequalities and crime. 
                                Jacques and Wright (2010: 384). 
 
In this section, it will be argued that criminology has played a significant role in the 
colonial and neo-colonial subjugation of Indigenous peoples.  The foundations for this 
argument are laid by identifying the role the discipline has played, and continues to play 
in the process of social control. 
 
Black (1976: 105) defines social control as “the normative aspect of social life.  It defines 
and responds to deviant behaviour, specifying what ought to be: What is right and 
wrong… Law is social control”, and furthers this argument by stating that as the law is 
regulated via the state, therefore law is “government social control” (ibid: 2).  If we take 
this proposition as a truth statement then we can posit that much of criminology, 
especially of the Authoritarian form discussed in Tauri (2013c) where many of its 
practitioners define and respond to crime as those terms are constituted by 
functionaries of the state, is itself a key functionary of social control.  As Jacques and 
Wright (2010: 390, emphasis added) argue “[t]o the degree that criminology is applied 
science, it is social control”.  
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Jacques and Wright (2010) employ the pure sociology of Black (1976; 1983) to expand 
their argument that criminology is a form of social control, and to fully encompass the 
role it plays in propagating social inequalities.  In pure sociological terms the 
reproduction of social inequalities refers to social processes which maintain or decrease 
the low social status4 of certain actors in specific social contexts.  In Black, Jacques and 
Wright’s schema, the more an individual or group becomes subjected to the application 
of state law/justice the more that individual or group’s social status is decreased.  As 
criminological research shows, the application of law occurs more often when 
individuals are low in social status.  And because the subjection of law leads to lower 
social status (or simply compounds it), the discriminatory behaviour of law against low 
status individuals and groups results in the reproduction of social inequalities because 
subjection to law further reduces those actors’ (already relatively low) social status 
(Jacques and Wright, 2010).   
 
So, how does criminology figure in this process?  Quite simply, if, as happens more often 
than not, criminology follows the policy predilections of state functionaries by focusing 
its attention on the acts and actors that governments define as criminal and seeks to 
apply its ‘science of crime’ to the measurement and analysis of these groups (the 
socially damned), then criminologists have the potential to be significant contributors to 
the reproduction of social inequalities (see Tauri, 2013c).  For example, referring to the 
                                                          
4  In the language of pure sociology, social structure is defined by the relative social status of every actor 
(person or group) involved in a social situation, and also by the relative social distance between every 
actor involved in that situation.  According to Black (1998) there are at least five kinds of social status 
and three kinds of social distance.  The five kinds of social status are vertical status, radial status, 
corporate status, symbolic status, and normative status.   
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process of the selection of participants in criminological research, Jacques and Wright 
(2010: 392) state: 
 
If... lower status offenders are more likely to be recruited for offender-based 
research, and greater recruitment to criminological research leads to lower levels 
of social status, then the argument can be made that offender-based research is 
involved in the reproduction of social inequalities. 
 
As many critical criminologists (and even some conservative commentators) have 
demonstrated the justice system can and does, discriminate.  It responds differentially 
to crime and to offenders depending on a range of innate or ideologically-derived 
factors or measures, such as the socio-economic status (class), race (ethnicity), sexual 
orientation, age, and so on (see Greenberg, 1993; Tombs and Whyte, 2003).  In the 
following section I discuss the way(s) in which the discipline has assisted in framing 
Indigenous peoples as a problem population in the settler-colonial context. 
 
Elsewhere I have analysed various strategies, or technologies of control formulated by 
the settler-colonial state response to the wicked problems wrought by Indigenous over-
representation in criminal justice, and Indigenous resistance to the imposed justice 
processes (see Tauri, 1999; 2005).  One of the key drivers for the author’s choice of 
subject matter for the eight papers that make up the thesis, was the inter-related issues 
of the lack of critical commentary on the settler-colonial states response to Indigenous 
crime and Indigenous resistance to the imposed justice ordering, and the historical lack 
of attention paid by the discipline to Indigenous experiences of criminal justice and crime 
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control policy.  The following section provides an overview of the Indigenous experience 
of the activities of the state and criminology in the ‘justice space’, and highlights some of 
the main findings presented in the eight papers contained therein.   
 
Criminal Justice and Indigenous Peoples   
There can be no doubt that the Indigenous experience of criminal justice should be 
profound concern to all, as on all four settler-colonial contexts (New Zealand, Australia, 
Canada and the US) Indigenous peoples are significantly over-represented in all 
statistical indices related to that sector5.  However, the contemporary settler-colonial 
state’s concern for Indigenous overrepresentation is not simply predicated on the 
statistical and risk profiles associated with Indigenes.  In all settler-colonial jurisdictions 
the criminal justice system and its agents have been the focus of significant criticism 
and political agitation by Indigenous activists (Jackson, 1992; Poata-Smith, 1996; Victor, 
2005).  Some Indigenous and non-Indigenous critical scholars have advanced the 
argument that the enhanced policing of Indigenes emanates in part from our resistance 
to the imposition of colonialism and neo-colonialism (see Jackson, 1988; McNamara, 
                                                          
5  From the statistics presented below it is immediately apparent that Māori representation in crime 
statistics is disproportionately higher on a population basis than for other ethnic groups in New 
Zealand.  In 2009, for example, the total police apprehensions were 235,684.  Out of this total: 
 Māori accounted for 98,893 apprehensions or 41.9 percent of the total; 
 Pacific peoples accounted for 21,563 or 9.1 percent of the total; and 
 New Zealand Europeans accounted for 105,778 or 44.8 percent of the total (Statistics New 
Zealand (2010). 
 
Finally, Māori imprisonment rates are also disproportionately high. The latest updated figures from 
the Department of Corrections (December 2009) show that out of a total of prison population of 8244 
(inclusive of inmates on remand):  
 Māori accounted for 50.8 percent of all inmates; 
 those identifying themselves as Pacific Peoples accounted 11.9 percent; and 
 those identifying themselves as New Zealand European or Pakeha accounted for 33.5 percent of 
the total. 
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1995; Palys, 1993), and, in particular, towards the imposed Eurocentric justice systems 
(Monture-Angus, 1995; Quince, 2011; Tauri, 1996; Tauri and Webb, 2011; Victor, 2005).   
 
The contemporary state’s response to the dual issues of over-representation and 
counter-hegemonic activity of Indigenous peoples, have elicited a range of policy 
responses, beginning with integrationist policies and interventions, such as borstals in 
New Zealand, to corrective training and residential schools in Canada (see Tauri, 2013a; 
2014c).  The rise of Indigenous activism against the legitimacy of the formal justice 
system saw the advent of a range of interventions aimed at alleviating the Indigenous 
over-representation problem and our critique of the imposed justice ordering (Tauri, 
2005).  
 
The following section provides a brief overview of some of the colonial projects 
deployed by settler-colonial states, heavily supported by members of the academy, in 
response to the wicked problems associated with their Indigenous peoples.  We can 
summarise these projects as falling under the headings of indigenisation, culturalisation 
and globalisation: 
 
Indigenisation 
Indigenisation has been described as the purposeful (targeted) involvement of 
indigenous peoples and organisations in the delivery of existing socio-legal services and 
programmes (Havemann, 1988).  For example, indigenisation initiatives became a 
popular policy response in Canada during the 1980s; and involved the development of 
programmes for providing policing services to Indian Reserves and communities; the 
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use of native court workers to provide assistance to indigenous defendants in court; and 
increasing attempts to develop community-based sentencing and correctional 
alternative for Indigenous offenders (Griffiths, 1988; Harding, 1991).  The focus of this 
form of indigenisation is the incorporation of Indigenous human capital within the 
justice system; a process that takes place without, or in lieu of, alterations being made to 
the structure of criminal justice that exists in settler-colonial contexts.   
 
The underlying practice-related principle of the indigenisation process is that involving 
more indigenous people in the criminal justice system will enable the institutions to 
deliver more culturally responsive programmes (Morse, 1988).  However, in contrast 
McNamara (1995: 3-4) highlights the tokenistic basis to this strategy when he argues 
that: 
 
The dominant element of the majority of aboriginal justice reforms that have been 
implemented since the 1970s [in Canada] have been committed to the assumption 
that ensuring justice for aboriginal peoples need not involve questioning the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system, nor the endorsement of autonomous 
aboriginal justice values and dispute resolution processes.   
 
Morse (1988: 12) further highlights this argument when he contends that “… these 
[indigenisation] initiatives can very easily be directed toward assimilating and pacifying 
the indigenous population rather than respecting their unique legal position within the 
nation as a whole”.  Lastly, Tauri (1998; 2005) argues that rather than leading to 
enhanced, positive engagement with the criminal justice system, indigenised initiatives 
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have largely increased the process of pacification and recolonisation of Indigenous 
peoples.     
 
The culturalisation of criminal justice 
From the late 1980s onwards the response of settler-colonial states to the Indigenous 
problem took a new, arguably more sophisticated turn, gradually moving from a focus 
on increasing the number of Indigenous officials, to a process of policy and practice-
related culturalisation.  This process entailed the planned strategy of co-
opting/incorporating select elements of indigenous life-worlds into the justice system, 
and more particularly, on to interventions implemented by criminal justice officials 
(Tauri, 2005).  In relation to the new, sophisticated strain of indigenisation, Havemann 
(1988: 83) argued that: 
 
Despite its appearance as more benign than the model of pure imposition the 
integrated or indigenised model is one in which the coloniser preserves aspects of 
the indigenous social control system, primarily in order to utilise its authority to 
support new patterns for domination. 
 
The culturalisation process involves the incorporation of indigenous philosophies or 
practices within the formal system by adding indigenous ingredients in the form of 
specific terms, phrases and cultural practices that government officials consider to be 
acceptable elements of indigenous cultural practice (Webb, 2004).  Examples from the 
New Zealand context include allowing for the recitation of karakia (pray) at the 
beginning of restorative justice programmes like Family Group Conferencing (Tauri, 
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1999), and blending Māori language and custom within primarily psych-based therapy 
programmes (see Department of Corrections, 2007).  The co-option strategy therefore, 
involves the pre-selection and utilisation of acceptable elements of indigenous culture – 
as defined by the policy sector – within justice policies and interventions, in order to 
make the formal justice system (appear) more culturally appropriate, and, it is hoped, 
engender generic programmes and services more likely to ‘work’ for indigenous 
peoples (Tauri, 2005). 
 
By the late 1980’s and early 1990s, the culturalisation of the policy sector had become a 
key aspect the New Zealand government’s Māori policy.  The importance of this process 
in terms of government response to Māori counter-hegemonic politics is especially 
highlighted in the following quote from Poata-Smith (1997: 176) who argues that:  
 
the fourth Labour Government (1984-1990) attempted to appease the rising level 
of Māori protest in two major ways.  The first involved extending the jurisdiction 
of the Waitangi Tribunal retrospectively to 1840 and the second involved adopting 
the policy of ‘biculturalism’, which was based on the selective incorporation of 
Māori cultural symbolism within the institutions of the state (emphasis added). 
 
The use of the strategy of culturalisation was perhaps most pronounced within the 
sphere of criminal justice.  Programmes and policies that fell in this category in the New 
Zealand context include the Department of Correction’s tikanga (definition) and 
responsivity programmes, the Department for Courts District Court Restorative Justice 
Pilot Projects, and the youth justice-focused Family Group Conferencing forum.  A key 
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feature of all three interventions is the fact that they are based on Western theories, 
concepts and practices of effectively responding to offending behaviour.  However, they 
were made distinguishable from other programmes because of the fact that elements of 
indigenous (Māori) cultural philosophy and practice were ‘added-on’ (Tauri, 1999).   
 
Perhaps the most well-known case study in the art of culturalisation is the Family Group 
Conferencing initiative New Zealand introduced to the world in the late 1980s.  The FGC 
process was introduced to overcome a number of the shortcomings identified with a 
youth justice system dominated at the time by what criminologists described as a 
welfare approach6 (Morris and Maxwell, 1993).  Undoubtedly, a key focus of the 
legislation that gave birth to the FGC was concerned with addressing the 
disproportionate number of Māori youth being processed through the system.  Becroft 
(2002) argues that two specific components were included to promote participation by 
young Māori offenders and increase the likelihood of positive outcomes for the Māori 
community, namely: 
 the inclusion of whanau (family), hapu (sub-tribe) and iwi (tribe) in repairing the 
harm caused by offending behaviour; and 
 the opportunity to have the conference in familiar, culturally appropriate 
surroundings, including the marae (meeting house). 
 
                                                          
6  The welfare approach considered offending to be caused by remedial family or individual dysfunction.  
Young people were considered to be a symptom of such dysfunction.  Decisions concerning a young 
person’s offending behaviour and future were made by professionals who largely had no previous 
relationship with the young person.  The response to the offending was proportionate to the perceived 
cause of the offending, rather than the nature of the offending itself (O’Connor, 1997). 
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Advocates of the FGC make a number of claims about the relationship between the 
conferencing format, Māori justice practices, and the role the forum has played in 
satisfying Māori concerns with the criminal justice system.  For example, it is often 
claimed that: 
i) because the conferencing process and Māori justice practice have restorative 
elements, the conferencing process therefore provides Māori with a culturally 
appropriate avenue for addressing their justice needs (Olsen et al, 1995); and 
ii) the conferencing process is an example of the system’s ability to culturally 
sensitise itself, and empowers Māori to deal with their youth offenders in 
culturally appropriate ways (Maxwell and Morris, 1993). 
 
Unfortunately the results of empirical research on the FGC forum do not support these 
claims.  For example, in relation to i) above, Maxwell and Morris (1993) found that the 
majority of FGC’s involving Māori were held in the offices of government agencies; only 
five percent were actually held on marae.  A similar review processed a decade later 
found the situation had not substantially changed (see Maxwell, Kingi, Robertson, 
Morris and Cunningham, 2004) despite the continued importance of marae to 
contemporary urban and rural Māori communities, the lack of significant impact of the 
Act and the forum to reduce Māori youth engagement with the system, and continued 
criticisms of the precedence given to government dominated sites for dealing with 
Māori youth offending (see Nga Kaiwhakamarama I Nga Ture (1998) and Tauri, 2004).   
 
For some Māori, initiatives that fall into the co-option category, including the FGC 
forum, are inadequate for addressing the problem of Māori over-representation.  Māori 
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criticisms of the co-option strategy centre on two key issues:  The first is that the 
initiatives represent a piece-meal approach to the recognition of the validity of Māori 
justice practice, and are formulated on the continuing assumption that the present 
system of criminal justice, whilst flawed, is ‘the best we have’, or, more accurately, the 
best we will ever get.  Therefore, given the Eurocentric system is the only legitimate 
institutionalised approach to social harm, the best we can manage is minor tinkering in 
order to enhance its cultural appropriateness for Māori (Tauri, 1998).  The second issue 
is that the recent trend for allowing Māori limited authority to deal with the offending of 
their own, represents a continuation of the historical strategy of co-opting Māori justice 
for the purpose of legitimising the imposed criminal justice system, and has little to do 
with Indigenous empowerment and self-determination (Jackson, 1995; Tauri, 1996b).  
Jackson (1995:34) summarises Māori criticisms when he argues that: 
 
[j]ustice for Māori does not mean the attempted grafting of Māori processes 
upon a system that retains the authority to determine the extent, applicability, 
and validity of the processes.  No matter how well intentioned and sincere such 
efforts, it is respectfully suggested that they will merely maintain the co-option 
and redefinition of Māori values and authority which underpins so much of the 
colonial will to control.  A ‘cultural justice system’ controlled by the Crown is 
another colonising artefact (emphasis added). 
 
Contemporary responses 
Since the early 2000s there has been a considerable amount of strategic activity across 
New Zealand’s criminal justice sector aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of crime 
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control activity.  Significant policy initiatives have included the Effective Interventions 
work-stream (2006-07), which involved the Programme of Action for Māori (PoAfM), 
and most recently, the Drivers of Crime Strategy (2009/10 and ongoing).  The 
motivations for these high level, inter-agency projects were issues commonly found in 
contemporary settler-colonial jurisdictions, namely a) the lack of impact from past and 
current policies on rates of offending and imprisonment, b) increasing fiscal crises 
resulting from exponential rise in prison musters, c) repetitive crises of legitimation 
with the general public arising from a and b; and d) continuing high levels of indigenous 
over-representation and critique (Tauri, 2009b).  The strategies and the PoAfM contain 
references to Māori over-representation and a range of activities that agencies claim are 
designed to respond to this issue.  However, overall the majority of initiatives fall under 
the culturalisation strategy while others provide the impression of activity but are 
designed to ensure that the status quo remains.  
 
The PoAfM provides a recent example of the latter.  Created through joint effort 
between the Ministry of Justice and Te Puni Kokiri and signed off by Cabinet in 2007, it 
contained a range of initiatives including: 
 an engagement process with Māori providers and offenders to gauge their views and 
experiences of the criminal justice system; 
 selection of a suite of initiatives (originally six and later expanded to up to twelve) 
focused on Māori offending that would receive cross-agency funding and then be 
evaluated to demonstrate the effectiveness of ‘Māori approaches’; 
 assessment of the effectiveness of the criminal justice sectors spend on Māori; and 
 an inter-agency fund for supporting practical Māori initiatives. 
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While the PoAfM was a joint effort between the Ministry of Justice and Te Puni Kokiri, in 
reality it was sidelined from the beginning by the lead agency in collaboration with 
other justice sector agencies.  Altogether the PoAfM contained up to twelve inter-related 
projects, including the four outlined above.  Only a handful were completed, including 
the engagement process (although the final report has still be officially released and is 
now seven years overdue) and the selection and funding of a select group of by Māori, 
for Māori initiatives.  Those that were completed were carried out by Te Puni Kokiri, the 
junior partner.  The majority of the significant tasks sat with the Ministry of Justice and 
apart from a research project on the subject of bias, were never fully initiated, let alone 
completed.  From the beginning it was clear to Te Puni Kokiri officials that the Ministry 
of Justice was reluctant to carry out any activities that would require critical scrutiny of 
the criminal justice sector.  For this reason the critical review of the sector’s spend on 
Māori was never completed and the development of a funding mechanism specific to 
Māori initiatives failed to progress past low level discussions with sector agencies 
(Tauri, 2010). 
 
Why the reluctance of the Ministry of Justice (specifically) and the wider justice sector, 
to respond seriously to the issue of Māori over-representation and Māori critique of 
their activities?  There are a number of reasons we can draw from, but the following are 
the most likely: 
 an historical lack of capability within the criminal justice sector to develop Māori 
policy and engage meaningfully with the range of Māori communities, in particular 
84 
 
‘problem populations’ like Māori inmates, ex-inmates, and gang members (Tauri 
and Roguski, 2012); 
 an over-zealous commitment to Eurocentric theories on the causes of, and 
responses to, crime, such as the Psychology of Criminal Conduct (Department of 
Corrections) and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (Ministry of 
Justice), which in turn block officials’ ability to seriously consider alternatives to 
Eurocentric approaches, including Indigenous theories and justice practices 
(Tauri, 2013c); 
 the justice sector’s historical reluctance to allow internal (by other government 
agencies) and especially external scrutiny of the effectiveness of its initiatives or 
the resources it spends on crime control (Tauri, 2013c; Tauri and Webb, 2012); 
and 
 a paternalistic attitude to Māori organisations and Māori communities in 
particular, and the community sector overall (see Tauri, 2009b; 2010). 
 
Taken together, all the above provide us with some understanding as to why it has 
proven extremely difficult for Indigenous outsiders to influence change in the justice 
systems of settler-colonial jurisdictions (Tauri, 2009b).   
 
What is pertinent to the arguments presented in this thesis, is the extent to which 
criminology, or more accurately, criminologists, have been involved in the settler-
colonial state’s continued utilisation of culturalisation to  develop ‘Indigenous’ policy 
and intervention (e.g., Maxwell and Morris, 1993).  As disclosed in specific papers in the 
thesis (Tauri, 2013c; Tauri, 2014a; Tauri and Webb, 2012), restorative justice provides 
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one of the key areas where the strategy of culturalisation and the parasitic relationship 
between members of the Academy and the state, is most evident.  The reliance of the 
state on members of the Academy to provide policy-relevant knowledge, and of the 
Academy for symbolic legitimation and funding via the state, has created a situation 
where the grafting of the Indigenous life-world on to imported, western crime control 
initiatives remains the norm.  At the same time, meaningful critique of the suitability of 
said initiatives for Indigenous peoples is largely absent from the research and analytical 
activities of state officials and their criminological advisors (Tauri, 2014a).  And, to 
complete this overview of Indigenous perspectives, it is the increasingly globalised 
nature of crime control that has added a new and potentially virulent problematic to the 
relationship between Indigenous peoples and the settler-colonial state.     
 
The globalisation of Indigenous justice 
 
It is… important that traditional decision-making processes are not repackaged by 
white professionals and presented to families as an innovative new practice, only 
serving to reinforce experiences of colonial superiority.                                            
                                                                                                                      Steve Jackson (1998). 
 
It is not only the policy and legislative activities of settler-colonial governments that is 
impacting Indigenous peoples’ determination to attain some form of jurisdictional 
autonomy.  We have to also be mindful that we are living in an increasingly globalised 
world and, as related in Paper 4 (Tauri, 2014a), the policy and justice sectors are not 
immune to their phenomena.  One of the defining features of the growing globalisation 
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of restorative justice has been the popularity of FGC-style initiatives in the settler-
colonial jurisdictions of Canada, the United States and Australia.   
 
The exportation of the FGC forum to these jurisdictions has been heavily influenced by 
the arguments and representations from advocates of the FGC that were discussed 
earlier: namely, that the FGC provides a forum that empowers Māori (an indigenous 
people) and enhances the ability of the criminal justice system to culturally sensitise 
itself and effectively utilise indigenous justice philosophies and practices (see Olsen et 
al, 1995; Maxwell and Morris, 1993; LaPrairie, 1996).  In response to these arguments 
we have countered that the forum represents the co-option of Māori cultural practices 
into New Zealand’s youth justice system.  The forum signifies the continued willingness 
of the State to disempower Māori by employing their justice processes while denying 
them a significant measure of jurisdictional autonomy.  What is now of concern to some 
Māori is that our justice philosophies and practices are now being used to disempower 
other Indigenous peoples (see Tauri, 2004 and 2009).   
 
Arguably, this situation is particularly noticeable in the Canadian context (Victor, 2011).  
For example, in 1997 Gloria Lee, a member of the Cree First Nation in Canada, published 
an article titled The Newest Old Gem: Family Group Conferencing.  In this paper, Lee 
expressed strong concerns for the fact that the imported FGC forum was being forced 
upon Canada’s Indigenous peoples at the expense of their own justice mechanisms and 
practices.  Lee (1997: 1) argued that “… First Nation communities are vigorously 
encouraged to adopt and implement the Māori process and to make alterations to fit the 
specific community needs, customs and traditions of people who will make use of the 
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new process”.  Lee’s statement of concern is both powerful and, as the fullness of time 
has shown, accurate.  It has been a number of years since the publication of that article 
and many Canadian Indigenes are struggling to gain support for the implementation of 
their own interventions and systems while having to implement culturally alien and 
inappropriate interventions (Victor, 2007).  Having faced a sustained period of 
colonisation, during which every effort was made to destroy their systems of justice, 
indigenes are now facing a new threat in the form of the increasing globalisation of 
crime control products (see Jones and Newburn, 2002a and 2002b; Karstedt, 2002) and 
in particular, the exportation of the FGC from New Zealand and Australia to the North 
American continent (Tauri, 2009b). 
 
What the above discussion signals is that any analysis of the Indigenous experience of 
settler-colonial state justice requires a multi-pronged approach cognisant of at least 
three truisms, namely 1) that state-related policy making ala Indigenous peoples is 
rarely about ‘us’, and especially not about our empowerment, but rather the state’s 
ability to respond in ways that silence the hegemonic potentialities of our 
policy/political activism and shore up the status quo; 2) that the state is assisted in this 
task by the Academy, and in particular by the ‘human sciences’ such as criminology; and 
3) that our ability to achieve a measure of self-determination in the realm of justice is 
being severely hindered by the increasing globalisation of crime control, a process that 
in turn is increasing the impact of the parasitic relationship between the state and 
members of the Academy, on Indigenous peoples (Tauri, 2014c).   
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PART III 
 
Published Papers 
 
 
The following section presents the eight papers that constitute the thesis in consistent 
format.  This required changes to the formatting of some of the papers from that used 
when they were published.  In most cases the changes are minimal, involving alterations 
to font, footnoting and referencing.  For example, in a published paper a reference might 
appear as Tauri: forthcoming, but appears here as Tauri, 2014c as it was published after 
the original citation.   
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Paper 1 
 
Criminal Justice as a Colonial Project in  
Settler-Colonialism 
 
Juan Marcellus Tauri 
 
(2014) African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies, special edition: 
Indigenous Perspectives and Counter-Colonial Criminologies, 8(1), pp 20-37. 
 
Introduction 
 
The challenge of ‘being Indigenous’, in a psychic and cultural sense, forms the 
crucial question facing Indigenous peoples today in the era of contemporary 
colonialism – a form of post-modern imperialism in which domination is still the 
Settler imperative but where colonisers have designed and practiced more subtle 
means (in contrast to the earlier forms of missionary and militaristic colonial 
enterprises) of accomplishing their objectives. 
                                                                                              Alfred and Corntassel (2005: 297-289).   
 
The quote from Alfred and Corntassel that starts this paper marks out the problem-field 
in which the notes assembled in the following pages are to be inserted.  What follows 
are ‘notes’ inasmuch as they represent the tentative explorations of a working paper on 
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a criminological question that has only recently been explored seriously by ‘western’ 
criminology: what role, if any, does criminal justice play in the settler-colonial states 
subjugation of Indigenous peoples (for recent Indigenous-informed examples see 
Agozino, 2003; Blagg, 2000b; 2008; Cunneen, 2006; Tauri, 2013c)?   
 
This paper offers an Indigenous-centred, critical perspective on the colonial projects 
(Thomas, 1994) employed in settler-colonial contexts to negate, or at the very least 
nullify, the negative impact of two inter-related ‘wicked problems’ that are deemed 
peculiar to these jurisdictions: the high levels of Indigenous subjugation within and by 
the criminal justice system, and the impact of Indigenous resistance to the hegemony of 
the imposed, criminal justice systems deployed by settler-colonial states.  The paper is 
comprised of three inter-related parts; the first two outline the construction and 
deployment of colonial projects in the colonial and neo-colonial contexts, wherein it is 
argued that the matrix of criminal justice was foundational to the state’s attempted 
eradication of, and eventual socio-economic marginalisation of Indigenous peoples.  The 
final section offers the argument that the continued success of criminal justice as a 
(neo)colonial project, stems from its parasitic relationship with the discipline of 
criminology.  Together, the continued deployment of these mutually supportive colonial 
projects against Indigenous peoples demonstrates that structural violence (Galtung, 
1969) continues to be a significant component of social control in the neo-liberal, 
settler-colonial context.   
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Colonial Projects and Settler-Colonialism 
 
The civilising process is not about the uprooting, but about the redistribution of 
violence. 
                                                                                                                    Baumann (1995: 141).   
 
In his critical commentary on the role of the discipline of Anthropology in the 
subjugation of Indigenous peoples, Nicholas Thomas identified a set of processes of 
social control, which he refers to as colonial projects that were fundamental to the 
successful establishment of a settler colony, and subjugation of the Indigenous 
inhabitants.  Thomas (1994: 105) describes these projects as “socially transformative 
endeavour(s) that [are] localised, politicised and partial, yet also engendered by longer 
historical developments and ways of narrating them”.  Furthermore, they are: 
 
often projected rather than realised; because of their confrontations with 
indigenous interests, alternating civilising missions and their internal 
inconsistences, colonial [and neo-colonial] intentions are frequently deflected, or 
enacted farcically and incompletely (Thomas, 1994: 106).  
 
Thomas argues that from the moment of first contact European colonisers utilised 
colonial projects to expedite the eradication, or failing this, the subjugation of the 
Indigenous peoples they encountered in new territories.  During the initial phases of 
colonisation, mutual benefit from trade in goods and religion were key projects for 
advancing the ‘civilising’ mission of colonialism (Cassidy, 2003).  Religious conversion 
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in particular, was considered vital for transforming Indigenous peoples from savage 
beings into ‘proper Christian subjects’ (Kidd, 1997) and better enable them to 
participate in the post-colonial society to come.  Later, the impact of Enlightenment 
thinking saw science and education displace religion as key colonial projects in the 
colonising endeavour (Lynch, 2000).  Through these projects the ideological and 
practical focus of settler-colonial strategy changed from saving our souls, toward 
policies and interventions that facilitated our removal from our lands, and preparing us 
to participate in the emerging capitalist economy.  Underpinning these policies was the 
development of ideological rationales, inspired by Social Darwinism that constructed 
Indigenes as inherently inferior - biologically, genetically and intellectually - to 
Europeans.  Malik (1996) and Wolfe (2010) refer to this change in ideological 
construction of Aboriginality as the racialisation of colonialism.   
 
A key colonial project that arose from the racialisation of colonial ideology, were 
identity categories (Maddison, 2013).  These included the introduction of measurements 
of indigeneity based on blood quantum (for example ‘full’, ‘3/4’, ‘half-Māori’ and so 
forth: see Meredith, 2006).  Relatedly, a raft of projects arose aimed specifically at 
‘breeding out’ the Indigenous, exemplified in a range of eugenics programmes, such as 
forced sterilisation, that were deployed across Canada, Australia and the U.S in the latter 
half of the 19th, and early part of the 20th centuries (Grekul et al, 2004; Lawrence, 2000).  
The eugenics programmes were in turn supported by a range of projects focused on 
eradicating Indigenous peoples ability to practice their culture, most notably in the form 
of child removal programmes and residential/native schools, especially in the Canadian, 
U.S and Australian contexts (see Bartrop, 2001; Trocme, Knoke and Blackstock, 2004; 
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Woolford, 2013).  The eradication of Indigenous culture through education policy was 
supported by the introduction of legislation in all settler-colonial jurisdictions aimed 
specifically at banning or criminalising the practice of Indigenous ritual and culture.  
Notable examples include legislation banning the potlatch ceremony in Canada (Jonaitis, 
1991), the Sun Dance in the U.S (Jorgensen, 1972), and Māori religious practice in New 
Zealand (Stephens, 2001).  And lastly, there are the colonial projects that can be 
collectivised under the heading of ‘structural violence’, exemplified by direct military 
action, forced removal of children, and the policies and actions emanating from the 
developing criminal justice system, much of which was imported intact from the 
jurisdictions of the European colonisers (Merry, 2000; see discussion below on 
structural violence).   
 
The numerous colonial projects that littered the settler-colonial landscape formed a 
complex ‘web’ of subjugating strategies across a range of social and economic policy 
platforms. Underpinning these were colonial states’ judicious deployment of structural 
violence (Churchill, 1997).  It was a web from which a single colonial project could be 
deployed discretely to overcome ‘wicked problems’ that evolve from state-Indigenous 
interactions; wicked problems being those social issues that arise, at least in the eyes of 
the state, as exclusive to problem populations and, as a result, define them as such.  Or, 
as often happened, the state combined projects in co-ordinated campaigns of 
subjugation, such as the combined strategies of police deployment, child removals and 
reservations schools deployed in the American, Canadian and Australian jurisdictions 
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  The sophistication of the 
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web and in particular, its co-ordination, is beautifully captured by Strakosch and 
Macoun (2012: 45) who write that: 
 
There are a number of ways to eliminate Indigenous political difference: by 
physically eliminating Indigenous peoples; by severing their physical connections 
to lands that lie at the heart of their political systems; by breaking down families 
and communities; by drawing Indigenous polities into the state and reforming 
them; and by entering into explicit, contractual exchanges (such as treaties) which 
publicly erase the political distinctions between coloniser and colonised. 
 
Furthermore, the centrality of structural violence to the pursuit of ‘colonialist’ justice 
(or perhaps more accurately, social control), and the interconnected nature of its 
deployment is exemplified in Fanon’s (1963: 38) statement that: 
 
The colonial world is a world cut in two.  The dividing line, the frontiers are shown 
by barracks and police stations.  In the colonies it is the policeman and the soldier 
who are the official, instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler and his 
rule of oppression... [i]n the colonial countries... the policeman and the soldier, by 
their immediate presence and their frequent and direct action maintain contact 
with the native and advise him by means of rifle-butts and napalm not to budge.  It 
is obvious here that the agents of government speak the language of pure force 
(Fanon, 1963: 38). 
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Colonial Projects in the Neo-Colonial Context 
 
Our respective geographical locations are framed by nation states such as the USA, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand where colonisation has not ceased to exist; it 
has only changed in form from that which our ancestors encountered. 
Moreton-Robinson (2009b: 11).  
 
How are we to contextualise the ground upon which the neo-colonial marginalisation of 
Indigenous peoples within settler-colonialism is constructed and maintained?  Some 
perceive it as a figuration (see Powell, 2011) or, as discussed previously, a structure 
(Galtung, 1969; Strakosch and Macoun, 2012) that is supported by both real and 
symbolic violence against Indigenous peoples that has, over time, become ‘cultural’; 
evolving from a process to a permanence within the body politic of settler-colonial 
societies (Galtung, 1990).  As postulated recently by Woolford (2013: 172-173; 174, see 
further discussion below), these various modes of epistemic violence (Kitossa, 2014) 
exist within an overarching web that facilitates the colonial subjugation of Indigenous 
peoples, via a “mesh that stretches itself across the content, operating through various 
nodes or sites that change, or take different shape, across time and space”.   
 
Structurally, settler-colonialism is visualised by Woolford (2013: 172) as a “series of 
nets that operate to constrain [Indigenous] agency”, and are inter-linked at the macro, 
meso and micro levels.  The first (macro)-level net spreads across the entire socio-
cultural realm of a settler-colonial society and involves the dominant subjugating 
processes of social activity, including the economy, government (including the 
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development of laws and subscription of the right to use violence) and religion.  
Woolford (2013: 172) contends that “[i]t is at this broad level that dominant visions of 
the colonial order are negotiated: for example, the formulation of the so-called Indian 
problem in Canada”, and by extension the ‘Aboriginal problem’ in Australia, the ‘Indian 
problem’ in the U.S, and the ‘Māori problem’ in New Zealand.  In the context of criminal 
justice, we have the wicked problem of Māori /Indigenous over-representation, 
represented in governmental discourse as a ‘fact of (criminal justice) life’ that poses a 
significant social problem and threat to social order requiring meaningful intervention.  
The ‘Māori problem’ is described in governmental and media discourse as being so 
significant that New Zealand’s crime problem would likely disappear if not for the high 
level and ongoing nature of Māori offending, because we are ‘full of crime’ (Otago Daily 
Times, 2012).  At this level of netting significant ideological and policy-related resource 
is concentrated at the ‘Māori problem’.  This comes in various forms, including high 
rates of surveillance of Māori by the institutions of social control, and political attention 
to the vote winning potentialities of addressing the wicked problem of Indigenous 
crime.   
 
Supporting the macro-level is what Woolford (2013: 172) described as the upper-meso 
level, namely the bureaucratic field of government, where “one finds the institutional 
netting that brings together various state and state-sponsored agencies that are 
essential to the operations of contemporary settler-colonialism, namely policing, the 
legal system, the military and health, education and welfare policy sectors.  Supporting 
the upper-meso institutions is a layer that features the service delivery mechanisms 
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that enable the practice of settler-colonialism to be facilitated.  In the education sphere 
this includes: 
 
a variety of schools (e.g., reservation and non-reservation; federal and mission, 
day and boarding) form a network of interactions, as they cooperate and compete 
with one another, depending on various circumstances (ibid: 172). 
 
At the upper-meso level of criminal justice we observe the strategic deployment of 
militaristic-style policing of Indigenous protest, the significant focusing of  policing 
resources and power against Indigenous individuals and communities in the form of 
stop-and-search powers and 3-strikes  legislation (Cunneen, 2006).  Policing, 
corrections, child care and protection services, the policy industry and the courts all 
provide avenues through which Indigenous peoples are governed ‘differently’ in terms 
of the depth, form and effects of policing.  Arguably, this represents a contemporary 
manifestation of the racialised policies of policing developed during the colonial context 
(Auger, Doob, Auger and Driben, 1992; Cunneen, 2006; Harding, 1991; Moyle, 2013; 
Tauri, 2009; 2014c).   
 
Finally we arrive at the micro-level layer of netting where the structural violence of 
settler-colonialism is operationalised and delivered on the ground.  In the education 
sphere this occurs via the implementation of repressive policies by specific schools 
(Woolford, 2013: 172): 
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[W]hich connects parents, children, teachers, principals, and communities in 
interactions defined by regionally-adapted techniques of governance and control, 
and a local actor-network that involved not just humans, but also non-human 
actors like disease, poverty, animals, and territory in local experiences of 
assimilative schooling.   
 
Within the criminal justice sector the micro-level net is operationalised through, 
amongst many possible examples, the targeted stratagem’s of police district 
commanders against problem populations, the purposeful targeting of Indigenous 
individuals and communities by racist (or poorly trained) police officers, and the 
uneven application of discretionary powers.  Other practices include individual 
departments choosing to ignore existing Indigenous practices and programmes in 
preference to imported western crime control initiatives (see Tauri, 2011b and further 
discussion later in this paper).   
 
We contend that similar to Woolford’s education-focused case study, the criminal justice 
system is a key colonial project within the armoury of the settler-colonial state.  It is a 
project built around a sophisticated web across the macro, meso and micro levels of 
settler-colonial society or more particularly, settler-colonial ‘government’. Furthermore, 
we argue that the criminal justice system’s importance as a colonial project has 
intensified in the last century because of the supposed diminished ability of the 
contemporary neo-liberal state to legitimately deploy direct violence (for example, 
military operations), or hard-line assimilatory policies that characterised previous 
colonialist attempts to subjugate Indigenous peoples. In other words, the killing times 
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are over, but epistemic and structural violence are still essential colonial projects in the 
on-going, contested process of settler colonisation, and its form, more often than not, 
manifests through the application of crime control policies, legislation and practices 
(Churchill, 1997; Cribben, 1984).   
 
Following the post-war internationalisation of human rights, the strategic, purposeful 
use of violence as a social policy tool for controlling problem populations, was deemed 
unacceptable (Bauman, 1995).  Similarly, the racist assimilatory policies that had sought 
the eradication of our Indigenous souls, rather than the destruction of our physical 
bodies, were also challenged and, rhetorically at least, replaced with more acceptable 
policy discourses such as ‘integration’ and ‘reconciliation’.  In the context of 
contemporary settler-colonialism, structural violence is expressed much differently in 
practice when compared to its deployment during the colonial era.  Today the structural 
violence of the colonising project is perpetrated against Indigenes in the form of 
militaristic-style policing strategies, the biased application of public disorder offences 
and discretionary powers, and the criminal justice-led large-scale removal of 
Indigenous children and youth to detention centres, and Indigenous adults to the prison 
system (Blagg, 2008; Cunneen, 2006; Kitossa, 2014)7.  The colonial projects that enable 
the deployment of structural violence by the developing colonial state, supported by the 
ideology of (genocidal) eradication, have become, at least at the surface of practice 
rather than intent, bio-political inasmuch as the state now seeks to govern and contain 
                                                          
7   Clear exceptions to the new form(s) of supposed humane colonialism arise from time to time, 
demonstrating that the ideals and practices of old colonialism never fully vanish from use.  Instead, they 
change shape and form in response to re-configured versions of the wicked problems that arise from time-
to-time in neo-colonial contexts.  The most recent significant example was the Australian Federal 
government’s implementation in 2007 of the Northern Territory Emergency Response in relation to a 
perceived rise in Aboriginal sexual and physical child abuse (Altman and Hinkson (eds.), 2007; Altman and 
Russell, 2012).   
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Indigenous peoples through ever more sophisticated projects that focus on 
administering life, rather than eradicating it, in order to “[R]ationalise problems posed 
to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a 
population: health, hygiene, birth rate, life expectancy, race” (Dean, 2010: 118-119).   
 
Doing Imperialism Quietly?  Criminal Justice and Structural Violence and Settler-
Colonialism 
 
Around the turn of the century there emerges a mythic, masterful silence in the 
narratives of empire, what Sir Alfred Lyall called ‘doing our Imperialism quietly’.  
             Bhabha (1994: 177 – emphasis added). 
 
Importantly, for the arguments made in this paper, settler-colonialism is not defined or 
constructed through a “moment of transformative restructuring” that leads to the 
context moving to a decolonising moment, or for that matter, ‘post’ the subjugation of 
resident First Nations.  As Strakosch and Macoun (2012: 43) contend: 
 
[This] has not occurred in settler colonies such as Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand.  This [post-colonialism] locates ‘real’ colonialism in the past, and assumes 
that now policy must deal with the ‘legacies’, ‘heritage’ or ‘reverberating 
aftermath’ of colonialism in today’s world. 
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In all settler-colonial societies crises are regularly projected ‘out from’ Indigenous 
communities, on to the state, whose task it is to fix whatever is ailing its Indigenes at a 
particular socio-historical moment.  As Moreton-Robinson (2009a: 61) describes it, 
these crises are “constructed as something extraordinary and aberrant requiring new 
governmental measures” (such as the Australian Federal governments Northern 
Territory Emergency Response, see Altman, and Hinkson, 2007).  This process, which 
Moreton-Robinson describes as the ‘state-of-exception thesis’ and Boulden and Morton 
(2007: 163) as ‘emergencies’, are managed as events that have “…. a political style, one 
that we have become increasingly use to since September 11”.  It is an alarming world, 
alerting people to immediate dangers to life, health and property.  Sometimes the 
dangers are real, sometimes they are imagined; and sometimes they are a complete red 
herring.  These (often contrived) emergencies are employed in part to rationalise the 
state’s exceptional interference in the lives of Indigenous peoples.  They serve both an 
ideological and functional role in colonial and neo-colonial contexts, including 
rationalising the use of structural violence to support the ongoing subjugation of 
Indigenous peoples.    
 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the structural violence of the criminal justice 
systems of the settler-colonial state, especially its key role of sequestering Indigenous 
peoples within state-controlled, closed institutions.  The role of criminal justice system in 
the modern European state is well established as reflective of the desire for internal 
control of populations and of their labouring capacity (Wacquant, 2009), characterised 
by the workings of the sequestering institutions so powerfully identified by Foucault 
(2000) - most notably prisons, asylums and workhouses.  In the settler society context 
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we might add to this list of closed institutions youth borstals, residential schools and the 
penal reserves and reservations of North America and Australia (such as Palm Island, 
see Anthony, 2009.  See also Churchill, 1997; Harris, 2004 and van Krieken, 1999), 
which were used as ‘camps’ for concentrating large groups of Indigenous individuals, 
and sometimes entire Indigenous communities who were deemed surplus to the 
developing capitalist mode of production (Rombough and Keithly, 2005).  More 
recently, the significant, and consistent over-representation of Indigenous peoples in 
youth detention centres and adult prisons, has been referred to by O’Connor (1994) as 
the ‘new removals’ and by Cunneen (1997: 2) as the ‘new stolen generations’ where 
“[t]he high levels of criminalisation and subsequent incarceration of Indigenous young 
people in Australia effectively amounts to a new practice of forced separation of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people from their families”.   
 
When taken together these examples of sequestration correspond with what Harris 
(2004) calls the management of dispossession, a slowly evolving set of colonial projects 
located principally at the meso-level of Woolford’s schema due to their primary purpose 
- the removal of the Indigenous individual from his or her cultural context.  These 
projects evolved within the settler-colonial contexts as primary sites for disciplining 
Indigenes at the point where “physical power moved into the background (while 
remaining crucial), and the disciplinary strategies associated with the management of 
people, nature, and space, came to the fore” (Harris, 2004: 174).  
 
Arguably the settler-colonial state has become much more subtle and manoeuvrable in 
terms of the development and employment of colonial projects.  No longer able to 
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maintain legitimacy by deploying racist, assimilationist strategies, such as the forced 
removal of our children under targeted policies8, or specific legislation banning 
language and cultural practices, or indeed replicating the physical genocide of the 
Indian Wars carried out in the U.S, or the killing times in Australia (Barkan, 2003; Neu, 
2000; Riethmuller, 2006), the neo-liberal settler state nonetheless deploys 
structural/epistemic violence as a colonial project against Indigenous communities.  In 
the guise of youth detention, prison and child care and protection processes (O’Connor, 
1994), the colonial projects of removal and sequestration remain significant structurally 
violent strategies deployed by the settler-colonial state in its ongoing ‘war of 
manoeuvre’ against Indigenous resistance to assimilation, and at times, annihilation.   
 
The Interconnectivity of the Criminal Justice Web 
Colonial projects intertwine and overlap, continuously morphing into new ‘technologies 
of control’ that enable the settler-colonial state to control populations that are deemed a 
‘problem’.  Thus in the Canadian context, we can trace the residential school morphing 
into the prison industrial complex, which is arguably now a primary site through which 
the colonial policies of integration and assimilation are perpetuated in the 
neo(liberal)colonial context (Proulx, 2002).  In relation to criminal justice, we see the 
                                                          
8  The strategy of child removal as a colonial project is no longer characterised by direct violence, such as the 
Australian policy of using police and armed forces to enter Aboriginal communities to make forced 
removals that was prevalent from the late 1900s to the mid-twentieth century (Cunneen, 1997).  It can be 
argued that the process has been replaced with one akin to Bauman’s (1989) rationalised process of 
modern bureaucracy and the rise of risk-based systems for analysing populations.  In this context, the 
direct violence of old-style removals has been replaced with risk-based evaluation that aids to identify 
high-risk individuals, families and communities in need of surveillance and intervention.  In all settler 
colonial contexts, Indigenous communities are judged high-risk in relation to child care and protection 
matters (Moyle, 2013).  This results in high levels of surveillance, high rates of reporting, investigation and 
of child removals.  
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silent yet nonetheless ‘violent’ imperialism of settler-colonialism present in Mallea’s 
(2000: 27) description of service delivery in Canadian prisons where: 
 
European culture dominates in the prison system and there is racism among the 
staff… Prisons provide the same extreme form of isolation which was the 
experience by children in the residential schools... One program called Teen 
Challenge is now operating within some Manitoba prisons.  Teen Challenge is a 
drug rehabilitation program based on fundamentalist Christianity.  It bans the 
practice of Native spirituality within the program and preaches that such 
spirituality… is the occult. 
 
Mallea’s description of authorised in-prison programmes in Manitoba relates to the 
argument made here that criminal justice is a key project for the dissemination of 
structural violence, through the fact that the site of isolation from one’s cultural context 
and pseudo-religious/scientific-programming - the prison - becomes a primary venue 
for the continued subjugation of the Indigenous life-world.  Arguably, this attempt is no 
less violent than projects utilised during the colonial context; if one accepts that the 
forced imposition of non-Indigenous religious belief and practice is ‘violent’, coupled 
with the ‘violence’ of the imposition of psycho-therapeutic service mechanism of a 
Eurocentric drug rehabilitation programme, and removal and isolation from one’s 
Indigenous community in a decidedly ‘non-Indigenous’ institution.  By banning 
Indigenous spirituality from the context of rehabilitative service delivery, the violence 
of isolation that occurs through the act of incarceration, is exponentially enhanced 
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through the concomitant violence generated by denigration of the Indigenous life-
world. 
 
The (Ordinary) Structural Violence of Settler-Colonial Criminal Justice 
 
The etiological myth deeply entrenched in the self-consciousness of our Western 
society is the morally elevating story of humanity emerging from pre-social 
barbarity.  
         Bauman (1989: 12).  
 
We can anticipate significant disagreement from some with the argument that criminal 
justice represents as a key site through which the settler-colonial state manifests the 
colonial project of structural violence against Indigenes.  An early example of this view 
is espoused by Anthony Giddens (1985) who, during his critique of Foucault’s 
perspective on power and the state, argued that the French theorist’s emphasis on 
coercive, closed institutions was too constricted to enable a sophisticated analysis of 
power and social control in contemporary Western societies.  Giddens (quoted in 
Gledhill, 2000: 17; emphasis Gledhill) preferred instead “a more general shift in the 
sanctioning capacities of the state from the manifest use of violence to the pervasive use 
of administrative power”.  This change in modes of social control from violence (or at 
least the threat of it) to the use of administrative, disciplinary technologies to elicit 
internal pacification of the population, is evidenced by contemporary police forces and 
the science of policing replacing violent policing, such as the deployment of military 
troops and military action, as fundamental to the practice of social regulation.  It also 
106 
 
signals the compartmentalisation of policing within the sophisticated, bureaucratic 
mechanisms of codified law, incarceration, parole and probation.  Giddens gives much 
weight in his analysis of contemporary social regulation to the supposed diminution of 
violence resulting from the contemporary state’s steady movement towards facilitating 
internal pacification of the ‘population’ through administrative power.  As such, he 
argued that a distinguishing feature of this mode of regulation of a population is the 
withdrawal of the military from direct participation in the internal affairs of the state. 
Within Giddens’ schema, criminal justice, including policing, when compared to the 
violence deployed in support of the colonial enterprise, represents a form of ‘quiet 
imperialism’. 
 
Indigenous and critical sociological scholarship exposes the Eurocentric bases of this 
type of theorising of the ‘pacifist’ exercise of power by the contemporary settler state.  
For example, an extensive literature demonstrates the explicit violence of policing in 
neo-colonial jurisdictions, both historically and contemporarily (see Churchill, 1997; 
Wilson, 1998 for the North American context, Watson, 2009 for the Australian, and 
Jackson, 1988; Pratt, 1992 for New Zealand).  Violence as a coercive tool of social 
control is fundamental to the formation and enduring hegemony of the modern 
(neoliberal) capitalist state.  Indeed, as Bauman (1989) succinctly demonstrates in his 
sociological study of the holocaust, violence as a project for controlling a population is 
not only possible in a ‘rationally’-derived polity, but is in fact the end point of the 
development of this so-called science of state craft: 
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Once the hope to contain the Holocaust experience in the theoretical framework of 
malfunction (modernity incapable of suppressing the essentially alien factors of 
irrationality, civilising pressures failing to subdue emotional and violent drives, 
socialisation going awry and hence unable to produce the needed volume of moral 
motivations) has been dashed, one can be easily tempted to try the ‘obvious’ exit 
from the theoretical impasse; to proclaim the Holocaust a ‘paradigm’ of modern 
civilisation, its ‘natural’, ‘normal’ (who knows – perhaps also common) product, its 
‘historical tendency’ (Bauman, 1989: 5-6: emphasis Bauman’s). 
 
Bauman (ibid: 6: emphasis Bauman’s) further argues that “[i]n this version, the 
Holocaust would be promoted to the status of a truth of modernity (rather than 
recognised as a possibility that modernity contains)”.  In effect, Bauman counters 
Giddens’ (mis)representation of modern state-craft characterised by the diminution of 
violence as a biopolitical strategy of control or as something that, when it does arise, 
represents an aberration, the rending of evil through the fabric of civility that cloaks 
‘western civilisation’.  Instead, as Bauman (1989: 18) contends, there is nothing 
inherent in the instrumental rationality of contemporary state-craft that makes it 
singularly incapable of deploying structural violence, in fact: 
 
The bureaucratic culture which prompts us to view society as an object of 
administration, as a collection of so many ‘problems’ to be solved…. as a legitimate 
target for ‘social engineering’… was the very atmosphere in which the idea of the 
Holocaust could be conceived, slowly yet consistently developed, and brought to 
its conclusion. 
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To consider contemporary settler-colonial policing as part of the diminution of violence 
as a key colonial project within the settler-colonial context, is to gloss over the fact that 
structural violence continues to be a significant strategy in the state’s ongoing 
pacification of their Indigenous peoples and other dispossessed populations.  The 
evidence of the continued importance of this particular colonial project to the settler-
colonial state is extensive: we see it used in its commonly described ‘direct’ form as a 
response to Indigenous activism, such as at Bastion Point and Wounded Knee in the 
1970s (D’Arcus, 2001; The Waitangi Tribunal, 1987), Oka in the 1990’s (Kalant, 2004) 
and most recently against the Mi’kmak First Nations resistance to gas mining in the 
Canadian province of Nova Scotia (2013).  The violence deployed in these contexts was 
strategic, planned, and purposeful.  As such, it stands in stark contrast to the supposed 
benign use of administrative power that Giddens’ and others present as characteristic of 
western, (neo)liberal government (Hayek, 1944; for critical discussion of this 
perspective see Oksala, 2011 and Springer, 2011).  Second, we can observe in the 
structural violence of contemporary criminal justice systems the pervasive, militaristic-
style over-policing of people of colour in Western jurisdictions, evidence of bias and 
racism in the way police use their discretionary powers, courts their discretion in terms 
of prison sentences or community sentences, and correctional services through the 
denial of the legitimacy of the Indigenous cultural context as a source of rehabilitative 
practices (Aboriginal Justice and Advisory Committee, 2000; Cunneen, 2006; Harding, 
1991; Perry, 2006; Webb, 2004).   
 
Recently, a number of commentators have begun theorising the contribution of law and 
justice institutions in the “historical and ongoing contested subjugation of Indigenous 
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peoples”, most notably Smandych (2013: 92), Veracini (2007) and Wolfe (1999).  The 
work of all three demonstrates that a key logic of settler-colonialism is the elimination 
of the Indigenous peoples.  Cited in Smandych (ibid: 93), Wolfe conceptualises the 
settler-colonial logic of elimination as more than just the liquidation of Indigenous 
peoples, but also: 
 
In common with genocide as Raphael Lemkin characterised it, settler-colonialism 
has both negative and positive dimensions.  Negatively, it strives for the 
dissolution of native societies.  Positively, it erects a new colonial society on the 
expropriated land base… In its positive aspect, elimination is an organising 
principal of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superseded) 
occurrence.  The positive outcomes of the logic of elimination can include officially 
encouraged miscegenation, the breaking-down of native title into alienable 
individual freeholds, native citizenship, child abduction, religious conversion, 
resocialisation in total institutions such as missions or boarding schools, and 
whole range of cognate biocultural assimilations. 
 
Why, might we ask, does Wolfe represent native schools, child removal and other 
similar colonial projects, as ‘positive’ manifestations of the colonialist logic of 
elimination?  Smandych (2013) attempts to address this issue by arguing that when 
compared to physical genocide via warfare, these strategies are ‘positive’ in that they do 
not seek to replace Indigenous societies in their entirety, but to control and corral; 
Paradoxically, by (forcibly) bringing Indigenous people together in these institutional 
settings, resistance and socio-cultural regeneration is enabled.  As Smandych (2013) 
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relates, resistance and counter-resistance by both settler-colonialists and Indigenous 
peoples, continues to structure and reframe settler-colonial societies, and ensures that 
the ‘end point’ of the logic of elimination remains elusive.  And importantly, as 
Smandych (2013: 93) further argues, the logic of elimination “continues into the 
present” in the guise of the supposedly ‘quiet imperialist’ projects discussed previously.  
But as we have discussed here, the centrality of the criminal justice system to the 
ongoing colonialist agenda, demonstrates the continued importance of ‘old colonial 
projects’ - most especially of structural violence, to the settler-colonial context.   
 
Closing Comments 
 
Aboriginal people were modernity’s ‘waste’: the criminal justice system became 
one of a number of sites of waste management for those stigmatised as belonging 
to a doomed race, and a warehouse for those who resisted the process. 
                            Blagg (2008: 21). 
 
How is it then, that supposedly ‘liberal’, democratic, Western nations such as New 
Zealand, Australia, Canada and the U.S are portrayed in this paper as anything but 
‘liberal’ when it comes to their use of the structural violence to effect the (continued) 
marginalisation of their Indigenous peoples?  For an answer we might refer to 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of the ‘illiberality of liberal government’, where supposed 
liberal governments act in ways that mirror authoritarian regimes by implementing 
policies with prejudice, and sometimes with violence, against targeted sections of the 
population: 
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[A]s was evident in recent revelations about the way in which liberal-democratic 
states (like those in Scandinavia) have, in the course of the twentieth century, 
practised forced sterilisation in the name of a eugenic Utopia on certain of their 
populations.  Even more pervasive has been the tendency within certain states 
(Australia, Canada), having ceased to attempt actual genocide, to commit forms of 
cultural genocide upon indigenous people within their borders in the name of 
their own well-being, such as in the case of the removal of children from their 
parents and families.  While the bio-political imperative does not account for all 
that bedevils liberal-democratic states, it is remarkable how much of what is done 
of an illiberal character is done with the best of bio-political intentions (Dean, 
2010: 156).   
 
Perhaps it is simply a continuation of the overwhelming ‘will to control’ that was so 
crucial to the original pioneering endeavours of the early colonialists.  Or is it because 
we Indigenous peoples are what might be called an unfinished project that impedes the 
neo-colonial (and neoliberal) state from announcing the end of colonialism?  It should 
be remembered that we were meant to accept the gift of civilisation, but instead had the 
temerity to resist, seeing colonisation for what it really meant – the eradication of 
ourselves and our culture.  We were also meant to die out; unable to cope with the 
ravages of western disease and the superiority of ‘western civilisation’, but instead we 
reproduced at much higher rates than the colonialists.  When these events failed to 
transpire it was believed that policy, and the march of the capitalist free market 
economy – the end points of social evolution - would bring about our assimilation or 
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integration and see us forever discard our archaic cultural practices and languages.  
Instead, we revitalised our cultures, exerted our rights to self-determination and began 
actively challenging the hegemony of many of the institutions, policies and 
interventions supposedly implemented to ‘reduce our risk to society’, including the 
criminal justice system (Tauri, 2005).   
 
As unfinished business we are an embarrassment to the settler-colonial state, because 
our very existence calls into question the legitimacy of settler-colonialism and the 
effectiveness of the supposedly benign, enlightened types of colonial projects now in 
vogue.  Unfortunately, the criminal justice system makes a lie of claims that the settler-
colonial state no longer has need of structural violence to control its problematic 
Indigenous populations, or that settler-colonialism represents a quieter (meaning less 
assimilatory) process of subjugation.  Instead, the policies and actions of the agents and 
agencies of crime control demonstrate that structural violence remains a significant tool 
of subjugation of Indigenous peoples in contemporary settler-colonialism.   
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Democracy: International Perspectives.  London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 217-233.   
 
Introduction 
Biko Agozino (2010: i) has described the discipline of criminology as “a ‘control-freak’; 
one whose “imperialist reasoning” is most evident when supporting “the [contemporary 
state’s] exercise of internal colonialism and neo-colonialism” within settler societies. In 
recent times the development of supposed evidence-based crime control policy 
throughout Western jurisdictions appears to have reinvigorated administrative 
criminological formations to the extent that they once again dominate policy discourse 
relating to the issues of Indigenous over-representation and critique of the operations 
of criminal justice. This chapter seeks to explore this state of affairs by firstly, providing 
a critical examination of the role criminology plays in the continued neo-colonial 
subjugation of First Nations and secondly, the role that myth construction and 
maintenance plays in the hegemonic activities of a particularly authoritarian form of the 
discipline.  A critical analysis of two articles from a recent Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Criminology (2010) special edition on ‘Aboriginal violence’ highlights the core 
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features and, arguably, the key failings of this authoritarian criminology in relation to its 
response to Indigenous justice issues: namely a preference for undertaking research on 
instead of with Indigenous peoples, the privileging non-engaging research 
methodologies and the potent use of myth to promote practitioners views of the world 
and silence the Indigenous voice.   
 
A Brief Outline of Australasian Criminology 
 
What is criminology?  A control-freak discipline! 
                           Agozino (2010: i). 
 
The assumption that those who read this chapter will be familiar with the broad history 
of the discipline of criminology is no doubt justified.  Therefore, this allows me to make 
a sweeping glance over this history as it pertains to the formation of the discipline in 
Australasia9.  Of course we all know that the power of positivistic, administrative or 
Eurocentric criminology, call it what you will, was seriously challenged in the 1960s 
onwards by the advent of various ‘critical’ criminologies.  These critical perspectives 
shared in common a rejection of (amongst other things) servicing the needs of the state 
and the overwhelming focus on ‘individual antecedents’ of criminality.  What 
distinguished these approaches from administrative formulations was their focused, 
critical gaze on the institutions of social control, and the impact of divisive, disempowering 
social structures (Scraton and Chadwick, 1991; see also Carrington and Hogg, 2012: 47-
48). 
                                                          
9  The term Australasia is used as a collective term for the separate, neo-colonial jurisdictions of Australia 
and New Zealand.   
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Muncie (2000) argues that the radical critique was so vociferous that some on ‘the left’ 
anticipated the demise of criminology itself or at the very least a ‘retrenchment’ of the 
administrative and positivistic varieties.  This supposition seriously overestimated the 
power of the radical perspective while underestimating the resilience of positivist, 
Eurocentric forms of criminology.  It ignored the fact that even if the individualised, 
Eurocentric focus of administrative criminology for a time lost its shine in terms of 
dominating journal and book publications, academic awards and the like (a highly 
debatable supposition), its tendency for theoretical imperialism and its sycophantic 
relationship with the state ensured it continued to receive the attentions of policy 
makers (Kitossa, 2012; Tauri, 2009).   
 
By the end of the 1980s the rejuvenation of law and order politics in the United States 
under Reagan, and Great Britain under Thatcher, brought with it the resurrection of an 
administrative criminology revived after the suffocation of the ‘nothing works’ 
paradigm of the 1970s.  Once again, positivistic criminologies were invited back into the 
governmental fold as Western jurisdictions turned increasingly to ‘tough on crime’ 
approaches to social harm (Shichor, 2000; Walters, 2006).  The resurrection of 
administrative, embedded criminologies10 entered its end game in the mid-1990s when 
policy industry’s in various Western jurisdictions implemented so-called evidence 
based policy (EBP) processes that the likes of  Tony Blair and his New Labour 
                                                          
10 Elsewhere, Carlen (2010) and Carrington and Hogg (2012) have advised against imagining 
criminologies to the point of creating monolithic constructs and intellectual dichotomies such ‘critical’ 
vs. ‘administrative’ approaches and such like.  Carrington and Hogg (2012: 46-47) argue that “[s]uch 
exercises in distancing…. have borne little intellectual fruit over the years, let alone in the present when 
critical work in criminology has become unmistakably ‘mainstream’ in Australia… as elsewhere.  While 
acknowledging the validity of this critique in terms of the eclectic nature of the discipline and the fact 
that all criminologies can ask critical questions, the historical and contemporary role of the discipline in 
subjugating Indigenes is readily identifiable via critical analysis via an Indigenous Standpoint; as will be 
demonstrated in this chapter.   
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government predicted would bring about the end of ideological policy making (Marston 
and Watts, 2003)11.  Instead, we had entered a new world in which evidence derived 
from scientific research, would dominate policy development (Walters, 2008).  The rise 
of EBP meant that that once again, positivistic, administrative criminological 
approaches became the acceptable face of the academy for policy makers (see Parsons, 
2002).  The situation was the same in various neo-colonial contexts, except for the 
preference of New Zealand and Australian administrative criminology practitioners and 
policy makers to look to Europe and North America for theoretical and empirical 
inspiration (Carrington and Hogg, 2012: 48; Tauri, 2009; Webb, 2003).   
 
To infer that criminology, or at least particular derivatives of the discipline are 
‘Eurocentric’ is not to ignore variations in epistemological, methodological preference 
and theoretical nuances that exist in our eclectic discipline.  However, from an 
Indigenous Standpoint the term encapsulates the cultural, social and economic roots of 
the European academy’s intellectual evolution.  As Agozino (2003; 2010) and Cohen 
(1988) contend, the colonial enterprise that took place from the 16th to the 19thand 
early 20th centuries12 was central to the theoretical and empirical evolution of the 
                                                          
11 Much like the radical perspectives’ predictions of the demise of administrative criminology or 
Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘end of history’, Blair et al’s announcement that EBP would facilitate the end of 
ideology and politics in policy making has been shown to be wishful thinking (for example, see Tauri, 
2009 and Walters, 2009).   
 
12 It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a thorough overview of both the intellectual development 
of the discipline of criminology, or of its grounding in the imperialist policies of Western colonisation of 
Indigenous peoples.  The former point has been made in detail elsewhere, although unsurprisingly 
critical analysis of the role of the discipline in the cultural and physical genocide by colonising powers of 
Indigenous peoples is sparse (although see for examples Cohen, 1988, Jackson, 1988; Pfohl, 1994).  The 
following quote from Agozino (2010: i) is suffice at this point to position criminology firmly as a key 
technology of social control in the colonial era: “[c]ontrol-freak criminology was there from the 
beginning of imperialism when the attempt to pacify the rebellious natives and stabilise foreign 
domination of finance capital was politely referred to as the ‘native question’… to which the answer was 
a pattern of pacification that has been identified as gun-boat criminology”. 
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discipline of criminology.  The imperialist underpinnings of contemporary criminology 
is eloquently captured in Agozino’s (2010: vii) observation that: 
 
It was at the height of the slave trade that classicism emerged to challenge the 
arbitrary nature of punishment in medieval Europe but this insight was not 
extended to enslaved Africans who were arbitrarily victimised even when they did 
nothing wrong.  However, it was not until the height of colonialism in African and 
Asia that Europe discovered the new ‘science’ of criminology as a tool to aid the 
control of the other – a supposed advancement on classical philosophies of justice. 
 
The Hegemony of Authoritarian Criminology in Australasia 
The issue of Indigenous over-representation in the criminal justice system has been a 
significant focus of criminological work in Australasia for the past quarter century.  
Until the advent of the ‘golden age’ of Indigenous-informed, Australian criminology in 
the 1980s and 1990s, much of the initial academic material was generated by those 
working within the administrative criminological vein.  During this period a group of 
mainly European criminologists published extensive material that privileged the 
Aboriginal experience of crime control policy and gave voice to their issues, much of it 
without the requisite filtering processes of the policy industry13 (see Clifford, 1982; 
                                                          
13 The situation is significantly different in that very little material that privileges the Māori experience of 
criminal justice processes was produced during this era.  Criminologists and policy makers tended to 
offer a steady diet of Eurocentrically-centred, uncritical policy statements, exemplified by the 
Reoffending by Māori (RoBM) project led by the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Māori Development 
(see Williams, 2001).  An exception is Moana Jackson’s ground breaking 1988 report He Whaaipanga 
Hou (Māori and the Criminal Justice System), Jackson 1990; 1992, 1995a; 1995b and in terms of 
historical work, chapter two of John Pratt’s (1992) Punishment in a Perfect Society, and Alan Ward’s 
(1995) A Show of Justice: Racial Amalgamation in Nineteenth Century New Zealand.  What little 
criminological material was being produced on Indigenous issues, for example components of 
Newbold’s 2000 publication Crime in New Zealand, were based on the privileging of Eurocentrically 
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Cunneen, 1992; 1994; 1997; 1999; Blagg, 1997; 1998; 2000b; Dodson, 1994).  This body 
of work represented a significant change from the diet of government funded material 
that masqueraded for ‘objective’, ‘value-free’ research we had been subjected to in the 
past14.  The period from the late 1990s onwards has seen a re-empowerment of neo-
conservative, state-centred criminological perspectives on the Blackfella/Māori 
‘problem’.  Unfortunately, as will be discussed later in the chapter, much of the material 
emanating from this perspective adds to the discipline’s sad history of abetting the 
subjugation of First Nations, proving that the Eurocentric, embedded components of the 
discipline are failing to learn from the discipline’s abusive past.   
 
Contrary to the claims of adherents such as Weatherburn (2010), the majority of 
criminological material that is influencing public policy and media discourse on the 
‘Indigenous question’, emanates from approaches that are predominantly quantitative 
in method, and largely ‘Aboriginal free’ in terms of data gathering and engagement with 
the research population.  The body of work that is considered of value to the policy 
sector and mainstream media, is predominantly statistically-focused and government-
funded (see Bond and Jeffries, 2010; Jeffries and Bond, 2010, Marie, 2010; Newbold and 
Jeffries, 2010; Snowball and Weatherburn, 2006 and 2007; Weatherburn and Fitzgerald, 
2006; Weatherburn, Fitzgerald and Hua, 2003; Weatherburn, Snowball and Hunter, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
derived material and not on meaningful engagement (or indeed empirical inquiry) with Māori; a stance 
replicated in a recently published chapter on ‘race and crime’ (Newbold and Jeffries, 2010). 
 
14 One significant exception to the rule that government funded material is non-critical, comes in the form 
of the 1992 report released by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
(RCIADIC).   
 
119 
 
2006 for exemplars of the type of material produced by embedded Australasian 
criminologists)15.   
 
There are a number of reasons why the material produced by embedded criminological 
approaches is proving popular with both policy makers and mainstream media.  One 
forceful explanation is that the body of work this paradigm produces largely avoids 
critical analysis of the policy-making process.  It avoids or sidelines complicated, messy 
‘structural determinants’ such as racist policing, racist court processes, racist 
Government policy and legislation (most recently demonstrated in the Australasian 
context by the introduction in 2006 of the Federal Government’s Northern Territory 
Emergency Response: see Altman, 2007).  These supposedly ‘too hard to measure’ 
determinants of Indigenous marginalisation are often dismissed through flippant and 
empirically weak contentions that institutional bias and structural determination have 
dominated (and negatively impacted) Aboriginal policy making (see Marie, 2010; 
Weatherburn, 2010 and discussion below).  This argument and many others form the 
great myths through which administrative, embedded criminologies seek to maintain 
hegemony in the race to be ‘of utility’ to the state (see below for in-depth discussion of 
the importance of  myth for administrative, embedded criminologies). 
 
I argue that the resurrection of administrative criminologies has seen the development 
of a form that is particular to settler societies, including Australasia.  To this peculiar 
form I give the name Authoritarian Criminology.  This ‘new’ form of criminological 
                                                          
15 A body of work exists that privileges the Indigenous perspective, but thus far is less likely to impact 
policy development and media discourse.  For example, see Altman (2007), Bull, (2004; 2009), Cunneen 
(2008 and 2009), Tauri (2004; 2009; 2011c); Vivian and Schokman (2009) and Webb (2003; 2004; 
2012).   
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formulation appears to serve the interests of the neo-colonial state, Eurocentric 
academic institutions, and the career aspirations of practitioners.  Of lesser concern are 
the needs of Indigenous peoples who serve simply as the providers of empirical data for 
analysis.  As such the practice of Authoritarian Criminology represents a contemporary 
exemplar of Agozino’s ‘control freak discipline’.  It is the contemporary form of 
embedded criminology that continues the discipline’s history of collusion with the state 
and the continued, neo-colonial subjugation of Indigenous populations (as illustrated in 
the work of Agozino, 2003; Cohen, 1988). 
 
The pursuit of Authoritarian Criminology is readily identified by the following core 
practices of its exponents, including that they: 
 focus their research and social inquiry on the definition and  conceptualisation of 
crime as defined by the state; 
 confine their critical criminological gaze to issues relating to state-defined 
problem populations, more often than not people of colour and working class 
youth, without significant engagement with individuals or communities from 
these populations; 
 confine their uncritical criminological gaze to state-run justice processes, policies, 
legislation and problems and questions that the state deems important for which 
they receive remuneration via the establishment of contractual relations;  
 limit their ‘critical analysis’ of state systems and policies to programme 
effectiveness and evaluation largely devoid of historical context and wider 
political economy of the state’s dominance of ‘justice’ in the neo-liberal moment; 
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 empower themselves through the veil of scientism, an ideological construct that 
privileges their approach to measuring the Indigenous life-world, whilst 
denigrating Indigenous (and other) forms of knowledge that seek to explain the 
social world from the perspective of the Other (see, for example, Marie, 2010); and 
 utilise the process of myth construction and maintenance in a hegemonic exercise 
aimed at privileging its ‘way of knowing’ in the policy making process, over that of 
potential competitors. 
 
The Mythological Foundations of Authoritarian Criminology 
 
The critique of postmodern thought notwithstanding, it is a fact that many 
criminological theorists make extensive use of analogy, myths and literary 
allusions in their construction of reality (emphasis added). 
                                                                                                                        Agozino (2003: 110-111). 
 
As Agozino observes, myth construction and maintenance is an essential element in the 
development of the discipline of criminology, and its construction of reality.  I argue that 
as Authoritarian Criminology is geared toward supporting the neo-colonial state and, 
either by osmosis or intent, a significant player in the continued subjugating Indigenous 
peoples, its myth construction and maintenance activities warrant closer consideration 
(Tauri, 2004; 2009).   
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Myth, criminology and policy making 
For a discipline that is populated by empiricists driven to identify the ‘laws of crime’ 
through scientific investigation, the claim that it relies on myth for its legitimacy might 
appear strange.  To understand this claim we need to push aside the veil of scientism 
that practitioners surround their practice with and accept that ideological artefacts such 
as these are central to the business of ‘doing Authoritarian Criminology’ (or, indeed, any 
form of the discipline).  I accept that exponents of Authoritarian Criminology are 
genuinely committed to producing ‘scientific’ data on the social world in order to inform 
an evidence-based, politically neutral, policy-making process.  Unfortunately, those aims 
are difficult to achieve when policy making and academic social inquiry are both highly 
ideological and political activities.  And as they are ideologically and politically driven 
they are by their very nature highly dependent on an “alternative dimension of myth” 
(Herzog and Abel 2009: 4) to support their hegemonic activities; hence the parasitic 
relationship between the two entities.  I argue that the myth-making of Authoritarian 
Criminology is reflective of the gap and tension between the ‘ought’ and ‘is’ 
characteristic of  institutional, knowledge development practices in the academy and 
the public service.  Accordingly, the academy’s knowledge construction and policy 
development are duplicitous activities where “... the ought provides a fantasised or 
glamorised ideal that the is of practices should be achieving” (ibid: 4, emphasis added).   
 
The creation and maintenance of myth is fundamental to Authoritarian Criminology’s 
hegemonic endeavours because of the important part it plays in mediating opposition 
and “justifying decisions regarding major issues” such as policy, legislation and funding 
of both research and interventions (ibid: 5).  Myth construction and maintenance is 
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particularly helpful for taming internal coordination problems (i.e., competition within 
and between various criminologies and, in particular the lived experience of problem 
populations, for the attention of the policy makers and their finite resources) and 
external one’s (i.e., nullifying the potentially politically damaging impact of independent 
scrutiny by Indigenous commentators and more critically inclined criminologists) 
“because myths, by their very nature, disguise and manage the emotional impact of the 
stories they tell” (ibid: 5).  Therefore, myths play a useful role in hiding the ‘real story’ 
behind the intent and likely impact of Eurocentric knowledge construction. 
 
Myth creation and substantiation run deep through Authoritarian Criminology, and two 
recent papers (one substantive and one, while comparatively short, nonetheless 
instructive for this discussion) appeared in the Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology (2010 - volume 43(2)) that provide contemporary exemplars of this 
process.  These are Danette Marie’s Māori and Offending: A Critical Appraisal, and Don 
Weatherburn’s Guest Editorial: Indigenous Violence. 
 
The myths that underpin Authoritarian Criminology are clearly identifiable in the work 
of Weatherburn and Marie in particular and other similar work (see references bottom 
of page 118).  Analysis of this body of work identifies four key myths central to the 
hegemonic activities of Authoritarian Criminology: 
 the myth of Eurocentric objectivity and the veil of scientism; 
 the myth of the dominance of Indigenous/communitarian perspectives; 
 the myth of the Indigenous dominance of evaluation and research on ‘Indigenous 
policies’; and 
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 the myth of the Indigenous dominance of policy making, intervention design and 
research is the primary reason for the failure to reduce over-representation. 
For the purposes of this chapter, the rest of this section will analyse the use of the 
first two myths as exemplified in the Marie and Weatherburn articles. 
 
The myth of objectivity and the veil of scientism 
The key to this myth is discourse that presents Authoritarian criminological knowledge 
as the valid form for informing policy making because it is derived from scientific 
observation of the social context, and its practitioners are both ‘objective’ and ‘value-
neutral. In contrast, other forms of knowledge construction are unscientific, ideological, 
value-laden and therefore biased.  And in this category practitioners place Indigenous 
techniques for knowledge construction and dissemination. 
 
Marie’s paper provides a solid example of the type of mythology-driven knowledge 
destruction at work.  For example, in her paper she makes two significant, albeit poorly 
evidenced claims common to the practice of Authoritarian Criminology: firstly, Māori 
(Indigenous) formulations of knowledge are ‘unscientific’ and should therefore play no 
part in crime control policy development; and secondly, Māori policies and 
interventions are ‘unscientific’ because there is no evidence to prove either the theories 
upon which they are based or the efficacy of the programmes that emanate from them.   
 
I need to begin my response to these mythological constructs by acknowledging that 
Marie’s point about the lack of evidence for Indigenous theories and interventions has 
some validity.  However, in making her claims Marie appears unaware of the politics of 
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crime control policy in the New Zealand context, especially as it relates to the 
development of Māori-specific policy.  Her apparent ignorance of the  ‘politics’ of Māori 
policy construction explains her exaggeration of the amount of influence Māori theory 
and practices actually has on crime control policy.  If she were aware of the politics and 
the vast array of documents regarding policy construction across the criminal justice 
sector, then she might have chosen to temper her comments on the failure of Māori 
approaches by acknowledging the following, fundamental truth about the criminal 
justice sector in New Zealand: that it has an extremely poor history of carrying out (or 
contracting) ‘scientific’, outcome-focused research/evaluation into the efficacy of it 
policies and interventions.  This lack of empirical analysis of the crime control in New 
Zealand pertains to the entire suite of policies and interventions whether they are 
informed by Tikanga Māori, Crime Control Through Environmental Design (CPTED) or 
some other theory (see Tauri, 2004; Te Puni Kokiri, 2002).   
 
Marie’s mythological construction of Māori approaches is weakened by a sustained, 
critical analysis of the efficacy of her preferred ‘scientifically’-derived interventions.  
Nowhere in her paper does Marie provide significant evidence that these category of 
programmes (for example, Multi-Systemic Therapy, corrections-delivered criminogenic 
programmes, CPTED, etc) are working in any substantial (or empirically verifiable) way 
to reduce Māori offending/reoffending.  And yet, as will be discussed later, New Zealand 
offenders are far more likely to receive the kind of scientifically-derived treatment 
Marie supports.  In comparison, they are much less likely to take part in Tikanga-
inspired interventions that Marie contends are having a negative effect on Indigenous 
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recidivism rates (see offenders’ comments in Te Puni Kokiri, 2007 and especially 
Department of Corrections 2009b).  
 
The myth of the dominance of Indigenous/communitarian perspectives 
The purpose of this mythical construct would have us believe that the development of 
effective solutions to the ‘Indigenous problem’ has been hampered in neo-colonial 
jurisdictions by a) the rise of Indigenous cultural ‘theory’, b) the biculturalisation of 
state policy, which led to c) the policy sector in Australasia ‘turning away from science’ 
and embracing cultural perspectives on crime control for First Nations.  For the likes of 
Weatherburn (2010) this explains the predominance of policies and interventions 
geared to conferencing processes, circle sentencing and enhancing the ‘cultural practice’ 
of agents and agencies and a focus on ‘bias’ and ‘structure’ rather than individual 
antecedents of crime.  Marie (2010: 283) makes a similar claim when she writes that 
Māori ‘theory’ dominates crime control policy development in the New Zealand context.  
She goes on to present a misleading summation of Māori theory by erroneously 
presenting it as primarily focused on cultural loss as the key determinant of Māori 
offending and overrepresentation: 
 
A major assumption of this theory is that the contemporary overrepresentation of 
Māori... is best understood as the outcome of Māori experiencing impairments to 
cultural identity resulting from colonisation.  Central to this theory... is also the 
assumption that ethnicity is a reliable construct by which distinctions can be made 
between offenders regarding what factors precipitated their offending, as well as 
best practices for their rehabilitation... rehabilitation efforts largely pivot on the 
127 
 
idea that restoring cultural identity will lead to a subsequent number of Māori in 
prison. 
 
To support her argument Marie cites Newbold’s (2007) summary of the types of 
programmes currently en vogue in corrections.  Yet inexplicably, Marie overlooks 
preceding chapters of Newbold’s book which demonstrate that within the Department’s 
theoretical paradigm, culture and cultural identity are not given causal power: in other 
words, culture neither causes crime, nor is a significant player in reducing it.  In fact, 
culture (specifically ‘Māori culture’) is confined to the responsivity trance of the 
Department’s theoretical and practice framework, where ‘restoring cultural awareness’ 
is viewed as a helpful process for preparing individual Māori offenders for ‘treatment’ 
(see Coebergh et al, 2001, especially pps. 15-16; Webb, 2012). 
 
Marie appears be to unaware of the fact that the so-called ‘Māori theory’ she is 
critiquing, is in fact a construct of government officials and contractors; a governmental 
interpretation of Māori knowledge and cultural practice.  What she presents as ‘Māori 
theory’ is in fact a policy framework employed by state institutions to indigenise (and 
colour) the programmatic requirements of the institutions (see Tauri, 2004; 2009; 
2011d; Webb, 2003; 2012).  It is difficult to comprehend how Marie could miss this 
situation given the documentation she cites are entirely constructed by crime control 
agencies and not from external, independent Māori (or indeed, non-Māori) sources.  
Marie fails to contemplate that she is not dealing with ‘Māori theory’, or ‘tikanga-based 
interventions’, but neo-colonial artefacts of government officials, criminologists and 
psychologists ‘jobbing’ for the Crown’s coin and utilised to satisfied the needs of 
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agencies, and not Māori (see McIntosh, forthcoming and Tauri, 2004; 2009 regarding 
the duplicitous nature of government institutions use of Māori symbols, Tikanga 
(theory) and responses to social harm).  The dominance of positivistic theory in 
Corrections policy programme, and the subjugation of Indigenous perspectives are 
evident in all relevant departmental documents, as demonstrated in the following text 
from a Department of Corrections (2009b: 42) review of the effectiveness of 
rehabilitation programmes: 
 
It is now generally accepted that treatment programmes should be adapted to 
cater for the cultural needs of offenders who participate.  As such, culture 
represents an important responsivity issue within offender rehabilitation. 
Incorporating culturally-based concepts, imagery and activities into programme 
content is regarded as a way of both attracting minority-group participants into 
programmes, and ensuring that the programme engages and retains them 
(emphasis added).   
 
Weatherburn (2010: 198) accentuates this particular myth of the dominance of 
Indigenous perspectives and a focus on ‘structure’ (i.e., ‘bias) in policy responses when 
he argues that: 
 
... debate about how to respond to Indigenous violence have focussed less on the 
question of how to reduce it than how to reduce the effect of Indigenous violence 
on Indigenous contact with the criminal justice system.  The general consensus on 
this issue seems to be that the best way to reduce Indigenous contact with the 
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criminal justice system is to create some tribunal or process that gives Indigenous 
community members a voice in how to respond to crime by Indigenous 
defendants. 
 
Both Marie and Weatherburn’s positions can be described as mythological constructs.  
Neither author appears to have engaged thoroughly with the vast amount of material 
generated by administrative criminological and government institutions that 
demonstrate the wide array of official responses to Indigenous crime, of which 
conferencing processes and liaison officers, etc, form only a small component of an 
extensive intervention strategy.  Nor have they engaged with the sophisticated material 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous have produced examining Indigenous over-
representation in Australasia or any of settler society jurisdictions.  If they had they 
would find that Indigenous and critical scholars in New Zealand (including Jackson, 
1988; Tauri, 2009; Webb, 2003), Australia (including Blagg 2000a, Cunneen, 2009; 
Dodson, 1994 and others), in Canada (Palys, 1993 and Palys and Victor, 2005) provide 
sophisticated, multifaceted explanations of the Indigenous experience.  This material 
also reveals the wide range of interventions, such as habilitation centres, and culturally 
and socially specific therapeutic approaches to a wide range of ‘risk factors’, to use the 
preferred terminology of Authoritarian Criminology, that Indigenous scholars and 
practitioners have designed.   
 
It is accurate to state that issues like bias, institutional racism, colonisation, and 
militaristic-style policing strategies are key foci of counter-colonial, Indigenous 
criminologies.  However, it is duplicitous to argue that they are the only or the most 
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predominant factors that Indigenous (and non-Indigenous), critical scholars identify as 
key explanations for Indigenous over-representation.  The key issue that Marie and 
Weatherburn miss is that it is the state that has demonstrated a preference for 
‘culturally sensitive processing’ of Indigenous crime, exemplified by agency controlled 
programmes such as group conferences, sentencing circles, Indigenous sentencing 
courts, Indigenous liaison officers, ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, Aboriginal Justice 
Strategies and such like (Tauri, 2011b).  These types of state-centred responses 
invariably lack jurisdictional autonomy (for First Nations), legislative weight and 
receive significantly less funding in comparison to mainstream policies and 
interventions.  In reality, a significant proportion of settler state responses to the 
Indigenous problem are simply orientalised artefacts that enable the state to be ‘seen to 
do something’ while avoiding independent (Indigenous) analysis of the failure of its 
crime control processes to provide meaningful justice ‘outcomes’ for subjugated 
populations (Palys and Victor, 2005; Tauri, 2011a).  
 
A thorough engagement with crime control texts produced by Government agents (such 
as Cabinet papers, key strategies, research documents, etc) demonstrates that the 
overarching theoretical paradigms that dominate the sector derive from Eurocentric 
theories.  Furthermore, the vast majority of interventions that Indigenous offenders 
receive emanate from positivistic criminological and psychological paradigms.  The 
predominant form of ‘therapy’ and crime prevention programmes Māori offenders 
participate in are and not, as Marie claims, based on Tikanga Māori.  The literature 
shows that Marie’s argument that Māori dominate the design of correctional 
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interventions and the evaluation and research process16 is nothing more than a 
mythological construct.  For example, a review of key documents demonstrates that the 
dominant theory of the Department of Corrections is the Psychology of Criminal Conduct 
imported wholesale in the mid-1990s from Canada (see Newbold 2007; Webb, 2003 
and the majority of the department’s policy documents since 1996 including the 
Department of Corrections, 2001a; 2001b, 2002 2009a and 2009b.  All this material is 
available either online and through an Official Information Act request) and life 
course/developmental theory (see Department of Corrections, 2007).  Likewise, the 
Ministry of Justice (2005; 2007) policy programme is dominated by CPTED and 
Rationale Choice Theory in relation to its crime prevention work programme and life-
course and other ‘developmental’ approaches inform youth justice (Becroft and 
Thompson, 2006; McLaren, 2000; Ministry of Justice, 2002).  
 
Contrary to the mythic claims of Authoritarian Criminologists such as Marie and 
Weatherburn, a thorough review of available research and government texts 
demonstrates that: 
                                                          
16 One of Marie’s more contentious claims is that Kaupapa Māori research (KMR) methodology dominates 
the evaluative processes of government agencies in New Zealand like the Department of Corrections.  
She also argues that the dominance of KRM is blocking the ability of agencies to gather ‘scientific’ 
evidence of the effectiveness of crime control policies and interventions.  In making this claim, Marie 
ignores a number of research and policy-related documents that demonstrate that the vast majority of 
evaluations carried out by criminal justice agencies in New Zealand utilise standard evaluation and 
research methods.  If used at all, KMR is usually little more than a sub-component of the entire 
evaluative process (see Tauri, 2009: 7).  The Department of Corrections 2009 evaluation of Māori Focus 
Units and Māori ‘therapeutic programmes’ demonstrates this point clearly.  While the contractors 
engaged on the projects utilised KMR protocols to ensure ethical engagement with Māori research 
subjects, they chose to employ a standard range of evaluative/research methods, including semi-
structured interviews, psychometric questionnaires and a rehabilitation quotient, for the data gathering 
phase of the project.   
 
132 
 
1. Māori theory (Tikanga, kaupapa) does not dominate policy making in any of the 
New Zealand’s crime control agencies (see Waitangi Tribunal (2005) for outline of 
the dominance of Eurocentric theory); 
2. the vast majority of policy, legislation, intervention design and funding decisions 
are informed by Eurocentric, imported ‘theories’ and interventions (for example, 
see the Ministry of Justice generated material on the recent Drivers of Crime 
project in New Zealand(2009a, 2009b, 2009c; 2009d); and 
3. the vast majority of government spend in New Zealand’s criminal justice system 
goes to Eurocentrically-derived crime control programmes17.   
 
Concluding Comments 
I have no doubt that some criminologists working in Australasia and within the 
identified authoritarian criminological paradigm, will find this chapter challenging.  I am 
just as certain that my text will be dismissed by some as aggressive and emotional.  
These are terms that Indigenous scholars hear too often when members of the academy 
chose to avoid engaging with the Indigenous critique. Soynika (1994: xiii-xiv, quoted in 
Agozino, 2007: 2) aptly justifies the decision to ‘speak to power’ in such 
uncompromising terms when he states that: 
 
[w]hen power is placed in the service of vicious reaction, a language must be 
called into being which does its best to appropriate such obscenity of power and 
fling its excesses back in its face”, and that “... language must communicate its 
                                                          
17 During the now defunct Effective Interventions initiative (2006-2007) officials from the Ministry of 
Māori Development were informed by crime control agencies that Māori initiatives, including 
‘counselling’ programmes that derive from non-Māori theoretical sources, received less than 10% of the 
sectors spend on therapeutic and other forms of intervention (Tauri, 2011b).   
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illegitimacy in a forceful, uncompromising language of rejection, seeking always to 
make it ridiculous and contemptible, deflating its pretensions to the core.   
 
Given the mythological nature of so much of Authoritarian Criminology’s work and the 
influence it has on policy, the time clearly has come for Indigenous scholars to challenge 
the hegemony of criminological practitioners who empower themselves to speak for us, 
while employing mythological constructs to silence our voices.  This call to arms can be 
justified through a number of rationales, although just two will suffice here.  The first is 
that we have the right to speak for ourselves, which involves critical scrutiny of what 
others say and write about us.  The second rationale comes in the form of an empirical 
question: for all its ‘science’, ‘objectivity’ and generous government support, what 
tangible outcomes has Authoritarian Criminology (or more widely, Positivistic 
Criminology) delivered to Indigenous peoples?  An empirically informed answer to the 
question must surely be ‘not much’.  Unless of course we measure effectiveness in terms 
of more Indigenous peoples in prison, ever increasing police resources employed to 
target Indigenous communities, more orientalised, state-centred conferencing models 
and more meaningless Indigenous justice strategies.   
 
A peculiar irony of Western criminology is that its administrative formulations and so 
much its theories of crime and interventions are constructed in high crime societies 
(Agozino, 2010; Cohen, 1988).  A further irony is that many Western criminologists 
seem to believe it is their duty to ‘teach the coloured folk’ about how to solve their crime 
problems by exporting failed policies and theories to ‘Third World’ nations (Agozino, 
2004).  Worse still is the fact that Authoritarian Criminologists residing in the Third 
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World and settler societies (such as Australia and New Zealand) continuously support 
the importation of failed, ‘scientific’ interventions, whilst utilising the veil of scientism 
to shield their activities from the critical gaze of the Indigenous Other.  When challenged 
for foisting on our communities alien processes, criminological experts respond by 
regurgitating ideological statements about ‘evidence-based policy’, ‘international best 
practice’ and the efficacy of ‘acultural interventions’18 (Tauri, 2011c). Like so many First 
Nation scholars and justice practitioners I have heard this self-serving rhetoric time and 
again.  And yet I never fail to be surprised by the silence that emanates from 
Authoritarian Criminology to our simple refrain: ‘why is so much of this criminological 
work carried out on our behalf, but without the necessary engagement with our 
communities’? 
  
                                                          
18 An example of this occurred while the author was working in New Zealand’s public service in the early 
2000s.  An American Professor of Criminology had been invited speak by a core justice agency about 
Multi Systemic Therapy (MST).  During question time the Professor was informed that Māori and 
Pacifica practitioners had long utilised multi-systemic approaches to social harm.  He was then asked 
what was different about MST, and how it would benefit Indigenous peoples who lived in a very 
different social context than North America. The Professor responded that MST had been scientifically 
tested, and results showed the programme that reduced crime amongst Afro-Americans and Hispanics.  
The Professor’s comparison of the social and cultural contexts of Māori and Pacifica peoples with that of 
Afro-American and Hispanic populations in North America highlights a fundamental Authoritarian 
Criminological approach to the creation of interventions and to people of colour.  Too often 
practitioners, like the American Professor, employ orientalising discourses that in one stroke eliminate 
perspective-destroying factors, such as the significant variation in strategies of subjugation employed in 
different colonial contexts, and the unique cultural, social and political experiences and formation of 
Indigenous populations and other ethnic minorities (see Blagg, 1997; Tauri, 1998).  
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A Critical Appraisal of Responses to Māori 
Offending 
Juan Marcellus Tauri 
and 
Robert Webb 
(2012) The International Indigenous Policy Journal, 3(4), Article 5, online. 
Introduction 
This article critically analyses the role that criminological theory and specific policy 
formulations of culture play in the New Zealand state’s response to the over-
representation of Māori in the criminal justice system.  Part one provides an overview of 
the changing criminological explanations of and responses to, Māori offending in New 
Zealand from the 1980s onwards and how these understandings continued colonialist 
approaches to Māori and crime, into the neo-colonial context.  In particular we chart the 
shift in policy development from theorising Māori offending as attributable to loss of 
cultural identity, to a focus on socio-economic and institutional antecedents and finally 
through the risk factors, assessment and criminogenic needs approaches that have 
gained prominence in the current policy context.  
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In part two the focus moves to the strategies employed by members of the academy to 
elevate their own epistemological constructions of Māori social reality within the policy 
development process.  In particular, the critique scrutinises recent attempts to portray 
Indigenous responses to social harm as ‘unscientific’ and in part responsible for the 
continuing over-representation of Māori in New Zealand’s criminal justice system.  The 
purpose of this analysis is to focus the critical, criminological gaze firmly on the 
activities of policy makers and administrative criminologists in relation to Māori as an 
Indigenous peoples19. 
 
Responding to Māori Offending: An Overview 
By the early 1980s the level of Māori over-representation in the criminal justice system 
had reached a level that commentators equated to ‘considerable and ongoing over-
representation’ based upon population (Quince, 2007; McIntosh and Radojkovic, 2012).  
This ‘social fact’ prompted a small number of dedicated, inter-agency policy projects20 
and the implementation of so-called Māori-specific interventions (see discussion 
below).  Despite all this policy attention, the level and nature of Māori over-
representation has remained high ever since.  It is because Māori over-representation 
became a recognisable statistical issue and received considerable attention from policy 
makers from the 1980s through to the 2000s that we have chosen this period as the 
                                                          
19  The term administrative criminology is used to denote criminological research and theorising that is 
aimed at enhancing state knowledge of the social context (see Galliher, 1999; Hirschi, 1993).  Tauri 
(2014c) argues that administrative criminological musings on Indigenous populations can be readily 
identified through key characteristics, including confining the focus of criminological inquiry to issues 
the state deems important, and state definitions of what constitutes crime, and a preference for using 
methodologies that restrict contact with marginalised social groups. 
 
20  Since the mid-1990s government agencies have instigated a number of inter-agency policy projects of 
which the issue of Māori over-representation has been a key focus.  These include the Reoffending by 
Māori (RoBM) project (1996-1999), Effective Interventions (2006-2008) and most recently, Drivers of 
Crime (2008-ongoing).   
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focus of our analysis.  It is, after all, the period in New Zealand’s criminal justice history 
that concerted efforts by policy makers to solve the so-called ‘Māori problem’ were 
finally made (Tauri, 2011a).   
 
Explanations and responses through the 1980s 
Generally, responses by policy-makers and academics to Māori offending in the 1980s 
reflected the growing popularity of community-centred responses to offending in 
Western jurisdictions grappling with rising levels of crime amongst ‘lower class’, new 
migrant and First Nation populations, (Tauri, 1996).  A similar response was followed in 
the New Zealand context, although policy makers quickly came under criticism for 
excluding Māori values, practices and philosophies (tikanga) during the development of 
ostensibly Māori-focused interventions (see Jackson, 1988).  The 1980s saw Māori 
increasingly campaign for significant control of crime control interventions targeted at 
Māori offenders and victims.  For example, the Ministerial Advisory Committee’s (1986) 
review of the Department of Social Welfare, Puao-Te-Ata-Tu, criticised the state’s 
delivery of programmes for Māori as ineffective and culturally inappropriate.  One 
supposed community-centred initiative was the Departments of Māori Affairs, Social 
Welfare and then Justice-led Mātua Whangai initiative, which promoted developing 
community-led responses to offenders based upon iwi (tribe), hapū (sub-tribe), and 
whānau (family) practices (Department of Justice, 1985).  However, Williams (2001) 
notes that Mātua Whangai underwent a number of changes from 1985, and by the late 
1990s it had moved away from the original intent of developing Māori-community 
centred approaches, to a limited service provision model that implemented 
Departmental aims with programme contractors.  These types of community crime 
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prevention programmes incorporate features of what might loosely be called Māori 
responses to social harm, but the reality was the design and delivery of state-centred 
initiatives that ‘added’ Māori cultural elements to existing intervention logic (see 
discussion below and Tauri, 1999).   
 
While traditional Māori approaches to social harm were given some attention after the 
Department of Social Welfare review, Māori dissatisfaction with the state system failed 
to abate, as evidenced by the release in 1988 of Moana Jackson’s report Māori and the 
Criminal Justice System: He Whaipānga Hou.  Jackson’s report examined Māori 
interaction with the New Zealand criminal justice system through a three year study 
involving interviews, focus groups and hui (focus groups/community meetings) with a 
range of Māori, including police, correctional officers, policy workers, inmates, 
community workers and academics.  In his analysis, Jackson argued that Māori justice 
practices had been marginalised through colonial practices that imposed British law.  
He observed that Māori practices and philosophies were denigrated to the point where 
they no longer operated in many Māori communities to a meaningful extent.  Jackson 
and his participants’ analyses of crime were directed toward a range of antecedents, 
including a detailed examination of the marginalisation of Māori by government 
institutions, most notably from the social welfare and justice systems.   
 
Māori who participated in Jackson’s research argued that the criminal justice system 
reflects a Pākehā (European) theoretical and practice bias, and that this bias was 
evident in research into Māori criminal behaviour.  It was suggested that policy makers 
and members of the academy did not consider Māori experiences of colonisation to a 
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degree necessary for informing the development of effective policy.  Policy makers were 
criticised for their tendency to assume that criminal behaviour by Māori could be dealt 
with in the same way as offending by other population groups.  Furthermore, 
participants observed that Māori offenders in the criminal justice system had 
experienced poor education, difficulties in family upbringing, long periods of 
unemployment and other factors which increased the likelihood of offending behaviour.  
However, unlike other groups of offenders, for Māori these issues were impacted by a 
history of marginalisation from New Zealand society through the process of 
colonisation.  Participants argued that Māori social deprivations were the result of state 
policies that had negatively impacted on Māori social structures, through the active 
suppression of Māori culture, and their economic and political autonomy (see Walker, 
1990).  To understand Māori offending, Jackson (1988) argued that theoretical 
explanations and policy responses had to contextualise Māori experiences in relation to 
a history of colonisation: 
 
The monocultural basis of Pākehā research into Māori offending has prevented 
recognition of these socio-cultural dynamics and the appropriate mechanisms 
needed to understand them.  This has resulted in a raft of “explanations” of Māori 
crime which reflect considerable monocultural and theoretical bias, but little 
effective explanation.  Thus the Māori offender has merely been defined as an 
urban misfit, a cultural maladept, an educational retard, or the victim of 
behavioural labelling, while the socio-cultural forces underlying such descriptions 
have been largely unrecognised (p. 26). 
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This emphasises the importance of understanding how colonisation shapes 
contemporary social relations and contexts, rather than seeking to limit analyses to that 
of individual pathology, and decontextualised from the wider social relations in New 
Zealand society.  Jackson believed Māori philosophies were relevant to understanding 
offending, and he argued that tikanga Māori would “… provide some insight into the 
complex questions of why some Māori men become criminal offenders and how the 
criminal justice process responds to them.  It approaches the topic from within a Māori 
conceptual framework and seeks to explain Māori perception of the causes and 
consequences of criminal offending” (1988: 17).  Jackson hypothesised that a Māori 
system based upon Māori values and authority to hear and respond, would be able to 
better address the Māori offending problem.   
 
Overall, Government Ministers and policy makers have largely ignored Jackson and his 
research participants’ argument for increased Māori jurisdictional autonomy.  Instead, 
the primary policy response largely revolved around the controlled integration of 
‘acceptable’ Māori concepts and cultural practices into confined areas of the justice 
system (see Tauri, 2011b).  For example, in reviewing He Whaipānga Hou, the Courts’ 
Consultative Committee (1991) (comprised from the judiciary, lawyers and community 
representatives) recommended to the then Minister of Justice that culturally 
appropriate responses to Māori offending were achievable through existing state 
mechanisms.  The Committee expressly recommended against transferring criminal 
justice-centred processes into distinctly Māori settings.  The Committee especially 
argued against marae (meeting houses) being used for court cases (thus ignoring 
evidence that historically Māori utilised marae as a site for dealing with social harm – 
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see Jackson, 1988).  It was argued that court trials could not be easily transposed to the 
marae setting while ensuring the integrity of the state process remained ‘intact’.  
However, officials did express the view that marae could play a minor role in the formal 
justice system through the delivery of community diversion and rehabilitative 
programmes designed by the state for the benefit of Māori offenders sometime in the 
future21.  
 
In contrast to the position taken by Jackson and his research participants, state officials 
made it clear that the only acceptable response to Māori concerns was for offending to 
be addressed through the purposeful incorporation of Māori justice and cultural concepts 
into the justice system, rather than a separate justice system or any meaningful form of 
jurisdictional autonomy (Tauri, 1999).  For example, since the early 1990s government 
agencies within the justice sector have followed the firm policy of enhancing the 
responsiveness of state processes to Māori.  The responsiveness strategy was based 
around incorporating more Māori values into the justice system.  The stated aims of the 
responsiveness strategy were to: 
 identify how to reduce Māori offending and victimisation; 
 focus on ways to be more effective in service delivery to Māori, and to actively 
encourage the positive participation by Māori in such delivery; 
                                                          
21  The government’s perspective changed recently with the introduction of Rangatahi (Youth) Courts in 
May 2008. The Rangatahi Court is, in all essence a Youth Court held on a marae with te reo (Māori 
language) and Māori protocols incorporated into the process. The purpose of the hearing is to monitor 
the young person's completion of his or her Family Group Conference Plan (Ministry of Justice, 2012). 
While the Rangatahi Court process signals a willingness on behalf of the New Zealand state to involve 
marae in the formal process, the extent to which it results in meaningful jurisdictional autonomy for 
Māori remains to be seen.   
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 explore the scope for greater diversity in dealing with Māori offenders (Justice 
Sector Policy Group, 1998: 6). 
 
To achieving the goals of the strategy were various Māori programme and provider 
developments funded and controlled by policy makers.  These initiatives were 
considered essential to enhancing relationships between the policy sector and Māori 
providers and communities.  By the late 1990s programmes with a specific Māori focus 
being supported or considered by the Ministry of Justice and Department of Corrections 
(via the Justice Sector Policy Group, 1998: 79) and set firmly in the responsiveness 
framework, included:  
 iwi based safer community councils; 
 community panel pilot diversion projects, such as Te Whānau Āwhina, that focused 
on offending by urban Māori offenders; 
 Māori focus units in prisons; 
 habilitation centres specifically focusing on Māori; 
 a cultural perspectives unit within the Department focused on developing Māori 
policy; and 
 a bicultural therapy programme. 
 
Through the responsiveness strategy developed during the 1990s, government officials 
drew a clear distinction between the Māori justice system advocated by Jackson and his 
participants, and the preferred strategy of integrating ‘acceptable’ elements of Māori 
culture into the state-dominated system.  The strategy further sought to enhance the 
goals and status of the formal system through recruitment of more Māori into the 
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justice sector.  Officials also strove to achieve the goals of the strategy through 
enhancing officials’ awareness of Māori culture, while purposefully avoiding significant 
alterations in either the structure or power dynamics of the formal system (Tauri, 
1999).  The New Zealand Police, for example, actively recruited more Māori officers and 
developed cultural awareness programmes as part of its responsiveness policy (Te Puni 
Kōkiri, 2002a).  The Department of Corrections responsiveness policy was dominated 
throughout the 1990s (and early 2000s), by the introduction of supposed Māori 
therapeutic programmes, the development of a Treaty of Waitangi Strategy and the 
signing of a small number of Memorandum of Understandings (MOU’s) with specific Iwi 
designed to enhance relationships with Māori communities (see Lomax, 1994; 
Department of Corrections, 2001a, 2002). 
 
The 1990s and onwards 
The 1990s onwards witnessed the development of more sophisticated, supposedly 
scientific approaches to the Māori problem, at least from a Eurocentric theoretical and 
practice-based position.  For example, in 1998 the Department of Corrections 
Psychological Services introduced a rehabilitation initiative for Māori called the Bi-cultural 
Therapy Model.  This model aimed to deliver psychological treatments to Māori offenders 
through incorporating elements of tikanga into (or more accurately, onto) therapeutic 
interventions.  In describing the initiative, the Department of Corrections (2001: 10) noted 
that: 
 
Māori therapeutic programmes have been developed as ‘blended’ programmes 
that incorporate tikanga Māori concepts alongside Western psychological 
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concepts.  These programmes provide a more focused analysis of how Māori 
tikanga and concepts relate to specific offending behaviour.    
 
This development, however, does not alter the basic premise of attributing offending to 
individualistic pathologies.  In reality, the treatment response has been adapted through 
the utilisation of Māori culture and tikanga within the rehabilitation process 
(McFarlane-Nathan, 1994, 1999; Nathan, Wilson and Hillman, 2003).   
 
The development of Māori Focus Units can be attributed to this blended approach, with 
the first being in place by 1997 (Department of Corrections, 2001a).  These units offer 
Māori inmates cultural instruction and te reo (Māori language) courses.  The rationale 
from the Department of Corrections (2002, p. 21) for developing these units was described 
as “… use Māori language and culture to create a change in the understanding, attitude 
and behaviour of Māori offenders” with a related “... commitment from participants to 
address the discrepancies between Māori tikanga and their current offending and 
lifestyle”.  Within Māori focus units, Māori therapeutic programmes have also developed 
into a cognitive group therapy intervention with Māori cultural components added on 
(Webb, 2012).  In evaluating the programmes, the Department of Corrections (2009a: 6-
7) states that: 
 
The Māori Therapeutic Programme (MTP) is a group-based offender rehabilitation 
programme.  The main purpose is to both encourage and enable the avoidance of 
new offending amongst participants. Currently, MTPs are delivered only within 
the MFUs.  Led by experienced group facilitators, the MTP group meets several 
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times each week over ten weeks to work through prescribed programme content.  
This content is similar to that used in existing mainstream rehabilitative 
programmes, centering on understanding the patterns of behaviour, emotion and 
interaction that lead up to “relapse” into new offending.  Participants are taught 
social, cognitive and practical skills necessary to avoid such relapses. In exploring 
such issues, the MTP uses Māori cultural language, values and narratives to assist 
participants’ learning and change22. 
 
It is observable that through the 1990s, psychological-based therapeutic treatments 
became ever more entrenched in New Zealand’s policy response.  The apex of this policy 
approach came with the development of the Integrated Offender Management (IOM) 
framework by the Department of Corrections in the second half of the 1990s.  Based on 
correctional policies imported from Canada and implemented in the early 2000s, the 
IOM process sought to identify the particular criminogenic needs of all offenders, 
including Māori, through applying diagnostic tools like the criminogenic needs index 
(CNI) (Newbold, 2007).  The importance of the risk and criminogenic needs paradigm to 
understanding and framing responses to individuals’ offending behaviour is 
demonstrated in the Department’s (2001a) report About Time - Turning People Away 
from a Life of Crime and Reducing Reoffending, where it is argued Māori offenders are 
more likely to be at risk of offending from criminogenic needs.   
 
                                                          
22  There are new developments for Māori offenders in prison, with Whare Oranga Ake Units, or Kaupapa 
Māori Rehabilitation Units being opened in 2011 and piloted on a limited basis.  Designed for inmates in 
the final stages of sentences as targeted pre-release rehabilitation initiatives, it will be interesting in the 
future to consider the effectiveness of these initiatives for Māori inmates.   
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Despite the fact that Corrections’ documentation made it clear that criminogenic needs 
are observable in a range of offenders regardless of ethnicity (and regardless of social, 
familial or historical context), officials went about designing features to enhance service 
delivery specific to Māori.  The most notable examples forged under IOM were the 
Framework for Reducing Māori Offending (FReMO) and Māori Culture Related Needs 
(MaCRNs).  In Maynard, Coebergh, Anstiss, Bakker and Huriwai’s (1999) discussion of 
the MaCRNs assessment tool for Māori offenders, several cultural-related needs are 
identified, including cultural tension, whānau and whakawhānaunga (kinship relations).  
Maynard et al (1999: 50) suggest that: 
 
Contemporary New Zealand society has developed primarily from 
Western/European- based norms, despite the fact that Māori are recognised as the 
tangata whenua [First peoples] of this country.  Māori culture has been generally 
compromised and discouraged in the process of colonisation and it is likely that a 
number of stressors and/or tensions have developed in connection with 
differences in cultural values and beliefs both between Māori and non-Māori, and 
amongst Māori.  Further, the lack of positive coping skills for dealing with such 
tension is likely to promote maladaptive responses which could include cognitions 
and behavioural patterns that increase the individual's risk of re-offending. 
 
Although these officials argue that specific Māori needs exist, Māori offending is framed 
within a theoretical focus on individual thinking as explanatory of maladaptive 
behaviour.  Thus, in the IOM policy context we see components of Māori cultural 
practice grafted on to a process based on individualistic theories of human behaviour, 
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which has already explained offending as generated in negative emotions and anti-
social thoughts (Webb, 2003).  It is clear from the description of the MaCRNs they were 
primarily developed to increase Māori responsiveness to psychological treatment 
interventions, and this is evident when Maynard et al. (1999: 44) write that, “[t]he 
responsivity principle states that offenders will be most affected by interventions that are 
matched to their particular learning style…”. 
 
A 2005 Waitangi Tribunal23 report into Māori cultural assessments provides insights 
into the development and limitations of the MaCRNs model.  The Tribunal report 
identified that only a limited pilot study occurred prior to MaCRNs assessment being 
implemented nationally.  That the assessment tool for Māori ‘needs’ was developed 
from a small sample before implementation, illustrates the limitations inherent in the 
policy sectors strategy of integrating Māori knowledge frameworks in an ostensibly 
individualistic approach like the CNI: in this instance the lack of wider engagement with 
Māori as stipulated in the Treaty contract, and through a breach of the ‘rules’ of 
positivistic social science in relation to validity and reporting of findings.  Three years 
after implementation, the Department of Corrections could “neither verify their 
soundness nor point to any quantifiable benefits that flow to Māori offenders who are 
assessed with MaCRNS” (Waitangi Tribunal, 2005: 151).  Morrison (2009: 82) notes that 
following the release of the Tribunal report, the Department of Corrections carried out 
                                                          
23  The Waitangi Tribunal was established by the third Labour Government (1972-1975) with the passing 
of the Treaty of Waitangi Act in 1975.  The initial purpose of the Tribunal was to inquire into and make 
recommendations to the Crown (represented by the Government of the day) relating to Māori claims 
against government actions that they believed contravened their rights under the Treaty of Waitangi 
from the date of the forum’s inception (Catalinac, 2004; Gibbs, 2006).  Later, in the mid-1980s, the 
Tribunal jurisdiction was extended to receiving Māori claims going back to the signing of the Treaty of 
Waitangi in 1840.    
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an evaluation of the MaCRN’s.  The evaluation found that the MaCRNs assessment tool 
was underused by Correction’s staff.  Furthermore, even when used, less than 20% of 
offenders assessed with MaCRNs then took up a culture-related activity as part of their 
offender management plan.  Morrison observes that soon after this evaluation, the 
MaCRNs assessment process was discontinued.  Similarly, in a (2002b) review of the 
criminal justice sectors responsiveness to Māori, Te Puni Kōkiri officials identified that 
the much publicised FReMO process was rarely used by policy workers in the 
Department of Corrections as designed.  More often than not, FReMO was utilised after 
policy and interventions had been designed by policy workers.  Taking both case studies 
into consideration, it is difficult to comprehend how some commentators have recently 
argued that these little used risk and needs assessment processes, and 
‘Māori/Indigenous theories of, and response to, criminality’, have come to dominate 
criminal justice policy making in the New Zealand context.  It is to particular this issue 
that we now turn. 
 
Critiquing Responses to the ‘Māori Problem’ 
So far this paper has charted the explanations of and responses to Māori offending from 
two related phases in the development of crime control policy in New Zealand.  The 
distinctly Māori perspectives from the 1980s, culminating in the production of Jackson’s 
1988 report identified a framework for addressing Māori offending through Māori centred 
and controlled responses.  The idea of rebuilding and instituting Māori social control over 
offenders goes far beyond the implementation of rehabilitation programmes for Māori 
within the system.  The period covered by the 1990s-2000s, however, demonstrate that 
the state was much more comfortable with a strategy of incorporating elements of Māori 
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cultural belief and practice into the existing system; a process that Tauri (1999) describes 
as the symbolic and physical indigenisation of New Zealand’s criminal justice system.  The 
responsiveness policy saw the recruitment of more Māori into the criminal justice system, 
and the development of blended (psychology-based) interventions.  This response clearly 
represented a rejection of Jackson’s notion of a parallel Māori criminal justice system, and 
the furtherance of the co-ordinated strategy of indigenisation through increasing the 
integration of Māori concepts into existing state processes.   
 
Despite clear evidence to the contrary, some contemporary authors from the 
administrative criminological perspective argue that the period from the 1980s to the 
2000s marked the transition in the Department of Corrections, and other crime control 
agencies, to adopting Jackson’s ideas and those of other Māori practitioners and academics 
(for example see Marie, 2010 in New Zealand; and for similar arguments in Australia, 
Weatherburn, 2010; Weatherburn and Fitzgerald, 2006).  Given the available literature, 
these commentators make the surprising assertion that the rehabilitation programmes 
received by Māori offenders are predominantly informed by this supposed new orthodoxy 
and focus mainly upon the concept of cultural identity deficit.  Furthermore, it is argued 
that the dominance of so-called ‘Māori theory and interventions’ presents a forceful 
explanation for the New Zealand states’ failure to arrest Māori over-representation in the 
criminal justice system.  In this last section we wish to refute these claims and focus the 
critical gaze firmly on the dominance of Western theories and interventions in state 
responses to Māori over-representation. 
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Does Tikanga Māori dominate the development of crime control policy in New Zealand? 
The argument that tikanga dominates the development of crime control policy greatly 
exaggerates the authority given to Māori approaches to offending within the system, 
whether measured by legislative empowerment or the amount of resource targeted to so-
called Māori initiatives.  The purpose of this mythical construct appears to be to convince 
us that the development of effective solutions to the Indigenous problem has been 
hampered in neo-colonial jurisdictions by a) the rise of Indigenous cultural theory, b) 
the biculturalisation of state policy, which led to c) the policy sector in New Zealand 
‘turning away from science’ and embracing cultural perspectives to develop crime 
control policies for First Nations (see Marie, 2010, and also Weatherburn, 2010 in 
relation to the Australian context).  For some practitioners of administrative 
criminology, this explains the predominance of policies and interventions geared to 
conferencing processes, circle sentencing, enhancing the cultural awareness of agents 
and agencies and a focus on bias and institutional practice.  Amongst these, Marie 
(2010: 283) makes the specious claim that Māori theory dominates correctional policy 
development in the New Zealand context.  To bolster this position, administrative 
criminologists offer misleading summations of Māori theories of social harm, by arguing 
that cultural loss is presented in such theoretical frameworks as the key determinant of 
Māori overrepresentation in the justice system: 
 
A major assumption of this theory is that the contemporary overrepresentation of 
Māori in offending, incarceration, and recidivism rates is best understood as the 
outcome of Māori experiencing impairments to cultural identity resulting from 
colonisation.  Central to this theory, therefore, is also the assumption that ethnicity 
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is a reliable construct by which distinctions can be made between offenders 
regarding what factors precipitated their offending, as well as best practices for 
their rehabilitation.  Considering a thwarted cultural identity is seen to have given 
rise to a higher proportion of offenders who are Māori, rehabilitation efforts 
largely pivot on the idea that restoring cultural identity will lead to a subsequent 
reduction of the number of Māori in prison. 
 
To support the argument Newbold’s (2007) summary of the types of programmes 
currently en vogue in corrections is cited.  Yet inexplicably overlooked are the preceding 
chapters of Newbold’s book which reveal that within the Department’s theoretical 
paradigm, culture and cultural identity are not given causal power: in other words 
culture neither causes crime nor factors significantly in its reduction.  In fact, culture 
(specifically Māori culture) is confined to the responsivity tranche of the Department’s 
theoretical and intervention framework.  In this tranche ‘restoring cultural awareness’ 
is considered helpful for preparing individual Māori offenders to receive therapeutic 
treatment (see Coebergh, Bakker, Anstiss, Maynard and Percy, 2001, especially p. 15-16; 
Webb, 2012).  Administrative criminological practitioners who take this view appear be 
to unaware that the so-called Māori/Indigenous theory they are critiquing, is in fact an 
invention of government officials and contractors (Tauri, 2013c).  In other words the 
‘Indigenous theory’ that informs policy making is best described as a governmental 
interpretation of Indigenous knowledge and cultural practice employed by institutions to 
enhance the indigenisation of their strategies and interventions (see Tauri, 2011a; 
Webb, 2003, 2012).   
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It is difficult to comprehend how commentators could depict the current policy 
situation in New Zealand this way, given that the available documentation is almost 
entirely constructed by crime control agencies, including external ‘experts’ contracted 
to deliver a proscribed project on behalf of government officials.  The majority of 
sources utilised by crime control policy makers are not generated by external, 
independent Māori (or indeed critical, non-Māori) commentators (Tauri, 2009).  We are 
not, as administrative criminological practitioners argue in relation to the Australasian 
context, experiencing the dominance of Indigenous theory in the design of policy and 
interventions.  What are presented as culturally derived items are more accurately 
described as neo-colonial artefacts developed by policy makers and member of the 
academy ‘jobbing’ on behalf of the state, which are then utilised primarily to satisfy the 
policy requirements of Ministers’ and their agencies (see Tauri, 2011a regarding 
government institutions purposeful use of Māori symbols and Tikanga to indigenise 
policies and interventions).  The dominance of positivistic theory in Corrections policy 
programme, and the subjugation of Indigenous perspectives are evident in all relevant 
departmental documents, as demonstrated in the following text from a Department of 
Corrections (2009b: 42) review of the effectiveness of rehabilitation programmes: 
 
It is now generally accepted that treatment programmes should be adapted to 
cater for the cultural needs of offenders who participate.  As such, culture 
represents an important responsivity issue within offender rehabilitation. 
Incorporating culturally-based concepts, imagery and activities into programme 
content is regarded as a way of both attracting minority-group participants into 
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programmes, and ensuring that the programme engages and retains them 
(emphasis added).   
 
This imagery is ignored in administrative accounts that accentuate the myth of the 
dominance of Indigenous perspectives and a focus on structure (i.e., bias in policing or 
the courts) in policy responses.  For example, one account from that perspective argues 
that: 
 
... debate about how to respond to Indigenous violence have focussed less on the 
question of how to reduce it than how to reduce the effect of Indigenous violence 
on Indigenous contact with the criminal justice system.  The general consensus on 
this issue seems to be that the best way to reduce Indigenous contact with the 
criminal justice system is to create some tribunal or process that gives Indigenous 
community members a voice in how to respond to crime by Indigenous 
defendants (Weatherburn 2010: 198). 
 
In promoting the view that Indigenous theories dominate the development of crime 
control policy, administrative criminological exponents appear to resist engaging with 
the extensive material Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars have produced in 
examining Indigenous peoples and over-representation in New Zealand and other 
settler societies.  If they did they would find that Indigenous and critical scholars in New 
Zealand (Jackson, 1988; Tauri, 2009; Webb, 2003), Australia (Blagg 2000b, Cunneen, 
2009; Dodson, 1994) and Canada (Gosse, Henderson and Carter (eds), 1994; Monture, 
1999; Turpel, 1994; Victor, 2007) provide sophisticated explanations of the causes of 
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Indigenous social harm and victimisation.  This material also reveals the wide range of 
interventions, such as habilitation centres, and culturally and socially specific 
therapeutic approaches to a wide range of risk factors, to use the preferred terminology 
of administrative criminology that Indigenous scholars and practitioners have designed 
(see Tauri, 2013c).   
 
Undoubtedly, issues like colonialism, institutional bias and militaristic policing 
strategies are all key foci of Indigenous criminological analysis.  However, it is 
duplicitous to argue that they are the only or the most predominant factors that 
Indigenous (and critical, non-Indigenous) scholars utilise to theorise the over-
representation issue.  The key issue that administrative criminology in New Zealand and 
other neo-colonial societies neglect is that it is the settler state that has demonstrated a 
preference for culturally sensitive processing of Indigenous offenders, exemplified by 
agency designed and controlled programmes such as group conferences, sentencing 
circles, Indigenous sentencing courts, Indigenous liaison officers, Aboriginal justice 
strategies and such like (Tauri, 2011a).  These types of state-centred responses 
invariably lack jurisdictional autonomy, legislative weight and receive significantly less 
funding compared to mainstream policies and interventions.  A considerable proportion 
of settler state responses to the Indigenous problem can be described as orientalised 
artefacts that enable the state to be seen to do something while attempting to silence 
independent (Indigenous) commentary on the failure of its crime control processes to 
provide meaningful justice outcomes for Indigenes (see Palys and Victor, 2005; Tauri, 
2011b).  Policies to increase Māori participation within corrections through 
communications, community relations, employment, service delivery, and community 
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partnerships, should not be confused with control over correctional philosophy and 
policy development.  Indeed, there have only been recent developments of two 
standalone pre-release units for Māori prisoners in 2011, the Whare Oranga Ake units.  
With thousands of Māori incarcerated on a yearly basis, the size of these 16 beds units, 
confirm that Māori-informed correctional programmes are limited within the current 
system. 
 
The dominant orthodoxies that inform penal practice and wider criminal justice processes 
are ignored by administrative criminologists, who instead present the erroneous 
assumption that rehabilitation programmes for Māori are based solely upon cultural 
identity deficits and dominate programme delivery to this group24.  Critical scrutiny of 
processes should involve an objective and systematic evaluation of the broader IOM and 
the criminogenic suite of programmes, and the failure of these to achieve stated aims, 
namely the significant reduction of recidivism amongst the prison population.  This has 
been thoroughly documented by Greg Newbold in his 2009 publication Another One Bites 
the Dust: Recent Initiatives in Correctional Reform in New Zealand.  In summary, contrary 
to the mythic claims of some administrative criminology accounts in the Australasian 
context, a thorough review of available research and government texts demonstrates 
that: 
1. Māori theory does not dominate policy making in any of New Zealand’s crime 
control agencies; 
                                                          
24  See for example, Marie’s (2010) assertion that the greater majority of Māori offenders receive tikanga-based 
treatment, while the extant literature clearly shows this not to be the case.  Unfortunately, Marie presents 
the MaCRNs process as having a meaningful impact on policy design and the delivery of correctional 
interventions to Māori offenders, when in fact it was only ever intended to supplement the much broader, 
psychology-dominated IOM approach (Webb, 2012).   
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2. the vast majority of policy, legislation, intervention design and funding decisions 
are informed by imported ‘theories’ and interventions (for example, see the 
Ministry of Justice generated material on the recent Drivers of Crime project in 
New Zealand (2009a, 2009b); and 
3. the vast majority of government spend in New Zealand’s criminal justice system 
goes to fund the orthodox ‘Western’ derived crime control programmes. 
 
Conclusion 
We wish to conclude our critique of the mythological constructs of administrative 
criminology by acknowledging the lack of evidence for the efficacy of Indigenous 
theories and interventions.  However, while making these claims commentators appear 
unaware of the politics of Māori crime control policy in the New Zealand context.  It our 
contention that ignorance of the politics surrounding Māori policy construction, leads to 
exaggerated claims regarding the amount of influence Māori theory and practices 
actually have on the development of crime control policy.  Even a rudimentary 
awareness of the politics involved, as evidenced by a vast array of policy documents, 
would undoubtedly curb exaggerated claims about the supposed failure of Māori theory 
and programmes.  This is because such knowledge would invariably lead commentators 
to acknowledge a fundamental truth about the criminal justice sector in New Zealand, 
namely that it has a poor history of undertaking scientific, outcome-focused 
research/evaluation on its policies and interventions (Tauri, 2011a).  The lack of 
empirical analysis of the crime control in New Zealand pertains to the entire suite of 
policies and interventions whether they are informed by tikanga, or Crime Prevention 
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through Environmental Design (CPTED) or some other theory (see Tauri, 2013c; Te 
Puni Kōkiri, 2002b).   
 
The mythological construction of Māori approaches offered by administrative 
criminologists is further weakened by a sustained, critical analysis of the efficacy of 
their preferred scientifically-derived interventions.  In particular, commentators fail to 
provide significant evidence that the preferred programmes of the state and 
administrative criminologists are reducing Māori rates of offending and reoffending in 
any empirically verifiably way.  Further to this is the fact that offenders in the New 
Zealand context are much more likely to experience the individual-focused therapeutic 
programmes that many administrative criminologists prefer, than they are to 
participate in tikanga-inspired interventions that are supposedly having such a negative 
effect on Indigenous recidivism rates (see offenders’ comments in Department of 
Corrections 2009b and Te Puni Kōkiri, 2007).  On this basis, any claim that Māori theory 
and/or culture dominates crime control policy construction in New Zealand, or that we 
are to blame for the contemporary failure of the overall crime control policy response to 
the Māori problem, should be considered little more than a mythological artefact that 
lacks empirical validity. 
 
Over the past thirty years, Indigenous commentators have produced a significant 
amount of critical material on the response of crime control agents to the ‘Indigenous 
problem’.  Less prominent has been critical analysis of the role played by the Academy 
in supporting the state’s historical and contemporary marginalisation of First Nations 
through crime control policy.  Evidence for the need for Indigenous scholars to turn our 
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critical gaze to the symbiotic relationship between the discipline of criminology and 
policy-makers is indisputable.  As Biko Agozino (2003) has demonstrated, the social 
sciences born of the 19th century (in particular criminology), played a significant role in 
the colonial project, with the First Nations of Africa and North American serving as 
guinea pig populations for the development and refinement of Western crime-control 
strategies.  In more recent times we have observed the resurrection and re-
empowerment of administrative forms of criminology in the policy making process, and 
with it a governmental preference for individualised, therapeutic interventions and 
policy development strategies largely devoid of direct engagement with First Nation 
peoples.  On these issues alone, the need for a sustained critique is justified. But this 
critique must serve a greater purpose, namely the empowerment of First Nations in the 
realm of justice, resulting in meaningful reductions in contacts with ‘the system’.  In the 
area of crime control, this necessitates a multi-dimensional, strategic approach 
involving (amongst other things) a critical focus on the policy and legislation-making 
functions of the state, the continued resurrection of First Nation responses to social 
harm as alternatives to the formal system, and the development of an Indigenous, 
counter-colonial criminology dedicated to contesting the hegemony of administrative 
criminological approaches in the development of crime control policy.   
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Paper 4 
 
An Indigenous, Critical Commentary on the 
Globalisation of Restorative Justice 
 
Juan Marcellus Tauri 
 
(2014) British Journal of Community Justice, 12(2), pp 35-55.   
 
Introduction 
This paper is intended as a small offering in response to the challenge posed by Muncie 
(2005), O’Malley (2002) and Stenson (2005) for criminological analysis of the 
globalisation of crime control to move from obsessive macro-theorising about ‘its’ shape 
and depth, and instead begin analysing the micro-level impact of all this globalised, 
criminological activity.  The manuscript also serves as a response to Aas’ call for our 
discipline to: 
 
… take up an old debt of omission and explore more systematically connections 
between globalisation and colonisation [which is] essential if we are to address the 
imbalances of power and the dynamics of othering and social exclusion in the 
present world order (2009: 413).   
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A further motivation for this paper is my wish to privilege the experiences Indigenous 
peoples of contemporary manifestations of globalised European Justice25, for as Fenelon 
and Muguia (2008: 1657) rightly argue: 
 
In the telling of man’s [sic] global project, the story of indigenous peoples has been 
woven into the fabric of globality, yet the leading experts on globalisation have 
either ignored the role of indigenous peoples or reduced their existence to pre-
packaged terms such as the ‘fourth world’ or as ethnics in ‘developing nations’ or 
even hidden in the broader ‘periphery’.  
 
It is the modest intention of the author that through this paper Indigenous peoples’ ‘real 
world’ experiences of the globalisation of restorative justice will draw the discipline’s 
attention to the meso and micro-level impacts of the inter-jurisdictional travels of their 
theories, crime control products, and legislation.  Arguably, privileging Indigenous 
peoples’ experiences of the globalisation of crime control is important for the 
development of criminological analysis of the phenomenon.  After all, the Indigenous 
peoples of Africa, the Americas and the South Pacific have experienced an almost 
continuous process of cross-border transfer of crime control products throughout the last 
200 years or more.  Furthermore, imported criminal justice systems were a significant 
                                                          
25   Further rationale for privileging the experience(s) of Indigenous peoples residing in settler-colonial 
societies include the significant, over-representation of Indigenous peoples in all Settler Society 
criminal justice systems (Cunneen; 2006; Tauri, 2004); the vast amount of evidence of bias, racism 
perpetrated against Indigenous peoples by the agents of crime control, not to mention the part played 
by them in the genocidal phases of colonisation that Indigenes refers to as the ‘killing times’; the 
historical lack of focus by Eurocentric criminology on research with Indigenous peoples, that enables 
their experiences to be reflected through the research generated by the discipline; and finally the right 
of Indigenous peoples to speak for themselves about issues that concern them, a right recently 
confirmed through the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United 
Nations, 2008).   
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tool in the colonialists’ attempts to eradicate Indigenous life-worlds, strategies that 
manifest in the contemporary moment in the form of violent policing strategies, and our 
significant over-representation in criminal justice statistics.  And yet despite all this, the 
Indigenous voice is often silenced in the vast lexicon produced by the Western Academy 
(Tauri, 2013c).  Therefore, the time has come for us to speak for ourselves; to challenge 
the often negative impact of the products generated by the Academy and the restorative 
justice industry, upon our communities, and dispersed amongst us as though they are 
offerings from the criminological gods for the benefit of the less fortunate (Agozino, 2003; 
Tauri and Webb, 2012).   
 
The paper begins with a brief overview of the globalisation of crime control products; 
followed by a critical discussion of the processes through which the Indigenous life-world 
has come to play a significant part in the developing globalised RJ Industry, elements of 
which rely heavily on Indigenous culture for the marketing of their products.  I argue that 
the increasing inter-jurisdictional transfer of specific crime control products is having a 
profound impact on Indigenous peoples residing in settler-colonial societies, firstly, 
through the purposeful, and often exaggerated and inappropriate use of elements of 
Indigenous life-worlds in the construction and subsequent marketing of crime control 
products; and secondly, through the impact this activity is having on the ongoing struggle 
of First Nation peoples to resurrect our traditional justice processes and/or achieve some 
measure of jurisdictional autonomy (Tauri, 2011c).   
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A Brief Comment on the Globalisation of Crime Control Products 
 
Criminologists are, together with other criminal justice professionals, becoming 
increasingly eager exporters of knowledge. 
     Aas (2009: 409). 
 
During the past twenty years globalisation has become established as a legitimate area of 
criminological inquiry, albeit one that is responded to in equal measures of admiration 
and suspicion (Hopkins, 2002; Newburn and Sparks, 2004; Robertson, 1990; Scholte, 
2005).  For some, the prevalent image of globalisation as ever-increasing flows of capital, 
people, data and cultural artefacts is a welcome development that presents new 
opportunities for breaking down perceived barriers related to ethnicity, class, language 
and culture (see Watson, 2004), overcoming poverty and inequality, and for the 
development of effective responses to universal issues such as crime and (in)security 
(Jones and Newburn, 2002a; Newburn, 2010)  For others, globalisation represents an 
unfolding tyrannical rule of peoples by a global economic regime that works exclusively 
for the benefit of Capital, reflected in an ever-increasing exploitation of cultural context 
for the benefit of policy entrepreneurs and the state (Hay and Watson, 1999; Held and 
McGrew, 2000, Odora Hoppers, 2000; Teeple, 1995).   
 
According to authors such as Friman (2009: 1-2) and Nelken (2004: 373), crime has ‘gone 
global’.  This statement signals that the scale and scope of the contemporary epoch of 
globalisation is unprecedented and unmatched in its degree of globality.  The evidence of 
this phenomena is apparently everywhere, including the transfer of a range of 
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criminological strategies, technologies, policies and interventions including Zero 
Tolerance (Newburn 2010; Wacquant, 2009), and Broken Windows (Shichor, 2004) 
policing strategies, and Mandatory Sentencing (Lynch and Sabol, 1997), and related ‘3-
stikes and you are out’-style legislation (Jones, 2003; Schiraldi, Colburn and Lotke, 2004).  
All of these artefacts are accompanied by sophisticated marketing rhetoric and media 
friendly sound-bites that betray (or perhaps more accurately, reflect) their conservative 
birth-right: ‘tough on crime’, ‘sensible sentencing’, ‘life means life’, ‘holding offenders 
accountable’, and so on.  However, it is important to note that the growing international 
market in crime control artefacts is not solely dominated by ‘tough on crime’ 
conservatives and their (supposedly) punitive policies and interventions.  Arguably one of 
the most significant players on the international market – to use perhaps a rather 
inaccurate collective term for what is a broad, often disparate movement – is the 
Restorative Justice Industry (Cunneen and Hoyle, 2010; Daley and Immarigeon, 1998).   
 
The Globalisation of Restorative Justice 
According to popular origin myths, the antecedents of contemporary RJ began in Canada 
in the late 1970s when a parole officer from Kitchener, Ontario introduced a process that 
enabled victims and offenders to meet face-to-face (Peachey, 1989).  From there it 
steadily grew, with the development of community boards in San Francisco in the 1980s; 
the proliferation of justice boards throughout North America through the 1980s/1990s; 
Family Group Conferencing (FGC) in New Zealand in the early 1990s, and Sentencing 
Circles in Canada.  All this activity has since been followed by an explosion of RJ-related 
activity across North America, Western Europe, and of late throughout parts of Asia and 
South America.  That RJ is now a full-blown industry that plays an increasingly important 
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role in the globalised crime control market is undisputable.  For example, Miers (2007: 
447) writes that “viewed globally, informed observers estimate that, by 2000, there were 
some 1,300 (RJ) programmes across 20 countries directed at young offenders”.   
 
The contemporary development of the RJ Industry has played a significant part in both 
the Academy’s commodification of Indigenous life-worlds and the global spread of RJ 
products.  For example, Deukmedjian (2008: 122-123) recounts the introduction by the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police of RJ into its practices via community justice forums that 
were based heavily on the police-centred, Australian formulated ‘Wagga Wagga’ model.  
The global trajectory of this model of RJ, based on the so-called ‘Māori’ approach to 
justice, can be traced from its successful insertion into the U.S in 1994 in Anoka, 
Minnesota (McDonald, Moore, O’Connell and Thorsborne, 1995).  As Deukmedjian (2008: 
122) recounts, this successful foray into the U.S “inspired McDonald and O’Connell [two of 
the architects of the Wagga Wagga model] to form the Transformative Justice Australian 
advocacy and consultancy group” that subsequently travelled throughout North America 
in the mid-1990s marketing a standardised form of FGC to both practitioners and policy 
makers.  Their travels included meetings with Indigenous elder’s councils in Ottawa and 
other Canadian jurisdictions (Rudin, 2013, personal communication).  Eventually the 
Wagga Wagga model became the standard for RJ-related service delivery by the RCMP 
throughout Canada (Chatterjee, 2000).  Further highlighting the rapid globalisation of the 
FGC as part of the developing market in RJ products, both Chatterjee (1999) and Richards 
(2000) recounting that RCMP officials visiting New Zealand and Australia in 1996 to see 
first-hand the FGC model in action, after which they negotiated a cost-sharing agreement 
with the Department of Justice (Canada) for 3.75 million each, for roll-out in 1997 of the 
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RJ initiative known as Community Justice Forums (Deukmedjian, 2008).  Subsequently, the 
RCMP contracted Transformative Justice Australia to train members to run the new RJ 
programme, which was very much a derivative of the New Zealand FGC and Australian 
Wagga Wagga conferencing models.  
 
Restorative Justice and the Commodification of Indigenous Life-Worlds 
 
Family group conferencing was a gift from the Aboriginal people of New Zealand, 
the Māori ….                        
                      Ross (2009: 5). 
 
The appropriation of components of Indigenous life-worlds by state functionaries and 
criminologists for the purpose of indigenising crime control products and culturally 
sensitising systems and products, is well documented in the extant literature (see 
Havemann, 1988; Tauri, 1998; Victor, 2007).  Arguably, the most influential colonising 
project of this kind in contemporary times came with the passing of the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 (the Act) by the New Zealand Government, and with 
it the introduction to the world of the FGC forum.  Advocates of the FGC process make a 
number of claims about the relationship between the format of the process, traditional 
Māori justice practices, and the role the forum has played in responding to Māori 
concerns with the formal criminal justice system (see Jackson, 1988).  For example, it is 
often claimed in Australasian-focused literature that: 
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1. the Act was influenced by Māori concerns for the prevalence of institutionally racist 
and culturally inappropriate practices within the New Zealand criminal justice 
system (Fulcher, 1999; Goodyer, 2003; Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1988); 
2. because the conferencing process and Māori justice practice have ‘restorative 
elements’, it provides the state with a culturally appropriate forum for addressing 
the justice needs of Māori (Hassell, 1996; McElrea, 1994; Olsen, Maxwell and Morris, 
1995); and   
3. the conferencing process provides evidence of the system’s ability to culturally 
sensitise itself, and also empower Māori to deal with their youth offenders in 
culturally appropriate ways (Doolan, 2005; Morris and Maxwell, 1993). 
 
Over the past two decades the oft-made claims of the Māori/Indigenous origin of the FGC 
forum and its ability to culturally sensitive New Zealand (and other settler-colonial 
society) youth justice systems, has largely been uncritically replicated in the international 
restorative justice and wider criminological literature (see Braithwaite, 1995; Carey, 
2000; Griffiths and Bazemore, 1999; Leung, 1999; Lupton and Nixon, 1999; McCold, 1997; 
Roach, 2000; Strang, 2000; Umbreit, 2001; Weitekamp, 1999; Zehr, 1990).  Specific 
examples of the way in which, to use Daly’s (2002) expression, the ‘origin myth’ of this 
particular RJ forum, especially the constant refrain to its supposed ‘Māoriness’, are 
reflected in the following statements from well-known advocates of the FGC forum, and of 
the RJ movement:  
 
The river [of ‘restorative justice’] is also being fed by a variety of indigenous 
traditions and current adaptations which draw upon those traditions: family group 
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conferences adapted from Māori traditions in New Zealand, for example… (Zehr, 
2002: 62). 
 
And 
 
[T]he principles of restorative justice are particularly consistent with those of many 
indigenous traditions… including… Māori people in Australia and New Zealand and 
the practice of]… family group conferencing by Māori people in Australia… (Umbreit, 
reported in Richards, 2007: 385). 
 
Perhaps the most startling elements of the origin myth of the New Zealand FGC, from a 
critical Indigenous perspective, is the claim that the forum was designed in part to enable 
Māori families to manage the offending of Māori juveniles (see, in particular, Morris and 
Maxwell , 1993 and Serventy, 1996).   
 
The constant reiteration of the origin myth within the restorative justice literature of 
(mostly) Western European criminologists and practitioners, has resulted in it acquiring 
the status of a seemingly uncontestable, taken-for-granted ‘truth’ (see Pavlich, 2005), one 
that RJ advocates refer to constantly in their accounts of the emergence of restorative 
justice practice in the contemporary moment.  And yet somehow, while focusing on the 
‘Māoriness’ and the ‘restorativeness’ of the FGC forum, these same authors consistently 
overlook readily available evidence that problematises almost all aspects of the origin 
myth (see discussion below), including, for example, the following ‘confession’ by Doolan 
(2005: 1), one of the primary architects of the 1989 legislation, that “those of us who were 
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involved in the policy development process leading up to the new law had never heard of 
restorative justice”.  He further states that empowering Māori families to have any form of 
‘control’ over responses to the offending of their youth was not a major consideration of 
policy makers.  Instead, Doolan goes on to affirm that the primary goal of the new forum 
was making young people responsible for their offending behaviour and decreasing the 
use of the Youth Court.  
 
In comparison to the grand mythologising of many RJ exponents, there is the growing 
literature from critical Indigenous and non-Indigenous commentators that directly 
contests the monolithic origin myths of restorative processes such as the FGC.  These 
commentators provide evidence of high levels of dissatisfaction amongst indigenous 
communities with the introduction of restorative justice interventions more broadly, and 
of the FGC forum in particular (see Blagg, 1998; Cunneen, 1997, 2002; Moyle, 2013; Tauri, 
1998; 2004; Zellerer and Cunneen, 2001).  These critics also take advocates of RJ to task 
for making “selective and ahistorical claims… about indigenous social control conforming 
with the principles of restorative justice, while conveniently ignoring others” (Cunneen, 
2002: 43; see also Pratt, 2006 for discussion of the tendency in RJ literature to 
romanticise Indigenous justice by ignoring evidence of the use of non-RJ type punishment 
practices by Indigenous communities).  
 
In her ground breaking critique of the philosophical foundations of the modern RJ 
Industry, Richards (2007) provides a succinct analysis of the ways in which the Industry 
formulates and sustains origin myths of forums like the FGC.  Richards achieves this by 
demonstrating the extent to which the Daybreak Report, authored by the Ministerial 
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Advisory Committee for the New Zealand Department of Social Welfare (Ministerial 
Advisory Committee, 1988) is continuously, and erroneously portrayed by members of 
the RJ movement as both the impetus for the introduction of restorative justice in New 
Zealand, and as providing evidence of extensive Māori input into the development of the 
FGC (for examples of this perspective, see Braithwaite, 1995; Doolan, 2002; Fulcher, 1999 
and Lupton and Nixon, 1999).  Richards analysis of the Daybreak report shows that the 
oft-repeated notion that Māori communities ‘mobilised against Pakeha’, were successful 
in pressuring the New Zealand government into adopting a more culturally suitable 
criminal justice system, in the form of a ‘Māori inspired’ FGC, is a significantly 
romanticised and exaggerated version of what took place.  In summary, Richards’ (2007) 
demonstrates that: 
 the initial working party appointed to consider what changes were necessary in 
New Zealand’s youth justice/child welfare system was formed without Māori 
representation; and 
 no specific recommendation was ever made by the Ministerial Advisory Committee 
that the Department implement family group conferencing. 
 
Undoubtedly, suggestions made by the Committee for reconfiguration of New Zealand’s 
youth justice system clearly resonate with the core philosophies and practices associated 
with RJ.  It is also true that we are able to make broad comparisons between the 
governmental forum (FGC), and certain aspects of Māori customary justice practice. The 
Committee recommended, for example, that the Children and Young Persons Act (1974) be 
amended to include greater consideration of the role of the family when dealing with 
Māori children, and the increased participation of Māori families in matters relating to 
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child welfare and juvenile justice (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1988).  Later in the 
report, the Committee (1988: 29) returns to these issues, claiming that a “substantial 
ideological change” would be necessary in order to amend the Children’s and Young 
Persons Act (1974) to cater to Māori needs.  However, as Richards demonstrates, the 
Committee did not make any specific recommendations, preferring instead to present a 
range of principles that they believed should shape changes to the legislation.  
Furthermore, the original Children and Young Persons Bill, precursor to the CYPF Act 1989 
made no reference the Committee’s proposals.  Finally, Richards relates that Annex 2 of 
the report focuses specifically on what the Committee believe should be done in regards 
to child welfare and youth justice practices.  In this section, the Committee (1988: 54), 
rather than advocating significant empowerment of Māori to practice their own justice, or 
‘control’ responses to their families and youth offenders, clearly stated that “[f]urther, we 
believe that the establishment of new Courts and special Judges would be unnecessary”.  
By rejecting any significant changes to status quo, and advocating for ‘cultural sensitivity 
training’ for court officials, and the construction of a state-centred forum, the Committee 
was following a strategy with a long history in the colonial context; namely the utilisation 
of components of Māori cultural practice through a process of indigenisation to provide 
the appearance of cultural sensitivity (see discussion below and Havemann, 1988; Tauri, 
1998).  
 
When considering all the above, it is evident that both the focus of the Committee and the 
contents of the Daybreak report is thus “less romantically - and more prosaically-oriented 
than ‘restorative justice’ advocates often imply” (Richards, 2007: 109).  Furthermore, the 
notion that the FGC forum emerged in New Zealand in response to an uprising of 
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indigenous communities keen to implement traditional justice processes,” is  not endorsed 
by the very report that is often cited within the RJ literature to support this contention.  It 
is, therefore, an exaggeration to declare that the Daybreak report is responsible for the 
implementation of the FGC forum in New Zealand as supporters of restorative justice 
often claim.  And with this realisation, comes the collapse of the origin myth of one of the 
most significant forums behind the contemporary globalisation of crime control, 
especially of restorative policies and interventions.  
 
Indigenous Response to the Grand Mythologising of Restorative Justice 
Over the past 15 years the origin myth of the FGC forum has been heavily critiqued by 
critical Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars alike, including Blagg (1997) and 
Cunneen (1997) in the Australian context; Lee (1997), Rudin (2005) and Victor (2007) 
presenting Indigenous Canadian perspectives26, and Love (2002) and Tauri (1998; 2004) 
from a critical Māori perspective.  These authors expose a number of significant issues 
including much of the empirical research on Indigenous satisfaction is exaggerated, and 
that Indigenous experiences of this type of forum do not match the glowing reports of 
their cultural appropriateness and ability to meet Indigenous aspirations for 
jurisdictional empowerment reported in the academic literature and through the 
pronouncement or RJ advocates (for example, see Love, 2002; Tauri, 1998; 2004 and 
Walker, 1996 for detailed discussion of the exaggerated claims of ‘cultural sensitivity’ in 
                                                          
26  In relation to Canada, Rudin (2005: 97) demonstrates that much the same myth-making is happening 
in relation to Eurocentrically-derived ‘indigenised’ programmes developed there, as is happening with 
the FGC forum, when he argues that: 
 
The belief that sentencing circles are a form of Aboriginal justice displays a serious 
misunderstanding of the hallmarks of an Aboriginal justice programme… the use of circles was 
pioneered by judges in the Yukon, particularly Judge Barry Stuart”, and “… it must always be kept 
in mind that sentencing circles are not an Aboriginal justice initiative or programme; they are 
judge-made and judge-led initiatives.   
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the Māori context).  Schmidt and Pollak (2004: 133) underline Māori criticisms of both 
the origin myth and the ‘myth of empowerment’ so prevalent in RJ literature on the FGC 
forum, when they write that: 
 
Māori writers such as Love (2002), Tauri (1999) and Walker (1996) have 
challenged the popular notion that the adoption of conferencing was a victory.  
Rather, they argue that FGC has co-opted and incorporated Māori perspectives, 
leaving intact the structural power relationships within child welfare. 
 
Much of the government-sponsored research underscores the co-optive nature of the FGC 
process and the marginalisation of whanau (family) members and ‘cultural experts’ (for 
example, in the New Zealand context re: FGC practice, compare Morris and Maxwell, 1993 
and Tauri, 1998 and Maxwell et al, 2004 and Tauri, 2004).  Alternatively, it has been 
argued that both the 1989 Act and the FGC process were influenced by Governments’ 
need to be seen to be ‘doing something constructive’ in the face of a perceived rise in 
juvenile offending, particularly amongst Māori youth, and continued criticism of the 
operations of the formal system (Richard, 2007; Tauri, 1998; 1999).  
 
Despite the contested nature of the findings of research on the FGC process and its 
empowerment (or not) of Māori, what is evident is that over the past decade the FGC has 
become an increasingly popular commodity on the international crime control market.  
This is particularly evident in the settler-colonial jurisdictions of Canada, Australia and 
the United States of America.  It should be noted that all these jurisdictions have 
significant over-representation of Indigenous peoples in their criminal justice systems.  As 
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related earlier, evidence exists that New Zealand’s FGC forum and its Australian 
derivative were purposely and at times aggressively marketed in other settler-colonial 
jurisdictions.  The marketing of these products was aided significantly by the fact that 
much of the academic literature uncritically promoting the origin myth discussed 
previously (see Consedine, 1995; LaPrairie, 1996; Morris and Maxwell, 1993; Olsen et al, 
1995 and Umbreit and Stacey, 1996.  For more contemporary manifestations of the 
reiteration of the myths see Maxwell, 2008; Ross, 2009 and Waites, MacGowan, Pennell, 
Carlton-LaNey and Weil, 2004).  The Indigenous origin myth has recently featured in 
commentaries on the spread of RJ forums across Great Britain and Western Europe 
(Barnsdale and Walker, 2007), and central and South America (Scuro, 2013).  The transfer 
process appears to be taking place in an organised manner, involving a range of policy 
workers, franchise companies and RJ advocates.  These ‘activists’ are heavily involved in 
creating viable markets for crime control products through the commodification of 
‘culture’, in particular Indigenous cultural practices (see Lee, 1997; Takagi and Shank, 
2004; Tauri, 2004; 2013b for analysis of these practices).   
 
Undoubtedly, the exportation of the FGC forum to various Western jurisdictions has been 
heavily influenced by the arguments discussed earlier.  Particularly important is the 
fiction that the FGC product provides a forum that empowers Māori /the Indigenous 
Other, and signals the ability of the imposed criminal justice ordering to culturally 
sensitise itself.  This process is driven by the co-option (intentional of otherwise) of 
Indigenous/Māori cultural practices and the purposeful utilisation of these selected 
cultural elements (such as ‘circles’) as a key marketing tool for marketing this type of 
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product across Western European crime control markets, and more recently across Asia 
and Latin America (Tauri, 2013b).  
 
Indigenous Justice and the Fictions of the Restorative Justice Industry 
 
The final belief is to believe in a fiction, which you know to be a fiction, there being 
nothing else, the exquisite truth is to know that it is a fiction and that you believe it 
willingly. 
           Shanley (1997: 685). 
 
Given the previous discussion, what are we to make of the following comment from 
Gabrielle Maxwell, one of New Zealand’s staunchest advocates, both nationally and 
internationally, of the FGC forum? 
 
In New Zealand there has been criticism that family group conferences have not 
been managed in ways that conform to traditional practice of Māori or those from 
other cultural backgrounds.  It has been suggested that the high proportion of Māori 
staff managing the process and the inclusion of Māori greetings and blessing is little 
more than tokenism and can rarely be described as a truly Māori process.  This is 
despite the undisputed origins of many aspects of the conference process in 
traditional Māori procedures (Consedine, 1995).  On the other hand, on occasion, 
the management of the conference process is sometimes passed over to a Māori 
social service group (Maxwell, 2008: 87). 
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In this quote we observe many of the issues Māori and other critical Indigenous/non-
Indigenous commentators have identified with much of the Academy and RJ advocates’ 
writing on the FGC forum.  Firstly, the most obvious issue is the claim that the FGC’s Māori 
foundations are undisputable.  The previous discussion, especially the work of Richards 
exposes that this claim is an exaggeration.  In reiterating the origin myth and presenting it 
as ‘undisputable’, Maxwell ignores a significant amount of literature exposing this fallacy 
that has been published since Consedine’s book was released.  This fact highlights another 
of the criticisms levelled by Indigenous scholars at some members of the RJ Industry, 
namely the lack of engagement with the critical Indigenous/non-Indigenous literature 
(see Tauri, 2013c; Tauri and Webb, 2011).  Secondly, Maxwell’s own published research 
on the FGC process contained criticisms by Māori FGC participants with the tokenistic 
way in which Māori culture was afforded space in the process by state officials, usually 
confined to allowing elders to recite karakia (prayer) at the beginning and end of the 
process (see Morris and Maxwell, 1993; Maxwell et al, 2004).  This situation is far 
removed from the claims by advocates that the process provides a meaningful forum for 
the empowerment of Māori (for example, see Maxwell, 2008).  Thirdly, in the above quote 
Maxwell is replicating a fundamental weakness in the FGC/Māori justice scholarship; 
namely ignoring the lack of direct Māori input into the design of the Act and the FGC 
forum.  Also overlooked is the fact that officials involved in the developing the process, 
most notably the chief policy architect, Doolan, have acknowledged that  the focus of work 
on the 1989 Act was never on developing a Māori justice process, or indeed a restorative 
one.   
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Restorative justice advocates are constantly, and erroneously equating Māori requests for 
a ‘traditional forum’ (more especially in Moana Jackson’s 1988 report He Whaipaanga 
Hou than in Daybreak), with Māori justice philosophies being foundational to the 
formulation of the forum itself.  To do so is to ignore the reality of policy making in the 
New Zealand context, in particular the historical tendency for the criminal justice sector 
to Indigenise Eurocentric crime control processes (see Jackson, 1995; Tauri, 1998; 2009; 
Tauri and Webb, 2011; Williams, 2000).  It also ignores the fact that the supposed Māori 
and restorative elements were identified long after the formulation and implementation 
of both the Act and the forum (Tauri, 2004).  As Daly (2002: 63) effectively argues “the 
devising of a (white, bureaucratic) justice practice that is flexible and accommodating 
towards cultural differences does not mean that conferencing is an indigenous justice 
practice”.  Daly (2002: 4) then goes further, revealing that Maxwell herself is aware of this 
distinction when she includes the following quote from Maxwell and Morris’ original 1993 
study:  
 
A distinction must be drawn between a system, which attempts to re-establish the 
indigenous model of pre-European times, and a system of justice, which is culturally 
appropriate.  The New Zealand system is an attempt to establish the latter, not to 
replicate the former. As such, it seeks to incorporate many of the features apparent 
in whanau [extended family] decision-making processes and seen in meetings on 
marae today, but it also contains elements quite alien to indigenous models. 
 
The Canadian scholar Stephanie Vieille (2012: 174) highlights a fundamental flaw in this 
perspective when she writes that: 
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Even though both FGCs and tikanga appear to adopt similar approaches to doing 
justice, for instance, by putting emphasis on active participation of victims, 
offenders, and the community, their underlying values differ significantly.  This is 
illustrative of a wider and problematic tendency to equate Indigenous approaches 
and mechanisms of justice with the all-encompassing restorative justice approach. 
 
How do we begin to explain the ongoing recitation of the origin myth by RJ proponents, 
when significant evidence that contradicts it is ignored?  In part, understanding the 
situation requires recognition of how important the origin myth is to the marketability of 
RJ products like the FGC.  
 
Marketing the Indigenous 
In much the same way as Kathryn Shanley in her 1997 (p. 676; emphasis included) article 
The Indians America Loves to Love and Read, I argue that: 
 
… we can identify neo-colonial cultural appropriations, thefts of ‘cultural property’ 
[and that] such cultural appropriations inextricably belong to overall totalisation 
efforts – the political and ideological domination of indigenous… peoples… 
 
The appropriation of Indigenous life-worlds is carried out in many different ways, 
sometimes in a blatant, unapologetic ‘stealing’ of Indigenous artefacts, such as when 
sports teams utilise Indigenous names and symbols (see recent debates regarding the 
Washington Redskins, especially in The Huffington Post, 2013), and at other times 
through sleight of hand, as in the case of the New Zealand state, non-Indigenous 
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academics and, eventually, restorative justice corporations marketing of the FGC process.  
The sleight of hand terminology is purposeful as it denotes the magic that often forms the 
basis of criminological musings, and the constructions of crime control policy.  
 
As an Indigenous person I find it easy to understand why Western criminologists, policy 
makers, academics and private RJ companies seek to appropriate elements of the 
Indigenous culture context to bolster the marketability of their products.  After all, one of 
the fundamental rules of modern marketing is 'sex sells', and indeed the Indigenous life-
world can be very sexy and erotic.  This process - the Western criminological enterprise 
utilising Indigenous motifs, phrases, practices to Indigenise and market their products, 
should be presented for what it really is, the eroticisation of Western crime control (see 
Acorn (2004) for discussion of the eroticisation of justice, specifically in relation to RJ).   
 
It is evident that many RJ practitioners and advocates are driven by a desire to do good, 
but what is also driving this process is the desire to strengthen the marketing potential of 
products on the competitive international crime control market.  But let's be clear what it 
is not about, at least in the first instance, the empowerment of Indigenous peoples. Nor is 
all this activity about returning to Indigenous peoples the ‘gift’ of once again being able to 
practice our traditional responses to social harm (Tauri, 2013a).  It is within this 
understanding of the development of products that are marketable in settler-colonial 
crime control markets that enables us to begin to answer the criminological question, so 
what?  Why is this issue important both for Indigenous peoples and critical criminological 
inquiry? 
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So What?  
 
[G]lobalisation’ in Indigenous eyes reflects a deepening, hastening and stretching of 
an already-existing empire.           
           Alfred and Corntassel (2005: 601). 
 
There is growing anecdotal evidence that the global transfer of crime control policy is 
negatively impacting Indigenous peoples (see Tauri, 2004 on New Zealand and Victor, 
2007 on Canada).  This is particularly evident in the restorative and youth justice 
contexts.  From a distance it appears that the process is impacting Indigenous peoples in a 
number of ways, including: 
 containment of Indigenous critique of neo-colonial state formal justice systems 
through the production of state-centred indigenised policies and programmes 
(Tauri, 2013b); and 
 blocking Indigenous activities aimed at enhancing their jurisdictional autonomy and 
ability to develop their own responses to social harm, via the importation of 
‘culturally appropriate’ crime control products (Victor, 2007). 
 
In 1997 Gloria Lee, a member of the Cree First Nation in Canada, published an article 
titled The Newest Old Gem: Family Group Conferencing.  Lee expressed concerns about the 
recently imported family group conferencing forum being forced upon Canadian 
Indigenous peoples at the expense of their own justice mechanisms and practices.  In 
particular she argued that “First Nation communities are vigorously encouraged to adopt 
and implement the Māori process and to make alterations to fit the specific community 
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needs, customs and traditions of people who will make use of the new process” (Lee, 
1997: 1).  Lee’s concerns with the nature of the importation of the FGC/conferencing 
process into the Canadian jurisdiction, and the impact it might have on Indigenous 
peoples justice aspirations in that country have been shown to be valid.   
 
The importation of the FGC forum into the North American context provides a neat case 
study on the impact of the globalising activities of policy entrepreneurs and RJ advocates.  
Almost twelve years since the publication of Lee’s article many Canadian Indigenous 
peoples are still struggling to gain state support for the implementation of their own 
justice processes.  The increasing employment of Indigenous life-worlds in the marketing 
of RJ products should be considered a significant component of the neo-colonisation of 
Indigenous peoples: having faced a sustained period of colonisation, during which their 
systems of justice were all but destroyed, Indigenes now have to deal with a new 
colonising project.  This particular project involves the purposeful exportation of 
restorative products from Australasia to the North American continent.  The marketing of 
this product and others like it, such as sentencing circles, is heavily reliant on 
exaggerating the indigenous foundations of the products themselves.  
 
We can demonstrate the potential negative impact of this process by citing just one case 
study, that of the Stó:lo First Nation of British Columbia and their experience of the 
importation of the ‘Māori justice process, FGC’ by the RCMP in the mid 1990’s.  Katz and 
Bonham (2006: 190) relate that in 1997, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police adopted a 
policy which gave the police the discretion to utilise restorative justice.  Based on family 
group conferences used in Australia and New Zealand, as presented around Canada by 
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‘Real Justice’ advocates such as Moore and O’Connell (Rudin, private communication, 
2012), the RCMP subsequently developed guidelines for community justice forums 
(Chatterjee & Elliott, 2003).  The forum that was marketed around North America at the 
time was based on the police-oriented ‘Wagga Wagga model’ developed by Terry 
O’Connell (see O’Connell, 1993).   
 
Dr Wenona Victor, a criminologist and activist from the Stó:lo Nation of the Fraser Valley 
in British Columbia, underlines the impact the transfer of FGC’s to Canada had on First 
Nation justice aspirations in that jurisdiction, thus demonstrating not only the 
effectiveness of the marketing process, but also the concerns Lee expressed in the late 
1990s.  Dr Victor describes receiving training on implementing FGC within Stó:lo 
territory, a process that had been sold to them as “developed by the Māori, the indigenous 
people of New Zealand”: 
 
On the first day [of FGC-related training] we all eagerly awaited her [the trainer’s] 
arrival.  We were somewhat surprised to see an extremely “White” looking lady 
enter the room; however, we have blonde blue-eyed, even red-headed Stó:lo among 
us, and so, too, we presumed, must the Māori.  However, it did not take us long to 
come to realise this lady was not Māori and was in fact Xwelitem [European].  Ah, 
the Māori had sent a Xwelitem; okay, we do that too, on occasion.  It is one of the 
many ironies of colonisation whereby Xwelitem often become our teachers….. 
[t]here are times when it is an Xwelitem who is recognised as the Stó:lo ‘expert’ and 
therefore, is the one talking even when there are Elders present.  But by the end of 
the three day training course I was convinced the Māori had lost their minds!  There 
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was absolutely nothing Indigenous about this [FGC] model of justice whatsoever! (in 
Palys and Victor, 2007: 6) 
 
Through the experiences of Māori and the Stó:lo, we might view restorative justice 
products such as these in terms of Tsing’s (2005) “packages of political subjectivity”, 
meaning that they are: 
 
[C]reated in a process of unmooring in which powerful carriers reformulate the 
stories they spread transnationally… These packages carry the inequalities of global 
geo-politics even as they promote the rhetoric of equality.  Those who adopt and 
adapt them do not escape the colonial heritage, even as they explore its possibilities. 
 
The exports in question, including the FGC, are seen by some Indigenous peoples, as a 
welcome and overdue extension of formal state justice processes beyond the Eurocentric 
bias of its response to social harm, and of enabling ‘other’ ways of doing justice (Hakiaha, 
1999; Māori Council, 1999; Quince, 2007).  However, we must be careful not to oversell 
the homogenising impact of these supposedly Indigenous-derived products.  We must 
always be mindful of what Aas (2009: 412) refers to as the “geo-political imbalances of 
power between ‘exporters’ and ‘importers’ of penal policies and interventions”.  We need 
to be wary of the parasitic relationship between some importers (government/think-
tank/administrative criminologist/private security company, etc.), exporters (another 
nation state/government agency) and the ‘customer’, who is all too often a community or 
an individual who has been given little choice in receiving these cultural appropriated 
‘gifts’.  As Tsing (2005: 76) argues, we should always keep in mind “the particularity of 
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globalist projects”; critically analysing who constructs them, and for whose (primary) 
benefit they are subsequently exported and implanted on the globalised crime control 
market. 
 
Final Comments 
This paper was intended to contribute to ongoing Indigenous resistance to the 
homogenising impact of much of the Western crime control industry’s activity.  Hopefully 
it will also serve as a wake-up call to criminologists and RJ advocates to ‘get real’ about 
the often negative impact of their marketing of their products is having on Indigenous 
peoples residing in settler-colonial contexts (Tauri, 2014c).  
 
The business of crime control is complex, multi-dimensional, global and profitable.  Like 
any business enterprise, participants seek to market their products in ways that 
distinguish them from those of their competitors, be they franchise companies or policy 
entrepreneurs from other jurisdictions.  As exposed in this paper, one key selling point for 
the RJ Industry is the supposed Indigenous foundations of key products such as FGC, and 
sentencing circles.  As the saying goes, “sex sells” and the Indigenous world is ‘different’ 
and erotic, and therefore considered extremely effective for marketing policies and 
initiatives in jurisdictions dealing with an Indigenous over-representation problem.  The 
techniques utilised by the Industry has been well identified in the extant literature; be it 
the appropriation of Indigenous terms and language, or specific, boutique cultural 
practices.  Or, as often happens, providing restricted space for Indigenous cultural 
practice within Eurocentric, standardised programmes.  From an Indigenous standpoint, 
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all this activity amounts to the continued subjugation of our life-worlds, in this case, for 
the benefit of policy makers, and RJ entrepreneurs. 
 
The impact the globalised crime control market on Indigenous peoples is very real, and at 
times negative and subjugating.  Those making money selling their biculturalised 
products to state and Federal governments should consider the consequences of the 
continued appropriation of the Indigenous life-world for the benefit of themselves and the 
Industry they participate in.  Perhaps it is time for all these non-Indigenous profiteers to 
begin looking to their own cultural contexts for the next ‘big thing’ in restorative practice.  
After all, we are often told by the demi-God’s of RJ about the lost restorative practices of 
Western European culture (Weitekamp, 1999), so why the need to plunder our cultural 
context?  Given the contents of this paper, and the growing critical Indigenous literature, 
they can be sure that the critical Indigenous gaze is now firmly turned towards them. 
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Paper 5  
 
Resisting Condescending Research Ethics in 
Aotearoa New Zealand 
 
Juan Marcellus Tauri 
 
(2014) AlterNative, 10(2), online.   
 
Introduction 
Indigenous peoples residing in Settler Societies have long expressed concern at the 
impact on their communities, of social research activity carried out by government 
agencies and academic institutions (see Battiste, 2000; Smith, 1999a).  More recently, 
Indigenous commentators have focused their critique of the research context on the 
ways in which Research Ethics Boards (REBs) impinge on the autonomy of Indigenous 
researchers and participants to pursue knowledge construction in ways that suit their 
social and cultural context. It should be noted that the title by which institutional ethics 
review boards are known can vary depending on geographic location, for example in the 
United States they are often referred to as Research Ethics Committees (RECs) and 
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), while in Canada they are designated Research 
Ethics Boards (REB)s or General Research Ethics Boards (GREBs).  The term REB is 
used here to refer to all committees of this kind.   Informed by the personal experiences 
of the author and Indigenous Canadian and New Zealand research participants, as well 
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as the extant literature, this paper critiques the processes employed by New Zealand 
REBs to assess Indigenous-focused or Indigenous-led research.  In response to a 
contested decision made by an REB, the author included questions in his study 
specifically related to issues related to REBs, ethics’ processes and Indigenous research 
so he could enquire of First Nation academics, researchers and service providers their 
thoughts on the issues that arose from a debate that occurred between the author and 
the REB.  In all, seven individual interviews and two focus groups (with a total of 12 
participants) were completed in both jurisdictions between November 2010 and 
January 2012.  The views of some of the participants are included in this paper, and 
referenced via a ‘code’ designed to protect their identity.  For example, focus groups are 
coded as CFG1 or CFG2 (Canadian focus group 1 and/or 2) with participants given a 
random number as an identifier known only to the researcher and the participant (such 
as CFG14).  Similarly, individual interviewees were randomly allocated a code based on 
the jurisdiction the interview took place in, plus ethnicity (for example, a Māori 
interviewee might be delegated the ‘code’ MII3 - Māori, individual interview 3).  
 
One key issue identified is the general lack of experience of REB members in researching 
with Indigenous peoples and a lack of knowledge of their social context, complex 
histories and preferred research processes.  As a result of this situation, REBs too often 
privilege the ‘liberal’, Eurocentric conceptualisation of the autonomous research subject 
as the focus of their deliberations on ‘right research’, which leads in turn to an over-
reliance on formulaic main-streamed (white-streamed) assessment processes that 
sideline the importance of the social context within which ‘real world’ research takes 
place.  Furthermore, these practices potentially marginalise Indigenous researchers’ and 
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their participants by placing them at risk of violating the ‘ethics’ of both the institution to 
which they have applied for ethical consent, or the Indigenous communities where their 
research takes place.  The institutionalised ethics’ procedures may even be read as a 
politics of containment that at once renders invisible the importance of relationships in 
Indigenous research while asserting the right of the institution to determine the ‘correct’ 
way that research should be played out.  
 
The paper begins with an overview of the author’s experience of the condescending 
ethics of a New Zealand REB involved in assessing the ethics protocol for his doctoral 
research.  This discussion informs the following section which highlights Indigenous 
issues with REBs identified in the literature and empirical research carried out by the 
author.  From there, the focus moves to an analysis of reasons for the poor quality of 
REB processes and decisions regarding Indigenous research, drawing on Butz’s concept 
of condescending ethics.  The paper ends with a call for Māori scholars (and 
communities) to resist the ‘condescending ethics’ of REBs and their related institutions, 
and develop a Māori-led, national-level ethics review process(es), that supports and 
protects Māori and non-Māori researchers who want to research with Māori, but are 
compelled by institutional edict to engage with the ethics protocols of the academy.  
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The Research Ethics Board Experience 
 
To assume that the Aboriginal past or knowledge can be adequately explained 
from a totally foreign worldview is the essence of cognitive imperialism and 
academic colonisation. 
                                                  Henderson (1997: 23, emphasis added).  
 
In late October 2009, the author and his then supervisor submitted the requisite ethics 
forms to the REB at the institution where he was enrolled to carry out doctoral research.  
The research focused on Indigenous experiences of the global transfer of crime control 
policies and interventions, specifically restorative processes like Family Group 
Conferencing, and the impact this kind of state activity was having, if any, on the 
development of their own justice processes.  The data gathering for the thesis was to be 
carried out via a combination of individual interviews and focus groups with Indigenous 
justice practitioners, researchers and academics in New Zealand and Canada (as well as 
a small group of non-Indigenous policy workers in Canada).    
 
Given the author’s previous experience with this and other REBs in the New Zealand, 
and as an occasional advisor to Māori post-graduates who had experienced issues with 
REB decisions, resistance was anticipated due to the authors’ decision to privilege the 
ethics protocols favoured by Māori and Canadian Indigenous participants.  As directed 
by Indigenous advisors, the protocols were constructed through direct collaboration 
with participants, elders’ councils and experienced Indigenous researchers in both 
jurisdictions.  As a result of this collaborative process, a research protocol was 
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developed that privileged collective strategies for eliciting informed consent and 
gathering data.  The strategies devised related to the wish of some participating 
communities (especially in the Canadian context), for privileging ‘communal’ 
expressions of consent, such as a) the fact that the research or meeting is agreed upon by 
an Elders’ council, b) individuals participating at a focus group or hui give their consent 
through the act of attending, or verbally at the beginning of the meeting, or c) an Elder or 
designated person provides verbal consent at the beginning of a focus group/hui on 
behalf of to the group and after discussing the background materials provided by the 
researcher.   
 
These strategies were included in the research framework as appropriate for eliciting 
informed consent if the participants rejected the standard, form-based process that is 
generally employed by social researchers.  The author carried out thorough, community-
level negotiations to ensure the development of protocols deemed ‘ethical’ and ‘tika’ by 
Māori and Canadian Indigenous participants.  The negotiations took place over a sixteen 
month period via phone, email and during two visits to the region of Canada where part 
of the research project was to take place.  For the New Zealand context, the author was 
advised on appropriate research ethics by three prominent Māori researchers, and 
relied in part on extensive research and engagement with Māori communities over the 
previous 15 years working in the academy and as a government official working directly 
with Māori communities.    
 
In contrast to the collaboratively constructed, community-centred and contextualised 
research protocols developed by the authors and his potential participants, the REB in 
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question followed a heavily standardised, Eurocentric process for assessing the 
ethicality of both a researcher and specific project.  It was evident from even a cursory 
glance at the relevant background documents issued by the REB, supplemented by 
communications between the author, his supervisor and members of the committee, 
that the focus of their ethics deliberations centred on institutionally-defined risk 
avoidance to researcher and research participant in a way that masked the power 
differentials at the same time that they were seen as protecting what they perceived as 
vulnerable research subject.  This Western liberal gaze may be seen as the 
empowerment and privileging of the institutional research norms and values in a 
universalising framework. 
 
The REB in question had already rejected a previous version of the proposal submitted 
in August 2009, in which the author had critiqued the REB’s privileging of individual-
focused protocols for eliciting informed consent.  Subsequently, the author and his 
supervisor carried out further discussions with research advisors and participants 
before resubmitting the application in late October of that year.  The revised submission 
included a thorough critique of the REB rationale for rejecting the previous submission, 
while offering a dual-consent process that ensured the researcher would avoid behaving 
‘unethically’, as that term is defined by Indigenous participants.  The author and his 
supervisor also sought to placate the REB by offering to use their preferred, 
individualised process; as set out in this extract from the second submission: 
 
Discussions between the primary researcher and Indigenous advisors for this 
project indicate that the consent-related processes preferred by… University are 
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unethical and culturally inappropriate for research engagement with these First 
Nations.  It would appear then that a compromise is required, and so the following 
process will be used to satisfy the requirements of… [the ethics board in question] 
with regards to confirmation of informed consent: All individual participants in the 
research will be informed of the purpose of the research either verbally, or through 
receipt of a written copy of the PIS, which will be offered to them prior to primary 
researcher reading out the document... The process required by… University will 
be explained to all participants, who will be informed that the requirements of the 
institution privileges informed consent evidenced through written, signed 
documents... research participants will be provided an opportunity at this stage of 
the process to respond to the request for written confirmation.  If they assent [sic] 
to signing the informed consent forms (see appendix 4), then these will be 
distributed to them for their analysis and signing.  If they do not assent [sic] to the 
[REB] process then the primary researcher will acknowledge this fact in their 
research notes from that particular session.  Individuals who decide not to sign the 
document will be asked permission by the primary researcher to agree to be 
contacted at a later date if any queries are made by… University officials because of 
the lack of signed consent forms.  A similar process will be followed during focus 
groups, during which a request will be made for one person to act as a 
representative for all participants and who can speak on behalf of that group. 
 
This extract illustrates the way that the ethics proposal submission drew on the 
consultation and collaboration of Indigenous participants.  For example, the strategy of 
identifying one person to confirm group consent to participation in the research, if the 
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REB needed to seek confirmation, was suggested by two of the Canadian advisors for 
the research after consultation with Elders Council members.  How this selection would 
be made was to be determined by the members of the group participating in a hui/focus 
group, or determined by Elders’ prior to engagement.  Unsurprisingly, the REB rejected 
the compromise offered of a dual-consent process to guide engagement with Indigenous 
participants, and continued to attempt to force its preferred individualised consent and 
engagement process upon the researcher and his research participants.  Many more 
months were lost attempting to alter the approach taken by the REB, before his 
supervisor finally received formal sign off for the research to proceed in April 2010.  As 
indicated earlier before embarking on the research the author added questions to the 
research schedule for individual interviews and focus groups in order to elicit 
participants views on the REB’s ethics review process.  The responses of Canadian and 
Māori research participants to these questions form an important part of the critical 
analysis offered in this paper.  However, before we present this analysis, we must first 
background the growing Indigenous critique of the institutionalised ethics process. 
 
The Indigenous Critique of Research Ethics Boards 
Recently, a number of Indigenous researchers have criticised the role REB’s play in 
stifling Indigenous-led, community-centred research.  A common theme of Indigenous 
critique has been the contribution made by REBs in the colonising project of Western 
research (Absolon, 2008; Berg, Evans and Fuller, 2007; Bishop, 1998; Denzin, 2008; Ellis 
and Earley, 2006; Glass and Kaufert, 2007; Marker, 2004; Schnarch, 2004; Smith, 1999a; 
Tuck and Fine, 2007; Wax, 1991).  Indigenous and non-Indigenous academic critique of 
REB’s covers a broad range of issues, including (but by no means exclusively): 
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 Individualism – marked by the privileging of the autonomous research participant, 
and informed consent processes that force individualised protocols upon 
collectives (see Ellis and Earley, 2006; Glass and Kaufert, 2007: 32-33; Manson et 
al, 2004; Piquemal, 2000; Wax, 1991). 
 Lack of expertise – members of REBs often lack adequate disciplinary, 
epistemological and methodological expertise in Indigenous research/issues, 
resulting in a, over-reliance on tick-the-box approaches that ensure the hegemony 
of institutionally-acceptable protocols (see A. Smith, 1997). 
 Universalism – the propensity for REBs to utilise processes derived from 
Eurocentric notions of ‘right’ (research) conduct, and essentialist notions of what 
does/does not constitute an ethical researcher, all of which eulogise the 
‘individual’ research participant and marginalise social groups which prefer 
collectivist constructs to guide the research process (see Battiste and Henderson, 
2000; Bradley, 2007; Ermine, 2000; Menzies, 2004; Wax, 1991; Wilson, 2004). 
 Formulism – an over-reliance on standardised, formulaic approaches that mask the 
complexity of the social context within which research takes place (see 
Hammersley, 2006; Smith, 1999b). 
 
In essence, the author’s recent personal experience of REB conduct and that relayed to 
him by other Indigenous researchers, strongly aligns with the issues identified in the 
extant literature, especially issues relating to consent and REB preference for 
individualistic research protocols.  For the sake of brevity, this paper will focus on issue 
of the dominance and impact of universalism on the Indigenous research context. 
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Universalism 
 
[T]he white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own 
logos, that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal form that he must still wish 
to call Reason. 
                                    Derrida (1982: 213). 
 
Universalism refers in the research context to ideological presentations that portray 
Western ‘social scientific’ research methods and methodologies as applicable to any 
and/in all social and cultural contexts.  The philosophical principles underpinning 
research-related universalism are presented by Battiste and Henderson (2000: 134) as 
follows: 
 
Eurocentric thought would like to categorise Indigenous knowledge and heritage 
as being peculiarly local, merely a subset of Eurocentric universal categories… It 
suggests one main stream and diversity as a mere tributary... [t]ogether 
mainstreaming and universality create cognitive imperialism, which establishes a 
dominant group’s knowledge, experience, culture, and language as the universal 
norm.   
 
Minnich (1990: 53) brings Battiste and Henderson’s evocation of the culture destroying 
potentiality of universalism into stark relief when he contends that “one category/kind 
comes to function almost as it is, were the only kind, because it occupies the defining 
centre of power... casting all others outside the circle of the ‘real’”.  In this schema, 
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Eurocentric notions of ‘proper research’ are represented as the acceptable ways to 
engage in knowledge construction.  In comparison, the philosophies and practices of the 
‘Indigenous Other’ are situated outside the institutionally-contrived ethics framework, 
to be allowed in when necessary to brush the institutional framework in the cloak of 
‘cultural responsiveness’.  
 
It is argued here that the research-related universalism described above, forms a key 
operating principle for New Zealand REB’s, an argument exemplified in the case study 
that forms the basis of this paper.  Universalism works as a dominant operational 
principle throughout the country, despite the fact that all REB-related guidelines include 
text exhorting researchers (and, one presumes, REB’s) to ‘respect difference’ (see 
guidelines developed by the National Ethics Advisory Committee, 2012 and the Ministry 
of Social Development, 2002).  A number of Māori practitioners and post-graduate 
students the author discussed these issues with, reported persistent failure on the part 
of committees to match their actions with the ethics guidelines that appear in 
institutional documents and websites.  This is evident in the REBs response to the 
author’s second ethics proposal and especially the authors’ decision to privilege the 
ethics protocols that were developed in collaboration with Indigenous peoples.  The REB 
responded by stating that "[the REB] has concerns about the researcher's ability to 
interact ethically with other communities under the auspices of… and about the 
commitment to obtaining voluntary and informed consent from each participant" (REB 
written decision, 24 February 2010).  Despite a request under the Privacy Act the author 
received no evidence from the REB members that supported how it came to this 
determination.  In fact, the request raised an issue that further demonstrates the 
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problematic nature of decision making by some REBs: despite being told the application 
evinced significant and lengthy debate amongst its members, the committee could not 
provide thorough notes of the discussion.  The only material furnished as evidence by 
the REB was the final, written decision emailed to his supervisor.  This lack of reporting 
meant it was difficult to rationalise how the REB came to its determinations.  Therefore, 
it proved extremely difficult to contest the REBs formal decision to reject the 
application, and especially the contention made by the committee that the author was 
unfit to engage in research with First Nation peoples.  In response to this type of closed, 
non-transparent deliberation by REBs, Katz (2007: 798) argues that: 
 
As they review and adjudicate individual cases, administrators should make 
themselves reviewable.  Minimally, they should make records of what they have 
considered and decided so that they can take distance from themselves in reviews 
conducted at a later date.  Maximally, they should articulate reasons that can be 
reviewed publically.  The decision, and in particular the determination that the 
researcher was potentially ‘unethical’, ignored the fact that significant effort was 
made to include the standardised informed consent and engagement process 
preferred by the institutional body. 
 
When presented with the author’s ethics submission and the REBs written responses 
and email correspondence, key Indigenous respondents were overwhelmingly critical of 
the universalistic tendencies inherent in the bodies ethics review, for example: 
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The email from the guy, the one who said you had to follow Canadian law – does he 
know what he means?  Does he know we have our ways; that the ‘law’ of research is 
set by us?  I think he means his law, the one government’s make, or  the college, the 
one we have to put right whenever they turn up to research us. (CFG24) 
 
So, you develop ethics after talking with us; to say you are unethical is like saying we 
are unethical about how we want to be researched!  It’s like saying we don’t know 
how best to talk to each other.  Where does this arrogance come from?  Surely it 
doesn’t come from talking to us? (CII5)  And 
 
... you talk to us, develop what we want, they ignore it and say you are unethical.  
We’ve already begun the process of informed consent that ensures ethical conduct in 
our communities.  The fact they don’t recognise that shows they have no idea about 
research with different Māori and Māori communities. (MII2) 
 
The universalism that appears inherent in institutionalised ethics process is based on a 
foundational myth of contemporary Western scholarship: that ‘White knowledge’ is the 
only knowledge worthy of consideration and only ‘white approaches’ to gathering 
knowledge can be considered ‘ethical’.  It appears to be, as Best describes it (cited in 
Ermine, 2000: 62) “... a dictatorship of the fragment, the privileging of Eurocentrically-
derived protocols, leading to the potential marginalisation of the ‘Other’.  Furthermore, it 
appears to be founded on an assumption that ethics (as the morals inherent in respectful 
human engagement) are best met through institutionally-derived, formalised processes.  
Arguably, this situation exists because of the mistaken assumption that the morals 
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necessary for governing ‘ethical’ research activity can be separated from ‘real life’ and 
reduced to a standardised list of rules.  Similarly, Christians (2007: 438) takes the view 
that “[e]thics is located in the sociocultural first of all, instead of in rational prescriptions 
and impartial reflection”.  From this perspective, ethics occurs at both the site of 
engagement between researchers and participants; it is organic and socio-culturally 
centred.  In contrast, the ethics process confronted by the author with respect to his 
doctoral research “assumes that one model of research fits all forms of inquiry… The 
model also presumes a static, monolithic view of the human subject; that is someone 
upon whom research is done” (Denzin, 2008: 104).  
 
The author’s REB experience demonstrates that the institutionalised process employed 
in New Zealand, is often beset with contradiction.  For example, the REB in question 
states in its web-based ethics documents that its protocols and practices are based on 
those developed by New Zealand’s Health Research Council (HRC).  If this is the case 
then the REBs inability to recognise the authority of an ethics process developed with 
Indigenous people can be interpreted as a violation of its own guiding principles, as set 
down by the HRC, in particular:  
 Partnership: working together with iwi (tribes), hapu (sub-tribes), whanau 
(families) and Māori communities to ensure Māori individual and collective rights 
are respected and protected in order to achieve health gain. 
 Participation: involving Māori in the design, governance, management, 
implementation and analysis of research, particularly research involving Māori. 
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 Protection: actively protecting Māori individual and collective rights, and Māori 
data, cultural concepts, norms, practices and language in the research process 
(National Ethics Advisory Committee, 2012; emphasis added). 
 
Furthermore, due consideration needs to be given to the instruction that when 
conducting observational studies, investigators should understand, respect and make due 
allowance for diversity among participants and their communities. (See also the Code of 
Rights, Right 1(3): ‘Every consumer has the right to be provided with services that take 
into account the needs, values, and beliefs of different cultural, religious, social, and 
ethnic groups, including the needs, values, and beliefs of Māori’). 
 
The process of Universalism and the risk it poses for the Indigenous researcher and 
participants were repeatedly identified by participants in both individual interviews and 
focus groups.  For example: 
 
The issue seems to me to be about their (the REBs) authority, and not about the best 
way of going about this business.  As Māori we have the right to determine how both 
insiders and outsiders research with us... reading that document [the REB’s written 
determination re: the second EA1 application], reads like they didn’t want to 
understand because it was easier to stick with what they know.  That is not a system 
based on everyone being the same [Universalism], but on everyone being like them. It 
is condescending to the extreme to tell us our ways are unethical (MII2) 
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The Condescending Ethics of Research Ethics Boards 
 
‘Condescending ethics’ – positions participants as the ‘Other’, reinforces 
powerlessness, and further marginalises them with knowledge production 
processes.   
                                                                                                                         Reid and Brief (2009: 83). 
 
We might begin to explain the current situation by analysing institutionalised ethics 
processes in New Zealand and other Settler Societies, as a contemporary manifestation 
of the condescending ethos that formed the basis of the role played by the academy and 
its research activities in the colonisation of Indigenous (Battiste, 2000; Smith, 1999b).  
The condescension of institutionalised REBs and their processes relates directly to their 
preference for individualised research ethics, and the categorisation of the ‘subject’ as an 
autonomous entity to be engaged in meaningful ways after the institutionally-focused 
review process.  And it is in this subjugation of the research subject that we find the 
basis of the institutional form, which according to Eikeland (2006: 42) is coloured by “... 
a condescending attitude following almost logically from its own point of view, that is, 
position, and implied in its research techniques, be they observation, experimentation, 
interviews, or surveys”. 
 
Butzs’ invocation of Habermas’ concept of communicative action in relation to his own 
experiences of REB’s, provides a helpful schema for understanding the condescending 
ethos of the institutionalised ethics processes discussed here.  According to Butz, 
Habermas distinguishes between two principle forms of ‘action’ in late modernity, 
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Instrumental and Communicative.  Instrumental action is “oriented to technical 
manipulation and control, and communicative action to the ideal of intersubjective 
understanding and consensus among individuals” (Butz, 2008: 250).  As Butz states 
(ibid, p. 250, emphasis his) 
 
The former is outcome oriented, the latter process oriented.  For Habermas, 
communicative action is ethically prior to instrumental action, in that the justice of 
an outcome is contingent on the justice of the process that yielded it.  In 
contemporary modernity, he argues, the communicative effort to reach consensus 
is frequently sacrificed to the imperative of bureaucratic efficiency. 
 
It is easy to view the author’s experience of REB’s in New Zealand (and, according to the 
extant literature, other Settler societies), in this vein, especially:   
 
[w]hen it is assumed that the problem of voluntary informed consent is solved by 
asking participants individually to sign written consent agreements regardless of 
the research context, then a fully communicative appreciation of the adjectives 
voluntary and informed are subordinated to the instrumental purposes of the 
monitoring and controlling attached to the noun consent (Butz, 2008: 251 – 
emphasis his).  
 
Central to our understanding of the condescending nature of REB process and 
Indigenous research, is the concept of power.  In the mythology of the development of 
contemporary research ethics, REBs arose from concerns of power imbalances between 
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the researcher - all powerful, and therefore ‘potentially dangerous’, and the research 
subject – powerless and in need of protection, provided, of course, by REBs as the 
independent arbiter of ‘righteous research conduct’ (Juritzen, Grimen and Heggen, 
2011).  Juritzen et al argue in favour of expanding the conceptualisation of power in the 
researcher-research subject relationship to critically encompass “ethics committees as 
one among several actors that exert power and that act in a relational interplay with 
researchers and participants” (ibid, p. 640).  Given the considerable power REBs wield, 
they cannot be exempt from critical commentary.  In fact their central role in 
determining what is/is not ‘ethical’, who can research which communities and on what 
issues, plus the fact their deliberations occur prior to research taking place, makes 
McIntosh’s (2011: 62) statement that “trust and power relations must be examined from 
the outset of any research endeavour” all the more authoritative.   
 
Undoubtedly power relations and differentials are central to the activities of REB and 
their individuals members, for let us not forget that all members (except perhaps for 
those committees that include ‘non-accredited’ community members) are quite often far 
removed socially, economically and politically from many of the individuals involved in 
the research proposals they are assessing, for as Keith-Spiegel and Koocher (1985: 389) 
write “[r]esearchers usually turn their gaze downwards in the societal power hierarchy, 
studying people who are poorer, more discriminated against, and in a variety of ways 
less socially powerful then themselves”.  Given the ways in which research was used to 
‘know’ Indigenes and its relation to the power of defining what is/is relevant knowledge 
throughout settler-colonial jurisdictions (Smith, 1999), makes Juritzen et al’s call for 
critically analysis of the power wielded of REBs in the New Zealand context.  Let us now 
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turn to explaining how and why condescending ethics processes manifest themselves 
through institutionally-derived REBs. 
 
Lack of Expertise, REBs and Condescending Ethics 
The reported experiences of Indigenous commentators and researchers points 
consistently to one key source of discontent with REBs, namely that their members 
generally lack experience of Indigenous communities, and the core principles and 
practices related to knowledge construction and dissemination (Smith, 1999a).  This 
brings forth the spectre of committees dominated by non-Indigenous academics and 
external advisors making decisions about appropriate ethics protocols, without the 
requisite socio-cultural experience and authority.  In the New Zealand context most, if 
not all, REB’s include a Māori member, part of who’s role is to advise on the 
appropriateness of  research that involves Māori participants, or touches on ‘Māori 
issues’.  However, it should also be noted that they are often the only Māori member of 
such committees which can result in the added burden of being the lone voice on 
significant issues that may arise with applications, as well as being expected to be the 
expert. 
 
van den Hoonaard (2006: 269) contends that the issue for many researchers are not 
ethics codes developed by REB’s, as much as way these codes are interpreted and 
employed by committee members; especially where members clearly have little 
experience of the context within which research takes place.  This position is supported 
by significant literature (e.g., Anthony, 2004; Bradley, 2007; Haggerty, 2003) and 
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comments to the author during his recent engagement with Indigenous researchers, 
including one participant who stated that:  
 
In my dealings with IRBs, I find they will have a standard ethics guidelines; go to the 
bibliography and all the usual experts are there, Henderson, Smith... they [REBs] say 
the right things, consult, engage, privilege [the Indigenous], but the practice is 
different.  Mainly white committees, no experience of us, who revert to their ways, to 
what they understand to be right. (CII3) 
 
Reid and Brief (2009: 83) highlight this failing with respect to their own experience of 
REB interference in their ethnographic project: “... they did not have the capacity or 
resources to fully support ethical decision-making in the project, nor did they have the 
mechanisms in place to hear from the community researchers themselves”.   
 
Arguably, in the case of Indigenous-focused research, the lack of knowledge and 
experience of the research context is of greater risk to both researcher and participants 
than lack of disciplinary expertise.  Hammersley (2006: 4) describes the dangers thus: 
“Researchers’ decisions about how to pursue their inquiries involve weighting ethical 
and other considerations against one another, and this requires detailed knowledge of 
the contexts concerned”.  By drawing conclusions on the ethics of research situations 
they have little expertise in or knowledge of, and ignoring advice from those with the 
relevant experience, REBs place Indigenous researchers and their research participants 
in danger of experiencing ‘unethical institutionalised research’.  Hammersley (2006: 6) 
further states that: 
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What is involved here, to a large extent, is a great pretence: ethics committees are 
to operate as if making research decisions were a matter of applying a coherent 
[standardised] set of ethical rules that do not conflict with any other 
considerations, or that override them, and that good decisions can be made 
without having much contextual knowledge.  
 
While following and conforming to an institutionalised bureaucratised ethics process 
means you have ‘acted’ as ethical researcher in that particular context, the experience of 
the author, his research participants and the published (critical Indigenous) record, 
demonstrates that simply following REB processes does not guarantee ethical research 
‘on the ground’ (see Butz, 2008; van den Hoonaard, 2001).  It is argued here that 
conformity to the Academy’s bureaucratised processes comes with significant, 
potentially ‘unethical’ baggage because, as Knight et al (2004: 397) argue, 
institutionalised ethics protocols are a set of “cultural norms that [serve] the interests 
and reflects the values of the IRB and the academy”.  Arguably, these cultural norms 
replicated through mandatory engagement with institutional ethics processes, reflects 
the ‘knowledge by mass production’ that permeates so much of the Academy today; the 
dangers of which are pointedly summarised by Lorenz (2012: 606) who states that: 
 
We should not be surprised therefore that universities have been changing in the 
direction of academic capitalism in the form of entrepreneurial McUniversities.  
This development boils down to ‘a move from elite specialisation with strong 
professional controls towards a ‘Fordist’ mass production arrangement’.   
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The McDonaldisation of the Academy is perhaps most evident when the formalisation of 
research becomes married with academic institutions reliance on universalistic 
processes of knowledge construction.  This situation, combined with the general lack of 
expertise of REB members of the Indigenous social context, generates an environment 
for the Indigenous pursuit of knowledge characterised by contradiction and 
condescension.  Having set out the condescending nature of the Academy’s ethics 
processes, we now turn to our focus to identifying responses that will enable the 
Indigenous Academy to counter the often disempowering practices of REB’s and their 
tendency to employ universalising, standardised processes.   
 
‘Researching Ourselves Back to Life’: Resisting Condescending Ethics 
 
If it is true that we been researched to death, maybe it’s time we started researching 
ourselves back to life (Comment by Indigenous elder in Brant-Castellano and 
Reading, 2010: 3, emphasis added). 
 
In a powerful call for decolonising the academic, research edifice, Arthur Smith (1997: 
25/26) asserts that: 
 
It is self-evident that Indigenous people now want their voice in research, and they 
want it to be heard and understood... [t]he right to establish and control the terms 
and conditions of cultural research is an inalienable right for all peoples of the 
Earth. The colonial era is dead, if not yet buried. 
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Given the reported experiences of Indigenous commentators and researchers, of the 
condescending nature of REB activities, one might argue that colonialism is very much 
alive in the present, especially in the realm of institutionalised ethics; and thus 
arguments for the death of the colonial era are perhaps slightly premature: the fight 
against the imperialistic tendencies of academic research continues.  
 
A strong argument in favour of the need to overhaul institutionalised ethics is the impact 
it has on us as ethical, respectful Indigenous researchers.  In the end, the repeated 
requests for assurances from the author that he would adhere to the Institutions 
individualised ethics protocols (particularly relating to informed consent) were given 
(albeit by his supervisor) in order to gain sign-off from the REB, thus enabling the 
doctoral research to proceed.  This was done with full knowledge that in all instances the 
ethics protocols of Indigenous participants (whether as individuals, groups or 
communities) would take precedence over the REB’s standardised process.  Schwandt 
(2007: 92) refers to this strategy as ‘playing the game’ in order to receive the gift of 
authorisation.  Schwandt reports using this strategy from time-to-time to keep her own 
students safe (albeit from REBs), as related thus: 
 
We publicly and privately complain about the onerous review process, but when it 
comes time to file the papers, we simply figure out what it is in terms of language 
and procedure that IRB’s are looking for and then find ways to say it just so... a 
major problem with such a strategy is that it encourages confusing technical 
compliance with IRB regulations with careful and sound substantive ethical review 
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of one’s research.  Moreover, it creates the impression that ethical matters are 
dealt with once IRB approval has been granted (ibid: 92).  
 
These sentiments were shared by a number of participants’ in the Canadian focus 
groups, including one who stated that:  
 
Sadly, we play the game, giving ethics committee’s what they want, knowing it isn’t 
right... playing the game means they don’t learn a thing, change the process, we do 
ourselves no favour [sic] and certainly not the participants: but what do you do?  Go 
up against them and they’ll do everything to crush resistance... (CFG16) 
 
According to the author’s focus group participants, personal communications with 
Indigenous researchers, and the extant literature, ‘playing the game’ appears to be 
widespread; indeed it is considered by some as necessary to protect themselves as 
Indigenous researchers and especially their research participants.  While it is easy to 
understand or validate resistance strategies like ‘playing the game’, I wish to propose a 
different strategy, one that requires us to stop playing the ‘ethics game’ as dictated by 
institutional REBs.  I am advocating that we develop our own REB(s), modelled on our 
specific socio-cultural and ethical principles and practices (see Brant-Castellano, 2004; 
Maddocks, 1992; Manson, Garroutte, Goins and Henderson, 2004: 60S for similar 
arguments in other colonial jurisdictions).  
 
What is being proposed here is neither novel, nor unrealistic: Precedents have already 
been set by other Indigenous including the Cherokee (Manson et al, 2004: 65S-70S), Nuu 
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Chah Nulth Indigenous (Wiwchar, 2004) and the Mi’kmaq Grand Council of Mi’kma’ki 
(also known as Sante Maio’mi within the seven districts of the Mi’kmaq nation, Nova 
Scotia).  Let us consider in detail, the example provided by the eminent leaders of the 
Mi’kmaq Indigenous who authorised the development of the Mi’kmaw Ethics Watch 
(Ethics’ Eskinuapink) “to oversee research processes that involve Mi’kmaw knowledge 
sought among Mi’Kmaw people, ensuring that researchers conduct research ethically 
and appropriately within Mi’Kma’ki” (Battiste, 2007: 114).  Battiste (2007: 114-115) 
relates that developing the process was “... a significant step toward ensuring Mi’kmaw 
peoples’ self-determination and the protection of our cultural and intellectual property”.  
The said Ethics Committee oversees the research protocol and ethical research 
throughout the seven traditional districts of the Grand Council, which includes the 
provinces of Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and 
Quebec.  Members of the original Mi’kmaw Ethics Watch included community elders, 
leaders and researchers.  Indeed, referring to Canada Menzies (2001: 21) writes that: 
 
Many Indigenous communities have now instituted research protocols that researchers 
must abide by when researching in an Indigenous community.  Such protocols, whether 
community – or researcher initiated, ultimately contribute to the establishment and 
maintenance of respectful research relations.     
 
This body works in similar ways to institutional REBs: members receive and consider 
research proposals and assess them against ethics norms and protocols generated by 
Indigenous themselves.  The purpose is similar to that of institutionally-focused REBs’, 
except that the primary goal is to protect Mi’Kmaw peoples and Mi’Kmaw knowledge 
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(Battiste, 2007: 126-127).  The Mi’kmaw Ethics Watch was instigated by the Grand 
Council of Mi’Kmaq to “assert the responsibility and authority of Mi’kmaw People as 
guardians and interpreters of their culture and knowledge systems” (Brant-Castellano, 
2004, p. 108).  Further, the protocol applies to “any research... or inquiry into collective 
Mi’Kmaw knowledge, culture, arts, or spirituality” (Mi’kmaq College Institute, 1999).  
While the protocols centralise the review of research applications, primary 
responsibility for monitoring is allocated to communities that fall under the auspices of 
the Grand Council (Brant-Castellano, 2004).  
 
Doing Things for Ourselves 
The suggestion that we develop a pan-Māori ethics process to support Māori research 
endeavours is likely to cause discomfort for some REBs and non-Indigenous researchers, 
for as Glass and Kaufert (2007: 27) write REBs “are accustomed to being the sole 
arbiters of the ethical acceptability of a project.  However, it is worth remembering that 
“[m]ost conventional boards are not yet well prepared to meet the demand of 
communities for a more interactive partnership” (ibid).  No doubt some, including Māori 
and other Indigenous researchers, will advocate that we continue to participate in REBs 
as we have done for the past two decades, so we might impact practice ‘from within’.  
There is some validity to this position because most, if not all New Zealand REBs include 
Māori academics as members or external advisors.  Furthermore, as previously 
mentioned the guidelines employed by most REBs include a sub-section dedicated to 
research practice involving Māori and/or Pacifica peoples.  And yet, despite all this 
attention far too many Māori academics and post-graduate researchers continue to 
report dissatisfaction the REB processes (see Hudson, 2004 and Walsh-Tapiata, 2003).  
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So, by all means we should continue to engage with the Academy’s REBs, if for no other 
reason than to provide guidance on Indigenous ethics, as well as ‘polite censure’ and 
gentle chastisement for unethical, disempowering conduct and decisions when 
necessary.  However, it is also evident that we must be more forceful in our attempts to 
effect change in the Academy’s attitudes and practices.  One way of doing so is to 
develop a Māori- dominated ethics process that is dedicated to supporting Māori post-
graduates, established researchers and non-Indigenous scholars wanting our guidance 
on conducting ethical research with Māori.  A process of this kind will focus in part on 
holding REBs, government agencies and private researchers accountable if their conduct 
negatively impacts Māori researchers and Māori research participants. 
 
In anticipation of resistance from REBs, especially non-Māori academics and 
researchers, I offer the following rationale for the proposed Māori-led ethics process: 
1. to provide a body that works to operationalise Māori self-determination in the 
realm of knowledge production; 
2. to provide emerging and experienced Māori/non-Māori researchers and the 
Academy’s REBs with an experienced body of experts with whom they can engage 
with to enhance their ability to carry out ethical research with Māori; 
3. to provide a Māori-dominated body to which Māori individuals, organisations, 
hapu, iwi and communities can turn to for support when issues arise with the 
conduct of researchers, REBs and academic institutions; and 
4. to empower us to send a strong message to the non-Indigenous academy and the 
institutions they serve, that their perspective on ‘how to research’ the Indigenous 
Other is no longer hegemonic. 
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Any one arguing against this suggestion should consider the recent United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the General Assembly in 
2007 that recognises member states poor treatment of Indigenous peoples and calls for 
“control by Indigenous peoples over development effecting them and their land”, and the 
need for Indigenous peoples to give their “[f]ree, prior and informed consent” to any 
decisions or actions that affect their well-being.  Inarguably, the actions of researchers 
and research bodies, including REBs, fall within the range of institutions, to which this 
principle of Indigenous empowerment applies, for as Brant-Castellano (2004: 102) 
rightly reminds us: 
 
[f]undamental to the exercise of self-determination is the right of peoples to 
construct knowledge in accordance with self-determined definitions of what is real 
and what is valuable.  Just as colonial policies have denied Aboriginal Peoples 
access to their traditional lands, so also colonial definitions of truth and value have 
denied Aboriginal Peoples the tools to assert and implement their knowledge.  
Research under the control of outsiders to the Aboriginal community has been 
instrumental in rationalising colonialist perceptions of Aboriginal incapacity and 
the need for paternalistic control.  
 
Furthermore, the development of an indigenous-dominated ethics process will enhance 
the prospects of the ‘decolonisation of the research project’ (Smith, 1999a) which: 
 
… proffers a (re)centering of indigenous worldviews into research methodologies 
based on subjectivity (perspective or voice), insider knowledge (authenticity), 
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reciprocity (giving back) and the non-exploitative design of research that ‘benefits’ 
the community and not the researcher (Coram, 2011: 41). 
 
The Academy, especially members of REBs, and the general population of researchers, 
might hesitate at the idea of an Indigenous-led ethics process.  No doubt some will view 
it as just another level of ‘red-tape’.  Schnarch (2004: 93) pre-empts such concerns when 
he writes that: 
 
Some researchers may balk at the idea of an Indigenous review/approval process, 
construing it as political interference contrary to academic freedom.  They do, 
however, readily accept the constraints of peer review for funding proposals, 
journal articles, and so on.  As with academic review, an Indigenous review process 
is generally intended to ensure quality of the work, its relevance, and the 
appropriateness of interpretation.  
 
Having prompted various counter-arguments, I see no reason why we cannot proceed to 
develop a Māori-specific ethics body in the social sciences.  A vehicle already exists upon 
which to build the process, namely the Māori Association of Social Sciences, which I 
believe can easily be turned from a representative/relational body, into one that actively 
works to support and protect researchers and research communities.   
 
Concluding Remarks 
A key motivation for the Indigenous focus on Western modes of knowledge construction 
was the role this activity played in the colonisation process and its ongoing role in 
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Indigenous marginalisation in the neo-colonial context (Tauri, 2009).  As Battiste and 
Henderson (2000: 132-133) write “[m]ost existing research on Indigenous peoples is 
contaminated by Eurocentric prejudice... [thus the development of] ethical research 
must begin by replacing Eurocentric prejudice with new premises that value diversity 
over universality”.  If we are to achieve self-determination over our own knowledge 
construction processes, then it is imperative that we challenge the power and authority 
the academy has over the production process; a power that is centralised in 
institutionally-centred bodies such as REBs.  This call to action should not be interpreted 
as an attempt to marginalise institutionally-based REBs, but to provide a Māori-
dominated processes for protecting our researchers and research participants from the 
well documented problems Indigenous peoples have been having with institutionalised 
ethics processes across all Settler Societies.  Whether the Māori-focused REB works 
separately from existing institutional REBs, or as an adjunct body that advises and 
guides them, are issues that would need to be addressed by Māori scholars (in the first 
instance), during the development phase.   
 
While we must acknowledge that the stated intentions of REBs and their members are 
‘to do good’ and protect the vulnerable, we must always acknowledge that in the first 
instance they will always be wedded to the institutions from which they derive; for as 
Bradley (2007: 341) relates: 
 
By controlling the models of research, who gets to speak and how subjects get to 
represent themselves, IRBs are in a powerful position as part of the institutional 
structure.  In this position they can, and often do, silence the voices of the 
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marginalised and perpetuate an academic political economy and a traditional top-
down research and professional model that quantify and objectify human lives by 
keeping them nameless, faceless and voiceless.  
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Paper 6 
 
Ritual and the Social Dynamics of Policy Making in 
New Zealand 
 
Juan Marcellus Tauri 
 
(2015) P. Howland (Ed.), Ritual Aotearoa New Zealand: An Effusive Introduction. 
Wellington: CANZ (in print).   
 
Introduction 
I wish to begin this paper by positioning myself within the context of the rituals of 
policy making in New Zealand: I went to University at the age of 26, where I studied 
Criminology and Sociology and eventually lectured Criminology for three years.  In 1999 
I left the Academy and spent ten years working in various government agencies 
including the Ministry of Māori Development (Te Puni Kokiri), Ministry of Social 
Development and Department of Corrections.  The majority of my time was spent 
working on criminal justice and social sector policy, and interacting with a range of 
agencies, including the Ministries of Justice, Police, Corrections, Internal Affairs, 
Housing, and Department for Prime Minister and Cabinet.  I participated in a number of 
inter-agency committees and projects, most notably the Youth Offending Strategy 
(2002), Crime Reduction Strategy (2002), Effective Interventions (2006) and Drivers of 
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Crime (2009/10).  I use this experience to provide a critical discussion of the rituals that 
underpin policy-making activity in the crime control sector New Zealand government.   
 
I have chosen to focus on the activities of the Policy Industry for the following reasons; 
firstly, the industry has the ability to significantly impact our lives through its close 
relationship with Cabinet, the development of legislation and access to extensive 
budgets for policy development and implementation; and secondly to demystify the 
mythological and ritualistic world policy makers are encapsulated within.  This 
construct assists in protecting the policy sector from external scrutiny and maintaining 
hegemony over the way social problems are defined and responded to.  I evidence my 
critique by referring to a specific case study I observed while working in New Zealand’s 
policy sector, namely the Organised Crime Strategy.  
 
Policy Development in New Zealand 
 
State?  What is that?  Well then, open your ears to me, for now I shall speak to you 
about the death of peoples.  State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters.  
Coldly it tells lies too: and this lie crawls out of its mouth: “I, the state, am the 
people”.  That is a lie! 
                                               Nietzsche 
 
Broadly speaking policy development can be understood as an institutionally-derived 
practice that is contextualised and codified in various written forms.  It is the process 
through which government identifies and puts into play actions they believe will 
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improve key social and economic indicators (e.g. lift overall youth educational 
attainment or reduce unemployment) (Althaus, Bridgman and Davis, 2007).  The 
process of policy making is facilitated through various bureaucratic actions including 
Cabinet papers, budgets, legislation, regulations and other administrative practices that 
have formed the basis of policy making in Western democracies for most of the last sixty 
years (Schick, 1996).  However, over the past decade the Policy Industry has been 
significantly impacted by the rise of two inter-related movements, managerialism and 
evidence-based policy (EBP) (Reid, 2003). 
 
The (re)construction of contemporary policy development processes 
In the mid-1990s, New Zealand’s Policy Industry began building on developments in the 
United Kingdom to conduct a co-ordinated process of modernisation.  This involved 
implementing of a range of techniques that proponents believed would enhance the 
efficiency of the public service.  These ranged from alterations in performance 
measurement, such as moving from reporting on outputs (i.e. the number of clients 
serviced) to outcomes (i.e. quantifiable evidence of the impact of policies, spending and 
interventions), and enhanced inter-agency co-operation across intersecting portfolios 
(e.g. criminal justice, welfare and health) (Shick, 1996; see also Cheyne and Belgrave, 
2005).  In short, New Zealand’s public service underwent a process of modernisation 
that brought its operations into line with the theories and practices of managerialism; 
an approach to policy development that had been gaining popularity in other western, 
neo-liberal jurisdictions.  Trinder (2000: 18) states that the managerialist ethos 
emphases value for money and focuses on “effectiveness and efficiency [as] a central 
driving force behind… policy”.  Through the managerialist movement government 
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agencies and providers contracted to deliver services on their behalf, were expected to 
quantify what they were doing, why they did ‘it’, and whether or not ‘it’ was working.   
 
The influence of the managerialist movement on New Zealand’s public service was 
boosted by the attendant development of the evidence-based policy or EBP movement 
immediately after the Blair government came to power in the United Kingdom in the 
mid-1990s (Bullock, Mountford and Stanley, 2001).  Evidence-based policy has been 
described as a technical approach to policy making that places empirically-generated 
evidence at the heart of policy development. The types of evidence privileged in the EBP 
environment are quantitative, scientific methods, such as randomised clinical trials, 
statistical meta-analysis and systematic, large-scale reviews.  The power of EBP to 
influence the modern Policy Industry derives from the part it plays in combating one of 
the key concerns of the modernisers, namely the perception that policy-making until the 
mid-1990s was dominated by the “untested views of individuals or groups, often 
inspired by ideological standpoints, prejudices, or speculative conjecture” (Davies, 
2004: 3).  In contrast, policy modernisers argued for a policy industry based on 
evidence of what works to produce positive social outcomes, and the only valid 
knowledge for informing policy is that derived from scientific, objective observations of 
the social context (Schick, 1996).  Thus 21st century New Zealand is supposedly blessed 
with a ‘scientific policy endeavour’ that ensures that the tax payer is receiving value for 
the hundreds of millions allocated every year to the policy industry.  
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Ritual and Myth-Building and Maintenance in New Zealand 
In a chapter on the public service in New Zealand, Shaw (2006) begins by describing a 
scene from the popular 1980s television series Yes Minister in which Sir Humphrey 
Appleby, a senior public servant, is leading his hapless Minister in circles by obfuscating 
on a question of whether or not a certain investigation had in fact taken place.  Those 
who remember the series might recall that two of the core premises were that the 
public service was the real power behind government, and public servants purposely 
employed a range of (devious) techniques to ensure this situation continued.  Upon 
reflection, Shaw (2006: 273) states that: 
 
At one level Yes Minister and its sequel, Yes Prime Minister, make for witty, well-
crafted viewing.  But at another they promoted a jaundiced view of public servants 
that is not, and perhaps never has been, a fair or accurate depiction of the role of 
public servants. 
 
I disagree with the substance of Shaw’s argument: Yes, while it is inaccurate to present 
the public service in New Zealand as an entity that is at all times manipulative, 
nevertheless, in my experience the behaviour depicted in the British television series 
was more common, and at times far more manipulative, than displayed by Sir 
Humphrey and his fictional colleagues.  The manipulation of Cabinet Ministers, 
competing agencies and the public, is common practice across New Zealand’s public 
service.  Furthermore, the degree and nature of the obfuscation and deceit often 
correlates to the potential for political damage of a particular issue, or the ability (or 
more usually the lack thereof) of specific agencies and officials.  The motivation, 
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perhaps even the necessity for manipulation and obfuscation, can be easily understood if 
we recognise that what is at stake is something more important to senior public 
servants than their significant salaries, power.  And what is more important to the 
attainment and maintenance of power, than the intertwined processes of ritual, myth-
building and maintenance? 
 
Ritual(s) in organisational culture 
Alvesson and Billing (1997: 125; see also Kertzer, 1989) describe three basic 
formulations through which corporate culture is expressed and reproduced, i) through 
artefacts - physical objects like furniture, logos, and dress that convey meaning within 
an organisation; and ii) through metaphors –“culturally rich verbal expressions”, or 
verbal symbols, creating” vocabularies to facilitate and guide interpretations” of 
organisational activity, and lastly, through rituals.  In Alvessen and Billing’s schema 
rituals are activities that occur within and between corporate operators, corporations 
or institutions and ‘outsiders’ (such as the general public as consumers of corporate 
products) that include certain repetitive patterns which contain symbolic and 
expressive elements that confirm existing (or newly constituted) power relations, 
institutional values and attitudes.  This type of functionalist analysis of ritual considers 
institutionalised ritual(s) as activities used to communicate organisational norms and 
mark those who are part of the institution itself (Jones and Sergot, 1995).  However, 
institutionalised rituals are often as much about who or what is excluded from the ‘club’ 
and therefore from power (Meyer and Scott, 2009).  This argument brings a much 
needed multi-dimensionality to the analysis of the place and purpose of ritual in 
bureaucratic institutions. 
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Suk-Young (2009: 3) contends that ritual(s) is an important feature of organisational 
culture and corporate activity because of the part it plays in overcoming “coordination 
problems” and ensuring individuals and agencies agree on the core ethics, principles 
and goals that drive organisational activity.  Further, Suk-Young (ibid: 26) makes the 
pertinent observation that: 
 
If one calls [a] meeting a “ritual”, then according to our argument, the purpose of a 
ritual is to form the common knowledge necessary for solving a coordination 
problem [see also Islam and Zyphur, 2009 and Smircich and Stubbart, 1985]. 
 
I do not entirely agree that a meeting per se is ‘ritual’.  There may be rituals involved in 
getting ready to attend the meeting, for example, pre-meeting discussions where 
officials go over a pre-set plan for marketing their policy position or identifying 
problems, including particular agencies or individuals, and creating strategies for 
nullifying these impacts.  For example, I recall being told by a friend working at the 
Ministry of Justice, an agency that the Ministry I worked for, Ministry of Māori 
Development, was in conflict with on a regular basis, that during the development of the 
Crime Reduction Strategy (Ministry of Justice, 2002) officials would hold pre-meeting 
meetings to strategise about how best to deal with the anticipated conflict.  In a ritual 
reminiscent of war movies, Ministry officials would gather to discuss their ‘intelligence’, 
to ruminate on our relative strength and weaknesses, determine their likely plan of 
attack and create strategies designed to protect their perceived policy ‘high ground’.  
Various officials would be designated to lead specific attacks (or defences) and would be 
invited to participate in the conflict by the ‘General’ (in this case the highest ranking 
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Ministry official) at pre-conceived points during hostilities.  The war metaphors are 
quite apt in this case; I and my colleagues from the Ministry of Māori Development 
would sit, often bemused as we observed the heavily scripted, ritualised defensive 
strategies of crime control policy officials, As such, it might be more accurate therefore 
to think of formal, public service interagency meetings as a platform or theatrical 
vehicle that enables the performance of ritual between policy makers (Lea, 2009).  It is an 
often heavily prescribed, coordinated site of interaction that compels performers to 
forestall or overcome potential coordination problems, collectivise normally disparate 
policy and decision-making processes, and to construct supporting myths specific to 
their industry.   
 
Ritual, myth and power 
Building on the previous discussion, in the policy context ritual is enacted in part 
through micro-political ceremonies involving established/agreed vocabularies, 
symbolic gestures and codified texts, usually produced in writing in the form of 
ministerial briefing papers, meeting minutes and cabinet papers.  This body of work, 
borne from ritual, enables policy workers and their disparate institutions to formulate 
common knowledge of, and approaches to, social problems, and to anticipate ‘right 
conduct’ in working together to respond to them.  Furthermore, it can be argued that 
ritual also serves to support the myth of a political neutral public service, mask the 
power and authority that lies in the hands of a large, unelected body of policy 
technocrats, and lastly, to assist in insulating the policy industry from the gaze of critical 
commentators, such as the media and independent members of the academy.  In the 
following section I utilise a case study to demonstrate the role of ritual in developing 
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and maintaining two of the core myths of the Policy Industry within the New Zealand 
context, the myth of political neutrality, and the myth of the primacy of evidence.   
 
Myth and policy development 
What have myths to do with policy making?  My experience tells me that the Policy 
Industry is, overall, genuinely committed to the aims of evidence-based, politically 
neutral, policy-making.  Unfortunately, those aims are difficult to achieve and maintain 
in what is in reality a highly ideological and politically-focused industry, one that is 
dependent on an “alternative dimension of myth” to mask the reality of its politicised 
activities (Herzog and Abel, 2009: 4).  I argue that myth-making in policy making is 
reflective of the gap and tension between the ‘ought’ and ‘is’ of institutional, 
bureaucratic practice.  Accordingly, it is a duplicitous activity where “... the ought 
provides a fantasised or glamorised ideal that the is of practices should be achieving” 
(ibid: 4).   
 
The creation and maintenance of myth can be said to be foundational to the ‘art’ of 
policy-making because of the important part it plays in “mediating opposition” and 
“justifying decisions regarding major issues” (ibid: 5).  Therefore, myth-maintenance 
(supported by ritual) is particularly helpful in policy-making for taming internal 
coordination problems (i.e., competition within and between agencies for finite 
resources) and external one’s (i.e., nullifying the potentially politically damaging impact 
of independent, public scrutiny) “because myths, by their very nature, disguise and 
manage the emotional impact of the stories they tell” (ibid: 5), and often play a useful 
role in hiding the ‘real story’ behind the intent and likely impact of specific policies. 
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Ritual and the Myths of Political Neutrality and the Primacy of Evidence 
 
Formally, officialdom is at the service of the political executive, its obedient 
instrument (although we must allow for the odd, rare occasion of the outbreak of 
juvenile-type resistance) the tool of its will.  In actual fact, it is nothing of the kind.  
Everywhere and inevitably the administration process is also part of the political 
process, administration is always political as well as executive, at least at the levels 
where policy-making is relevant, that is to say in the upper layers of administrative 
life. 
                                                                                                                                 Miliband (1969) 
 
One of my all-time favourite movies is Usual Suspects, released in 1995.  The film 
contains a number of memorable scenes and splices of dialogue, but the one that has 
stuck in my mind is probably the most often quoted: “the greatest trick the devil ever 
played was convincing the world he didn’t exist”.  This quote refers to the deceptive 
practices employed by the ‘Evil One’ to divert attention away from the role he/she plays 
in the madness and pain of everyday life.  A similar deceit on the part of New Zealand’s 
Policy Industry is its on-going attempts to convince both the public and its political 
masters that it is politically neutral.  In my experience the Policy Industry is much more 
successful in this endeavour with the public, while most politicians are well aware of the 
politicised nature of the public service.  
 
I qualify my comments, however, by acknowledging that many members of the public 
service, in particular those doing the technical work (the ‘policy proletariat’), try their 
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best to adhere to the public service code of conduct and the theoretical and practice 
bases of EBP.  However, in my experience - apart from the odd exception – policy-
making is a fraught process which requires practitioners to continuously compromise 
these core values.  Why?  Because in reality, contemporary policy making in New 
Zealand is not much different from the supposed bad old days of opinion-based policy 
that existed before the rise of EBP: It is no less ideological than it ever was, and it 
certainly is far from the objective, politically neutral beast its exponents claim. 
 
There are a number of ways we can evidence the argument that the Policy Industry is 
political: firstly, it is a given that a number of the public service are members of 
registered political parties.  Some keep their political affiliations to themselves; while 
others openly declare them as is encouraged under the Public Service Code of Conduct 
(PSCC) (State Services Commission, 2007).  The PCSS stipulates that while it is the right 
of all policy workers to affiliate politically they must be circumspect when carrying out 
duties on behalf of any political entity.  More significantly it is possible to also argue that 
the public service is wedded to the political system through the fact that officials and 
institutions are compelled to support the implementation of the policies of the 
Government of the day.  The myth of the political neutrality of the public service is built 
in part on the fact that the PSCC directs officials to give full and frank advice to 
government ministers.  What this should mean in practice is that if existing evidence 
does not support the policy directives from Cabinet and indeed may cause harm to the 
public, then it is the duty of public servants to advise Ministers of this fact.  However, in 
reality this rarely happens, especially in the crime control sector, and when it does it is 
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often more about protecting the reputation and resources of the agency and their 
Ministers, than the public27.   
 
The political nature of the Policy Industry is, however, much more insidious and far 
reaching than these benign examples demonstrate.  The Industry can be charged with 
being political and partisan (as opposed to neutral) via the fact that while directed by 
Cabinet and beholden to it; it holds extensive power over the development and 
implementation of policy itself.  If you live in Wellington, New Zealand and work in the 
Industry long enough, you will hear politicians and media (and sometimes, but rarely, 
policy workers) state that policy is not made or dictated by Cabinet, but is controlled by 
the policy mandarins in the small geographical triangle that takes in the parliamentary 
precinct, the Terrace and much of Lambton Quay.  This point is often made tongue-in-
cheek, but my experience is that it holds true in many cases.  The myth of political 
neutrality masks two sub-surface truisms that are not easily observed by external 
audiences, but are well known within agencies.  These are that i) part of the ‘art of 
politics’ and therefore of policy-making (which is the textual articulation of political 
theory/ideology) is a theoretical or conceptual framework for explaining the world and 
how it works; ii) while individual members of agencies will have their own ‘theory of 
the world’.  Agencies utilise specific theoretical paradigms that match their institutional 
view of how the world works, and form the ideological bases for policy development.  
                                                          
27  One recent exception, whereby criminal justice officials did provide conflicting advice, occurred 
recently when Ministry of Justice officials provided a written brief to their Minister on proposed 
‘Three Strikes’ legislation.  Officials pointed out that the proposed changes to sentencing policy could 
lead to significant violations of individual rights under both the Bill of Rights and human rights-
focused legislation.  The Minister acknowledged receiving the briefing but not having reading it.  This 
scenario is highly likely, although in all likelihood the Minister would have been advised on the 
contents of the briefing by one of his advisors.  Technically, this enables the Minister the ability to 
state that he had not read the paper, while all the time knowing of its contents (see Dominion-Post 
(2010) Three Strikes Papers Seen but not Signed by Justice Minister, article published on 3 March.   
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For example, neo-liberal economics has been the dominant political and economic 
theory/philosophy for the development of economic policy by New Zealand’s Treasury 
agency since the mid-1980s (Treasury, 2001); the Psychology of Criminal Conduct is the 
dominant theoretical paradigm in the development of prison policy by the Department 
of Corrections from the mid-1990s (Department of Corrections, 2013); and a form of 
neo-tribal orthodoxy underpins policy making in the Ministry of Māori Development 
(2013); and iii) agencies employ various rituals and associated activities that either 
mask the theoretical underpinnings of their processes or validate them over others. 
 
Case study: the Organised Crime Strategy 
To demonstrate the political nature of policy making and the myth of the primacy of 
evidence, we need look no further than the highly inflammatory issue of gangs and 
crime.  On 7 May 2007, a two year old girl was murdered in Wanganui, the victim of a 
gang-related drive-by-shooting.  Understandably the incident caused outrage amongst 
the wider public and politicians.  Through the media, public figures, such as the Mayor 
of Wanganui, Michael Laws, called for ‘something to be done’ about the perceived 
violence and general lawlessness of ethnic gangs in the region (Wanganui District 
Council, 2007).  The Government’s response was swift: just a few days after the incident, 
public service officials were called upon by Ministers to brief them on the issues and 
potentially effective policy options.  Up to that point the only meaningful, albeit largely 
ineffective, policy initiatives in place were the Ministry of Social Development-led inter-
agency project called the Plan of Action: Improving Outcomes for Young People in 
Counties Manukau (Ministry of Social Development, 2006) and a joint Ministry of Māori 
Development/New Zealand Police project which utilised established (adult gang) 
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leaders to mediate directly with so-called youth gangs in an attempt to dampen down 
tensions and reduce the potential for further violent confrontation between these 
groups.  The reality was that over the preceding decade or more, the crime control and 
social policy sectors had an unwritten rule of not working with gangs, meaning no 
funding for gang members to develop social programmes or support for activities that 
involved gang members or their associates28.   
 
Officials’ response to requests from Ministers about how best to respond to the 
Wanganui incident, was to revive the then grossly overdue Organised Crime Strategy 
(OCS) (Ministry of Justice, 2002) that was initially part of the larger Crime Reduction 
Strategy signed off by the Labour government in May 2001.  The Strategy identified 
seven priority areas for the wider criminal justice sector, of which organised crime was 
designated Priority Area 5 (family violence and community violence and sexual violence 
were priority areas one and two).  By the time of the Wanganui gang shooting, priority 
area five was the least developed, and certainly any formal strategy was by then almost 
six years overdue. 
 
                                                          
28  There are a few exceptions to this rule, for example some District Health Boards in New Zealand have 
funded patched gang members to deliver services, such as information on immunisation programmes, 
in recognition of the difficulties government agencies often have in accessing ‘hard to reach’ 
communities.  However, in my experience such enlightened thinking in the Policy Industry is rare, and 
more often the response is puerile.  Take for example the recent situation of Eugene Ryder: Eugene is a 
former member of the Black Power and is now acknowledged, even by some police officers in 
Wellington, as an effective youth worker.  Eugene works with the hard to reach youth, those either 
involved in, or moving towards involvement with, gangs.  In 2008 Eugene was invited to give a talk at 
a youth conference scheduled to be held in Wellington.  Unfortunately one of the main sponsors of the 
conference, the Ministry of Social Development, made it known that any future involvement or funding 
by them would possibly cease if Eugene spoke at the conference.  The Ministry made the demand 
despite the fact that it had, at that time, lead responsibility for developing effective, informed youth 
gang-related policy.   
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Work began in earnest on resurrecting the OCS in mid-2007.  It involved some of the 
usual strategies, tactics and rituals officials utilise in order to be seen to be busy when 
potentially nasty coordination problems arise in the public sector: firstly, lead agencies 
were empowered (in this case, Ministry of Justice, followed closely by the New Zealand 
Police); other important players were identified (for example, DPMC, Ministry of Social 
Development, and to a lesser extent the Ministries of Māori Development and Pacific 
Island Affairs); an inter-agency group established; a schedule of meetings agreed, along 
with priority work items (background papers, briefings to Ministers, Cabinet papers, 
etc) and tasks identified and allocated.  Given the political capital inherent in the gang-
related incident in Wanganui, work on developing the OCS was given priority by 
Government, and therefore by participating agencies.  The fact that the lead agencies 
had failed to deliver on the promised organised crime strategy for some two to three 
years was never discussed at formal meetings and overlooked in official documentation.  
Regardless, this overdue strategic item provided agencies with a ready vehicle to be 
seen to respond meaningfully to what Cabinet clearly considered to be a politically-
charged, perhaps even electorally damaging issue. 
 
So where does ritual fit into this particular case study?  All of the above strategies and 
activities can be viewed, individually or collectively, as rituals of (in)activity.  In the 
event of a highly charged, political issue arising, agencies (individually or collectively) 
swing into ‘action’, utilising the well-established rituals of activity outlined above to 
serve as markers of responsiveness, concern for public safety and expertise.  The long 
overdue OCS became a ready vehicle through which officials and agencies could 
demonstrate their ability to respond quickly and efficiently.  Having no doubt briefed 
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Minister(s) on the situation, including claiming that the Strategy was an appropriate 
and effective mechanism for responding to the Wanganui incident, officials then moved 
to deploy another set of rituals, referred to here as the rituals of deception.  This set of 
rituals is commonly used by criminal justice officials who need to retrofit policy to a 
social issue for which it is unsuited. 
 
Retrofitting in the case of the OCS, refers to the fact that other policy mechanisms and 
strategies already existed through which to create meaningful policy; the original intent 
and focus of the proposed OCS did not correlate to the type of social issue that 
developed in Wanganui, and the lack of evidence that an OCS-style approach would 
demonstrably alter the social conditions which led to the Wanganui incident.  Rituals of 
deception are common in situations of policy retrofitting: they enable officials and 
agencies to mask the fact that their activities are more about managing potential 
coordination problems than about constructing meaningful ‘real world’ solutions.  The 
coordination problems that were the target of the OCS-related rituals of deception were 
masking a long-overdue piece of supposedly important strategic work, the historical 
lack of meaningful policy response to gang-related violence and gangs per se, and the 
complete failure of the preferred suppression and surveillance policies since the mid-
1980s to solve the so-called gang problem.  All of these coordination problems carry the 
potential to negatively impact institutional credibility with Cabinet and the public, and 
inter-agency relationships.   
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Why the deceit? 
There are a number ways to explain and understand why supposedly neutral policy 
mandarins become involved in the politics of policy and utilise rituals of (in)activity and 
deception.  At base level it has to do with affinity and access: the higher up the 
managerial decision-making structure one gets, the closer you are to the political 
decision-making process and the politicians who ultimately make those decisions.  
Accordingly, the more one has ready access to political authority the more one pays 
attention to the political consequences of policy design and implementation.  In other 
words, the higher up the management food chain you move, the less concerned with the 
technical development of policy you become, and the more you focus on what is 
referred to in Wellington as the ‘front page of the Dominion-Post test’: namely, how will 
a particular policy or policy issue look in the news media when it is released?  A further 
issue for consideration is what is the risk of negative media publicity to Cabinet and the 
policy sector?  In other words, senior managers can be viewed as political commissars 
who carry out the dual roles of educating the technocrats on the political expectations of 
Cabinet and the Ministry, and providing political risk assessment and protection 
services for Chief Executives, their agencies and Cabinet Ministers.   
 
Of course it can be countered that the argument I present here robs policy workers of 
their ‘agency’.  However this position presupposes that policy workers are empowered 
to carry out independent articulation of ‘free thought’ in the politically charged 
environment of a policy shop to begin with.  My experience was that this was rare and 
most definitely discouraged.  The reality of the policy environment and the position of 
the policy proletariat is effectively summarised by legal theorist Stanley Fish (1989: 
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141) who describes professional analysts not as free agents, but as "embedded 
practitioners" whose values, canons of evidence, normative measures and theoretical 
schema are proscribed by his or her professional community.  As a result, the potential 
for professional objectivity or political neutrality are, by definition, curtailed 
significantly by their personal, and their agencies proximity to, political power.   
 
The policy commissars and their direct line managers, who may be referred to 
collectively as the Policy Elite, also have the unenviable task of adhering to and 
implementing the policy platforms of incoming (newly elected) governments, along 
with new policy initiatives dreamt up by the current government.  This can be a 
nightmare at times, especially if the government’s policy goes against the majority or all 
of the available research evidence, as often occurs in the criminal justice sector (see 
below).  The case study of the OCS and policy response to the Wanganui incident, 
highlights the myth of the political neutrality of the public service.  This example 
underlines the role of ritual in masking the way(s) in which officials and agencies will 
bow to political and media pressure and construct policy responses ill-suited to the 
specific social issue that is dominating front page news at a particular time.  When 
observed from afar, this type of ritualised response to the potential for ‘bad publicity’ 
may appear crude, but it can be supported by more sophisticated rituals.  In the case 
study discussed here, it included a set of pre-conceived activities that provided the 
policy response with a ‘veil of scienticism’, that effectively maintains the myth of the 
primacy of evidence in the policy-making context. 
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The OCS and the myth of the primacy of evidence in New Zealand policy making 
According to the myth of the primacy of evidence, policy-making in New Zealand is 
founded on the use of empirical evidence to develop effective solutions to real world 
problems.  There are times when this appears to be an accurate description of the link 
between research-generated knowledge and policy development, particularly in policy 
sectors such as education and health.  My experience of the EBP process within the 
crime control context is that while from time-to-time relevant evidence plays a part in 
policy construction, more often than not rituals of deception are favoured.  There is also 
a tendency towards utilising a preconceived strategy of importing and implementing 
policies from other western jurisdictions, regardless of the lack of evidence that these 
interventions would work in the New Zealand context (the recent introduction of boot 
camps for youth offenders a recent example), a practice that clearly breaches core 
principles of EBP, including that policies and interventions are clearly suited to the 
social context to which they are been imported (Tauri, 2009). 
 
Without doubt, empirically-derived evidence is important to the development of policy in 
the New Zealand context.  However, it is the point at which evidence is gathered and 
pre-determined decisions made about what evidence to use, that problematises the 
Industry’s claims to be working in a politically neutral, EBP environment.  In terms of 
the OCS, core agencies went to great pains to retrofit the urban/ethnic gang issues onto 
a policy mechanism focussed (largely) on a fundamentally different gang-related issue 
altogether, namely the interlinked issues of organised (international) crime cartels and 
terrorism.  Part of this process included a whole set of rituals of deception focused on 
the use (non-use) of evidence.   
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Generally, the policy development process in the crime control context is characterised 
as following a fairly straightforward process: the policy problem identified or received 
→ policy industry formulates ‘plan of action’ → background/policy papers developed 
including (if necessary) identifying a range of responses/interventions → review of 
existing research and evidence of the effectiveness of range of intervention options.  The 
last stage in this linear process, the review of evidence, can be considered one of the 
primary sites for the practice of rituals of deceit.  In reality the process often looks like 
this: framing the policy (research) question → preconception of the acceptable 
parameters of the research review based on predetermined factors, including agency 
ideological/theoretical paradigm (the Department of Correction’s Psychology of 
Criminal Conduct), policy commissars assessment of political climate and/or Ministers’ 
policy directives → predetermined decisions/findings → selection of, and privileging, 
existing evidence in support of pre-determined policy solution.   
 
As a Ministry of Māori Development official, my colleagues and I identified significant 
weaknesses in background papers produced to resuscitate the OCS.  Firstly, the 
retrofitting process had resulted in weak analysis by core agency officials in terms of 
‘fitting’ the street gang issue within an organised crime strategy.  The best example of 
this was their attempt to create a continuum of organised crime that ended with the 
usual transnational crime conglomerates (international drug cartels, etc), and began 
with ‘youth street gangs’, or more accurately what Ministry officials referred to as a 
‘small group of loosely affiliated youth who hang out in public together’ (a touch team 
perhaps?  Maybe youth choir members going home from church?).  Officials then 
attempted to create some solidity around the continuum in order to rationalise the 
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inclusion of the various organised crime groups.  At the ‘high end’ (links between 
national drug organisations and international drug cartels) the evidential base was 
loose, yet the arguments for significant linkages was at least plausible.  However, the 
further down the hierarchy of gang structure we move the more the evidence becomes 
vague and inconclusive.  At this point in the policy process, evidence was replaced by 
unsupported suppositions, rationalised as ‘best guesses’ to retrofit the current street 
gang issue onto  a strategy focused on ‘organised crime’.   
 
This fact came as no surprise to Ministry of Māori Development officials like myself, 
who had read the existing New Zealand and international literature on gangs and 
criminality, and found no firm evidence in New Zealand of major links between ‘street 
gatherings of youth’ and organised national/international drug cartels  Furthermore a 
significant number of studies demonstrated that most ‘youth street gatherings’ did not 
fit the poorly constructed definition of a gang that dominated this policy (Ministry of 
Social Development, 2007).  In fact, the greater majority of so-called Māori, Pacifica and 
Pakeha (European) youth gang members were unlikely to become involved in organised 
crime or to graduate to adult ethnic gangs (ibid).  Through numerous interdepartmental 
comments to core OCS agencies we repeatedly used the availing evidence to critique the 
evolving policy position.  Furthermore, we implored justice officials to base their policy 
argument on the available evidence, or, if not, to provide evidence that supported the 
position they were taking.  Of course none was forthcoming as it either did not exist, or 
what did exist (internationally) did not support their position.  Instead, what occurred 
was the use of selected parts of research, and definitions (of ‘gang’, ‘organised crime’, 
etc) that excluded elements that contradicted their argument, something I and my 
237 
 
colleagues encountered frequently in the Policy Industry and began to call the ‘cherry-
picking ritual’. 
 
At one stage we strongly challenged the definitional work on what did (and did not) 
constitute organised crime, citing numerous international definitions that demonstrated 
the fallacy they were creating by including youth, and even ethnic gangs, as key 
components of the OCS.  In response, officials countered by citing the United Nations 
definition and argued that it allowed for such inclusions.  In fact, it did no such thing, as 
our commentary below demonstrates: 
 
Paragraph 12: only part of the United Nations (UN) definition of organised crime is 
used, what is missing is the second part, which stipulates the types of behaviours 
and activities that would fall within the purview of ‘organised crime’ (such as illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs, traffic in persons, etc).  In developing the draft convention 
for the suppression of transnational organised crime, the United Nations purposely 
undertook to develop a ‘specific’ definition, in order to avoid having such a broad 
definition that violations of human rights would occur (e.g., enabling states to 
utilise organised crime legislation/responses to target non-organised crime 
‘organisations’ such as youth/ethnic ‘gangs’) (taken from Ministry of Māori 
Development inter-agency comment on Ministry of Justice Cabinet paper). 
 
The ritual of cherry-picking of evidence to suit a pre-conceived policy position is driven 
largely by the policy commissars with one eye on the external political context 
(meaning media scrutiny), and both ears bent to a Minister’s poll-driven directive.  It is 
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a ritualised process that is most evident when witnessed directly via input into policy 
development, or indirectly as an external policy commentator who receives the 
paper/briefing as part of the standard inter-agency or Cabinet consultation process – 
otherwise it largely remains for the most part hidden from the public and the media.  I 
argue that while policy making is sometimes influenced by relevant evidence, much of 
the evidence used is carefully (pre)selected to support the policy position of the current 
government and/or the preferred theoretical paradigm of specific institutions.  The 
rituals of deception thus play a key role of allowing officials and agencies to present, to 
themselves, to other policy workers, Cabinet and the public the illusion of ‘a ‘scientific’, 
empirically-informed process informing the development of crime control policy in New 
Zealand.   
 
Evidence–based policy is perhaps best understood as simply a new technique that has 
been added to the tool box utilised by the Policy Industry to define/control potentially 
politically disruptive social issues in line with their understanding of the social context.  
The rituals of deceit serve to ensure that any policy solutions are constructed in line 
with that understanding and remain within the control of the policy sector to define 
social problems and the solutions to them.  Perhaps we might best understand this 
deceit by taking a policy-as-discourse approach that “frames policy not as a response to 
existing conditions and problems, but more as a discourse in which both problems and 
solutions are created” (Bacchi, 2000: 48).  In this schema, policy-making becomes a 
process through which potentially damaging coordination issues (such as the gang 
shooting in Wanganui) enable the Policy Industry to control the process of problem 
definition and problem solving.  However, the primary goal of the Policy Industry, at 
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least in the criminal control sector, is not to solve social problems, but to reframe social 
issues and policy in such a way that the power to define and respond remain in the 
political sphere.  By so doing, the Industry is able to mediate the degree to which crime 
control agencies and present and former governments, do not become the focus of 
critical analysis of the causes of significant social problems.  If we understand the 
actions of criminal justice officials in trying to retrofit the ethnic gang and youth 
congregation issues onto the OCS in this light, then we might readily identify with 
Edelman’s (1988: 16) definition of policy as “…. a set of shifting, diverse, and 
contradictory responses to a spectrum of political interests”.   
 
Conclusion 
The Policy Industry and its activities are all about power and the power they have to 
construct crime control policy can have a profound effect on our daily lives.  When we 
dovetail this fact with the notion that all this ‘power’ sits with a large group of unelected 
individuals and the agencies they represent, then we have a duty to expose the 
processes they use to develop policy, legislation and interventions.  Despite the 
grandiose claims of the Industry regarding the Public Service Code of Conduct and their 
adherence to the overarching principle of political neutrality, it is very much a 
politically-motivated beast.  This point may seem laboured, but it is an important one to 
make when considering the connections between ritual and policy making.  This is 
because a large amount of the intellectual and rhetorical work that underpins the rituals 
of the Industry is aimed at supporting the intertwined mythologies of political 
neutrality, and the primacy of evidence-based policy; while all the time masking 
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inherent power struggles between bureaucratic agencies over ever-decreasing 
resources and its parasitic relationship to the political elite. 
 
The case study used in this paper highlights the extent to which ritual forms a key 
component of the policy-making process.  It was selected to demonstrate the support 
ritual provides to the key myths of New Zealand public service. I have also been 
purposely critical (or ‘negative’, if you are a senior public servant), as this reflects my 
experiences of the policy industry, and to counter the overly positive spin that 
dominates agency publications, Cabinet papers and self-generated research.  Shaw 
(2006) does have a point: the public service is not always the self-serving, manipulative 
institution portrayed in Yes Minister.  However, its use of ritual and myth-maintenance 
to shore up its authority over policy-making problematises its oft-made claims of 
political neutrality and the importance of evidence in creating meaningful policies and 
interventions.   
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The Waitangi Tribunal and the Regulation of Māori 
Protest 
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(2012) New Zealand Sociology, 26, pp 21-41. 
 
Introduction 
Despite the political rhetoric of successive governments around partnership and a 
commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi, Māori Treaty rights remain contested, as 
represented in the contemporary moment in legislation such as the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act 2004.  In this context, it is useful to reflect on an important period of Crown 
and Māori relations, a period that marked a shift in recognising longstanding Treaty 
rights through the development of a specific forum for reviewing Māori Treaty 
grievances - the Waitangi Tribunal.  The paper examines the important formation 
period of the Tribunal in the early 1970s to mid-1990s to illustrate two interrelated 
points: firstly the Tribunal's formation poses a contradiction in that while it represented 
the first meaningful examination of Crown breaches of Māori Treaty rights, it did so 
utilising an ‘informal’ review process that initially lacked the authority to impose 
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binding decisions; and secondly that during this period the Tribunal encouraged the 
incorporation of Māori political and social activism into a government controlled forum.   
 
The establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 
appeared to offer Māori a meaningful process for airing their Treaty grievances.  Until 
the Tribunal’s formation, Māori Treaty activism had been largely contained within the 
formal court processes of the justice system and governmental processes which decade 
upon decade denied recognition of Māori rights.   
 
The paper focuses on two related questions: ‘why did the government develop the 
Waitangi Tribunal at this juncture in State/Māori relations’, and ‘what function or 
purpose did the Tribunal serve at this point in State/Māori relations’?  We argue that 
the processes and mechanisms of the Tribunal constituted a form of regulation resulting 
from the shift from a Fordist to a Post-Fordist mode of capitalist accumulation in New 
Zealand from the late 1970s.  More precisely, the formation of the Waitangi Tribunal 
and the first decade of its operation can be understood as a state-centred informal 
justice forum that assisted the state in regulating the potential hegemonic impact of 
Māori Treaty activism.   
 
The authors set out to contest claims that the Tribunal and its processes are evidence 
that the New Zealand state had sought to address Treaty grievances in a meaningful 
way, by providing Māori with a forum where they could ‘tell their stories of 
dispossession’ (Maaka and Fleras 2005; see later discussion on perspectives on the 
development and role of the Tribunal).  In contrast, we argue that although the 
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regulation of Māori protest and Treaty grievances from the inception of the Tribunal 
may not have been as overt as those employed during the colonial context29, regulation 
existed nonetheless; albeit reconstituted to reflect the developing Post-Fordist 
economic and regulatory environment.  We use regulation theory as a theoretical and 
conceptual framework to describe the underlying socio-political drivers behind the 
development of the Tribunal at a particular point in State/Māori relations. 
 
The decision to focus on the early period of the operations of the Tribunal (from 1975 to 
the late 1980s) was influenced firstly, by the fact that the establishment of the Tribunal 
signalled the first instance in which the state had organised a specific, institutionalised 
response to Māori activism after a long period of disengagement from Māori and their 
Treaty issues.  Prior to the Tribunal the Government had considered the Treaty a 
‘nullity’, and left it to the courts to mediate (and consistently) repudiate Māori claims.  
And secondly, much of the material generated by academics and researchers on the 
Tribunal has focused on claims-making and the way in which the Tribunal dealt with 
claims and government responses to their deliberations.  In comparison, our focus is on 
the drivers behind the development of the Tribunal at a particular point in State-Māori 
relations, which we believe is an under-theorised and researched area of the Tribunal’s 
history and operations. 
 
 
 
                                                          
29  The colonial government legislated extensively in the nineteenth century to suppress Māori protests 
against land sales.  For example the Suppression of Rebellion Act 1863 allowed for the arrest of Māori 
who were defined as rebels, generally defined as those who refused to sell, resulting in the 
confiscation of their land (Ward, 1995). 
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The State’s Response to Māori Political Dissent 
As the historical record shows, Māori have long contested the ways in which the Crown 
and the New Zealand government have developed policies that directly impact on them 
and their communities, particularly in relation to land confiscation and breaches of the 
Treaty of Waitangi.  As stated earlier, most of this activity had been dealt with through 
the state-dominated justice system, as well as numerous petitions made by hapū and iwi 
to government and the Crown.  However, by the late 1960s, the form and nature of 
Māori Treaty-related activity began to change (Morris, 2003; Ward, 1993).  Spurred by 
the ethnic reorganisation of other colonised indigenes and influenced by the Black civil 
rights movement of the 1960s, Māori began to more actively express their discontent 
with assimilationist state policies since the 1880s (Hill and Bonisch-Brednich, 2007: 
166-167; Poata-Smith, 1996; 2004).  Thus, in 1970 the protest organisation, Ngā 
Tamatoa (Young Warriors) began its career of confrontational politics against the New 
Zealand state (Hazlehurst, 1993).  In 1975 the then Labour Government was confronted 
by the famous Hikoi (Great March) of numerous Māori from the far north to the steps of 
Parliament in Wellington (Walker, 1987).  And by the mid-1980s organised Māori 
activist movements had emerged as a potent political force in challenging government’s 
hegemony over State/Māori policy (Spoonley, 1989).   
 
The impact of the rise of Māori protest activism on government policy, cannot be 
overstated (see Poata-Smith, 1996; 2004).  For example, Catalanic (2004) argues that 
one of the key drivers behind the rise of Māori activism was the policy context that 
predominated in New Zealand for much of the twentieth century, one based on 
assimilating Māori into ‘mainstream society’.  To further this policy, government 
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actively denied Māori grievances by ignoring Treaty issues, while at the same time 
upholding the Treaty of Waitangi as the founding document of the nation via the ‘joining 
together as one, the Crown and Māori’.  This continued, policy-driven denial of Treaty 
justice was instrumental in the radicalisation of Māori Treaty politics.  In relation to the 
link between Māori activism and the development of the Tribunal, Catalanic (ibid: 11) 
states that: 
 
The policy assimilation that characterised New Zealand politics and society acted 
as a constraint to the definition of Māori socio-economic problems as connected to 
Crown injustices committed under the Treaty... [therefore]... the New Zealand 
politico-institutional context... conditioned the way in which Māori sought to draw 
attention to their problems – protest activism – that was eventually the most 
successful factor in achieving the desired recognition. 
 
The New Zealand state’s response to the hegemonic threat posed by the radicalisation 
of Māori ethnic politics was swift.  From the mid-1970s the state’s policy and 
administrative response moved from being openly assimilationist, to become imbued 
with the rhetoric of Māori bicultural ideology (Tauri, 1998).  Administrative responses 
included attempts to increase public service responsiveness to Māori values, needs and 
aspirations; a new distributive ideal based on the bicultural allocation of power and 
resources; and acceptance of the Treaty of Waitangi as a policy blue print for reuniting 
‘the founding partners of New Zealand’ (Sissons, 1990).  However, arguably the most 
substantive response to the counter-hegemonic activity of Māori was the Waitangi 
Tribunal. 
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The Waitangi Tribunal 
The Waitangi Tribunal was established by the third Labour Government (1972-1975) 
with the passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Act in 1975.  At this point the Tribunal was 
given the authority to inquire into and make recommendations to the Crown 
(represented by the Government of the day) relating to Māori claims against 
government actions that they believed contravened their rights under the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Catalinac, 2004; Gibbs, 2006).  The government’s intentions for the Tribunal 
in terms of process and jurisdiction are summarised by Ward (1993: 185) who writes 
that: 
 
[I]n future, ‘any Māori’ or group of Māori who considered that they were 
prejudicially affected by any act of the Crown or its agents, in breach of the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, could bring a claim to a new tribunal, the 
Waitangi Tribunal.  The Tribunal would act as a commission of enquiry, with power 
to summon witnesses, investigate widely and make recommendations (emphasis 
ours). 
 
However, despite the authority given to the Tribunal to investigate, initially the 
jurisdiction of the new body was significantly constrained. According to Walker (2005), 
in order to gain Government support for the Tribunal in the first instance, one of its 
chief architects, the late Matiu Rata made a number of significant concessions at Cabinet 
level relating to the powers of the proposed forum.  For example, the legislation that 
established the forum determined that after a hearing was held with Māori 
complainants, the Tribunal was empowered to only make recommendations to 
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Government on how it should respond.  However, the Government was not bound by 
the Tribunal’s recommendations and could ignore them at will (Sorrenson, 1995; 
Stokes, 1993).  The legislation also restricted the forum to considering claims emanating 
from violations of the Treaty of Waitangi occurring after 1975 and purposely excluded 
historical claims.  These concessions meant that the vast majority of events considered 
by Māori to represent significant breaches of the Treaty contract, sat outside the 
jurisdiction developed for the new entity.   
 
The restrictions in jurisdiction caused concern amongst some Māori commentators.  
Ward (1993) relates that as a result few claims were brought before the Tribunal.  
However, this situation changed with the advent of a ‘bi-cultural tribunal process’ 
instigated by Chief Justice Eddie Durie in the early 1980s, and the content of initial 
reports that underlined the extensive scope and nature of Māori grievances, and Crown 
breaches of Māori Treaty rights (see Waitangi Tribunal 1983; 1984).  This, along with 
what Ward (1993: 186) describes as New Zealand middle class desire to ‘confront the 
historic sources of Māori grievance and to offer redress’, saw these jurisdictional 
restrictions partially lifted with passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985 
by the then recently elected Labour Government.  The legislation extended the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction to enable it to consider Māori claims against violations that took 
place after the signing of the Treaty in 1840 (Gibbs, 2006). 
 
Despite significant constraints on the initial jurisdiction placed upon the Tribunal, 
arguably little changed after the alterations provided for in the 1984 legislation, a range 
of authors (e.g., Robinson, 2002; Ward, 1993) claim that the forum represented a 
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significant change in the State’s response to Māori Treaty grievances.  In summing up 
this perspective, Catalanic (2004: 10) writes that ‘[i]t (the Tribunal) has been heralded 
as marking the beginning of a post-colonial era in New Zealand, in which Māori-Pākehā 
relations were being transformed from Pākehā dominance to negotiation towards 
greater justice, equity and partnership’.  While undoubtedly the Tribunal signalled a 
change in formal Government process for dealing with Māori grievances, the 
predominant perspective on the drivers behind its formation have a tendency to 
overemphasise the notion that it represented a significant transformation in power 
relations between the state and Māori (see for example, Maaka and Fleras, 2009).  In 
comparison, we argue that a critical analysis focused on the wider socio-political 
context developing in New Zealand at the time, demonstrates that while the Tribunal 
represented a unique response, the purpose and goals aligned with previous policy: 
namely continued state control over Māori policy in light of changes in Māori grievance 
politics (see Byrnes, 2004; Gibbs, 2006 for similar perspectives).   
 
Key questions of the paper 
As outlined earlier, this paper focuses on two inter-related questions: ‘why did the 
government develop the Waitangi Tribunal at this juncture in State/Māori relations’, 
and ‘what function or purpose did the Tribunal serve at this point in State/Māori 
relations’?  We argue that the answers lie in part in the wider changes in capitalist 
development in New Zealand from a Fordist to a Post-Fordist regime of accumulation 
that began in the mid-to-late 1970s and continued throughout the 1980s.  In particular, 
we contend that the formation of the Tribunal can be linked to the growing popularity 
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of informal justice processes as one mechanism employed by the modern state to 
regulate social discontent and political protest in Post-Fordist contexts.  
 
Fordist to Post-Fordist Regimes of Accumulation and Regulation 
Regulation theory is useful for anchoring our examination of the New Zealand state’s 
response to the increasing radicalisation of Māori political dissent, as it provides a 
framework to analyse the changes in the forms of regulation of populations and dissent 
in capitalist economies (Tickell and Peck, 1995).  Regulation theory attempts to explain, 
through an analysis of capitalist development, the paradox between capitalism’s 
inherent tendency towards instability and crisis and the constant drive to stabilise 
around a set of institutions, norms and rules that support, or attempt to affect economic 
and social stability (Amin, 1994).  
 
Filion (2001: 86-87) identifies two concepts at the core of regulation theory.  Regime of 
accumulation describes the organisation of society that aid economic activity and 
growth.  Included in this domain of activity are the political institutions, culture and 
systems of production.  Mode of regulation refers to the nature of mechanisms that bring 
society in line with the requirements of the sphere of production.  Amin (1994: 8) 
describes the mode of regulation as the ‘institutions and conventions which regulate 
and reproduce a given accumulation regime through application across a wide range of 
areas, including the law, state policy, political practices, industrial codes, governance 
philosophies, rules of negotiation and bargaining, cultures of consumption and social 
expectations’.  These components of society can pattern behaviour in ways that support 
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the prevailing regime of accumulation.  They provide the social mores, beliefs and 
behaviours that support capitalist accumulation (Painter and Goodwin, 1995).  
 
Due to its contradictory and crisis-ridden tendencies, capital requires forms of 
institutional regulation to supports its continued reproduction and legitimacy. 
Successive phases of capitalist development can be characterised and analysed via the 
combination of regimes of accumulation and regulation formed to support capital in 
that particular epoch (Jessop, 1994).  Each regime therefore has distinctive regulatory 
characteristics and regulation theory attempts to explain transformations and 
differences between phases, such as the movement from a Fordist regime to a Post-
Fordist regime of accumulation that occurred in many western capitalist societies from 
the immediate post-war period onwards30. 
 
Fordism 
The Fordist regime of accumulation is generally characterised by mass production and 
mass consumption, based upon the assembly line production techniques introduced in 
the United States at the turn of the twentieth century by Henry Ford (Lipietz, 1992).  As 
Wilkes (1993) notes, the concept of assembly line production brings with it notions of 
universalism, uniformity, repetition and rationality.  The regulatory forms commonly 
ascribed to Fordism include the welfare state31; the role of trade unions in raising 
consumption standards of working class and public servants; the media-inspired 
                                                          
30  See Amin (1994) and Jessop (1995) for discussions about different theoretical explanations on the 
emergence of Post-Fordism. 
 
31  Lipietz (1986a) writes that the Fordist mode of regulation in Western jurisdictions often included a 
welfare system designed to ensure every wage earner a guaranteed income in times of economic 
hardship, with social legislation covering minimum wage levels and collective agreements.  This tends 
to institutionalise the class struggle by meeting some of the needs of workers, whilst allowing 
capitalist accumulation, including the cheap appropriation of labour, to continue. 
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interest in mass consumption and the replacement of the extended family with the 
nuclear model as the family formation of modern society (Falion, 2001).  The Fordist 
accumulatory epoch is generally considered to have lasted from the early 20th century 
until the early 1980s depending on the particular jurisdiction, at which time the 
supporting regulatory regimes began to lose their effectiveness.  Lipietz (1992) 
contends that crisis developed within Fordism's supposed universal and rational 
system as real wages continued to increase and the cost of fixed capital in relation to the 
total work force also rose, resulting in the retraction of profit margins.  This brought 
forth a new accumulative and regulatory regime, Post-Fordism.  
 
Post-Fordism 
In contrast to the Fordist epoch, Post-Fordism is characterised by a reduced role in 
society for trade unions; a sharper division in the working class between core and 
peripheral workers; and a greater flexibility of work practices, characterised by 
diversification, rather than universalism.  The Post-Fordist mode of production has been 
described as involving the commodification and privatisation of a range of collective 
services that were previously organised by the Fordist state (Aglietta, 1979).  The 
market reforms of the 1980s to mid-1990s in New Zealand showed a decisive move 
towards this type of capital organisation and accumulation, the privatisation of public 
works a clear example of this process (Kelsey, 1993; 1997). 
 
The move towards a Post-Fordist era of capital accumulation is accompanied by the 
development of different modes of regulation.  As with modes of regulation 
characteristic of previous forms of capital accumulation, they provide the means of 
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institutionalising and confining class struggle and potential hegemonic crises within 
state-controlled processes.  These modes of regulation will be different from those 
which characterise the containment and control of class and ethnic relations in the 
Fordist era. 
 
Despite the existence of the range of regulatory mechanisms listed above, crises of 
capital within the Fordist era brought about the need for new and innovative forms of 
regulation.  The state’s response to the social disintegration inherent in the crises of 
accumulation was to penetrate even more deeply into civil society in order to 
restructure social relations into forms appropriate to the emergence of a new, Post-
Fordist regime of accumulation.  This statement is perhaps at odds with the common 
portrayal of the Post-Fordist state as less regulatory and less involved in civil society 
(see Bonefield and Hollaway, 1991).  Arguably, this portrayal is overstated.  The rise of 
Post-Fordism did not see the state withdraw from its regulatory position, but instead 
re-shape itself and seek to control the regulatory process in different, less obvious ways 
than were constructed during the Fordist context.  One less obvious form of state 
regulatory control is the informal justice forum, of which the Waitangi Tribunal, during 
its first decade or more of operation, greatly resembled. 
 
Post-Fordist Regulation and the Rise of Informal Justice 
Although the informal justice movement began initially during the latter part of the 
Fordist epoch, it was during Post-Fordism that its products became key components of 
the regulatory regime (Hofrichter, 1987).  This was due in part to the growing 
obsolescence and ineffectiveness of Fordist state institutions and technologies of 
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control that mediated class and social conflict during the earlier epoch (Santos, 1995).  
These institutions, including the police, courts and child care and protection, while still 
powerful and coercive, were no longer on their own successful in reproducing what 
Spitzer (1982) calls politically docile populations.   
 
Arguably, the rise of radical socio-political movements, such as feminism and 
indigenous activism, represented forms of political expression that contested the 
legitimacy of existing modes of justice, and therefore regulation, in the developing Post-
Fordist context.  These counter-hegemonic movements were not easily contained within 
existing institutional processes designed to support a Fordist accumulatory regime, thus 
prompting the development of alternative modes of regulation (Hofrichter, 1987).  We 
contend that informal justice became a key Post-Fordist regulatory response in the New 
Zealand context, and that a primary example of this ‘new form’ of regulation was the 
Waitangi Tribunal. 
 
Informal justice forums operate within Post-Fordism as pacificatory mechanisms, 
drawing potentially hegemonic activity into state-designed and dominated regimes.  
The Tribunal, particularly the way it operated throughout much of the 1980s, 
neutralised conflict that could threaten the state or capital accumulation by responding 
to legitimate Māori grievances in ways that inhibited their transformation into serious 
ideological or physical challenges to the authority of the state (Santos, 1982).  Abel 
(1982) notes that informal justice institutions of this kind are generally created and 
controlled by the respondents, and rarely if ever by the grievant themselves. 
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In order to neutralise conflict, informal mechanisms must be able to attract disputants 
to their processes.  State-centred informal justice seeks to achieve this goal by 
appearing to operate as a neutral arbiter between the claimants and the state.  Inducing 
complainants to submit voluntarily to an informal justice regime heightens the chances 
of their accepting any decisions made and believing that ‘justice has been done’, despite 
the fact that the process is often designed to limit the possibility of adverse decisions 
being made against state interests.  This has a neutralising effect on class conflict, by 
denying class antagonisms and appealing to general standards of engagement that are 
designed to promote capital affirming modes of social cohesion.  As Selva and Bohm 
(1987: 50) note: 
 
[t]he residual is the legitimation of state intervention and the return to 
uncontrolled political power, delegalising social relations by loosening power 
from formal controls.  Thus, under the banner of informalism and the rhetoric of 
personal justice, state authority and political control has been partially obscured.   
 
From this brief conceptual outline, it become possible to explain the emergence of the 
Waitangi Tribunal during the rise of Post-Fordist phase of capital accumulation in the 
New Zealand context and to illustrate how regulation of Māori grievances and claims 
has changed in this transitional period.  In the following section, the Waitangi Tribunal 
is examined as a form of Post-Fordist regulation, to demonstrate how the informal 
procedures it utilised throughout the 1980s, channelled, then neutralised, the 
hegemonic potentialities of Māori Treaty activism. 
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The Waitangi Tribunal as a Post-Fordist Regulatory Body 
 
It could be argued that the Waitangi Tribunal is a belated attempt to extend the 
hegemony of the rule of law over Māori, at a time when its legitimacy is most 
directly under attack.         
                                                                                                             Jane Kelsey (1984) 
 
Chris Wilkes (1993) suggests the Fordist period in New Zealand was broadly located in 
the period 1935 to 1984, otherwise known as the ‘Long Boom’ (Nielson 1990: 81).  
During the 1960s the long boom was also sustained by increasing productivity of labour 
through mass production techniques and the rapid expansion of agricultural exports to 
the world economy, while the local economy and the manufacturing sector were 
protected through a range of state subsidies and tariffs (Roper, 1993).  The Fordist 
phase was brought into crises in the late 1960s and early 1970s due to a falling rate of 
profit, rising foreign debt and the shifts in the global export markets away from New 
Zealand produce (ibid). 
 
In the move towards Post-Fordist accumulation and regulation in the 1980s, the Labour 
government introduced free market policies, collectively referred to as ‘Rogernomics’, 
which sought to restructure the New Zealand economy through privatisation of state 
services and assets32.  Ideologically driven by new right economic theory, the process 
involved the reformation of government control over key assets into separate State 
                                                          
32  Rogernomics refers to the plethora of neo-liberal economic and social policies developed by Roger 
Douglas and the Labour government from 1984-1990.  Douglas, the Minister of Finance from 1984- 
1988, argued that social goals and political considerations should be excluded from economic policy.  
Douglas and Labour sought to construct a highly deregulated economy in New Zealand, driven by 
market forces (Kelsey, 1997). 
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Owned Enterprises that were required to be profit focused.  The enterprises could then 
be privatised and subsequently offered for sale to the private sector.  Resistance to 
these policies came mainly from Māori, who saw the resources under the auspices of the 
enterprises being further alienated to private control, leading to potential breaches of 
their rights under the Treaty of Waitangi. Kelsey (1990: 1) offers an insight into this 
effect on Māori articulation of Treaty grievances when she argues that: 
 
The pace and scope of Rogernomics left a politically naive and economically 
illiterate population stunned and apathetic.  Significant resistance came from just 
one quarter.  Māori movements of the 1970s intensified throughout the 1980s as 
Māori reasserted their rights under the Treaty of Waitangi to te tino 
rangatiratanga, or complete authority over themselves and the country's key 
resources of land, fisheries, waterways and minerals.  With determination, and 
sometimes desperation they challenged the government moves to vest in the 
hands of private capital the resources guaranteed to te iwi Māori in the Treaty. 
 
Māori concerns focused upon the fact that by privatising resources, the Government - as 
the Crown’s representative - was potentially divesting itself of its Treaty responsibilities 
and, as result, their Treaty rights.  The interests of capital would be supported through 
legislation, while Māori would remain economically and politically destitute, with little 
or no resources to exercise sovereignty over (Kelsey, 1990).  Rising Māori protests 
challenged the legitimacy of the government’s activities in this sphere, and through 
court action they were eventually able to curtail the Government’s ability to implement 
the reforms (Kelsey, 1993).  In order to allow capitalist accumulation to continue 
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unimpeded, attempts were made to channel Māori activism into new forms of 
regulation, the most obvious being the Tribunal. 
 
In the Fordist period, regulation of Māori protests against Treaty breaches was 
maintained firstly by a formal legal system that denied the validity of the Treaty, while 
emphasising parliamentary sovereignty as the sole legitimate power in the country.  
Secondly, a paternalistic welfare state provided rising living standards for both 
European and Māori.  While Māori did not have recognised Treaty rights, they had 
access to education, health and housing support.  However, by the mid-1970s, both the 
legal and welfare systems were proving insufficient for regulating Māori Treaty 
grievances and political activism. This situation necessitated the development of 
alternative forms of regulation, which the state set about constructing throughout the 
late 1970s and into the 1980s (Kelsey, 1990).  It is possible to see that the decline of the 
Fordist mode provided the conditions for the emergence of the Tribunal in 1975.  The 
Fordist state could not fully contain Māori concerns for Treaty rights through the formal 
legal or parliamentary systems as it had done up to this point.  As Wilkes (1993: 205) 
argues ‘[d]emands for the revitalisation of the culture and language, and the return of 
wrongly appropriated tribal land, now sought a real answer which the old settlements 
could not produce’. 
 
Kelsey (1993) contends that in the 1980s the state could respond to Māori Treaty 
activism in two ways.  It could use coercion, as had previous governments, with the 
potential for increasing Māori sense of grievance and, therefore, conflict with the state.  
Or it could choose the path of passive revolution, a term derived from Antonio Gramsci 
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that denotes the ‘inclusion of new social groups under the hegemony of the political 
order without the expansion of real political control by the mass of population over 
politics’ (ibid: 234).  The State chose the latter, inducing and encouraging aggrieved 
Māori to seek the Tribunal as neutral arbiter between the conflicted parties. Through 
the Tribunal the State temporarily brought the counter-hegemonic activities of Māori 
within its ambit until the challenge was defused, through both real (in terms of limited 
fiscal settlements), and rhetorical concessions (e.g., formal apologies) , and the promise 
of meaningful ‘change’ in State-Māori relationships.  By drawing Māori protests off the 
street and national television and into the Waitangi Tribunal (see Gagne, 2009: 42), the 
State was largely able to regulate actions that could have presented a barrier to the 
developing Post-Fordist regime of accumulation.  
 
We are not suggesting that the Tribunal was intentionally created as a regulatory body 
from its inception.  Earlier we argued that the Tribunal was created as a forum to hear 
grievances, a necessary response by the state to the developing radicalisation of Māori 
activism.  Jessop (1991) contends that the emergence and subsequent dynamic of 
structures of regulation might be endowed with a greater intentionality than is justified.  
In the case of the Tribunal it would be an exaggeration to reduce its origin merely to the 
formation of a mode of regulation in response to accumulation or ideological crises. 
However, it is possible to view the emergence of the Tribunal as a Post-Fordist mode of 
regulation as a non-intentional, but nonetheless focussed strategy, aimed at ensuring 
state-controlled direction of an already emergent structure.  Regulation should be 
viewed as a complex and provisional process mediated through institutions and 
conducted by social forces.  Given these points, the Waitangi Tribunal should be viewed 
259 
 
as a state-formed regulatory body that assisted the state to institutionalise Māori dissent 
and political activism as part of the Post-Fordist regulatory regime that began to emerge 
and then expand in New Zealand throughout the 1980s. 
 
For the Tribunal to institutionalise Māori protest and dissent, it had to be able to attract 
Māori claimants to its processes.  The Tribunal developed in ways that enabled it to 
attract claimants by appearing to be more responsive to Māori grievances than the 
formal court system.  The ability of the Tribunal to attract claims enhanced as it 
proactively moved from replicating the process of the formal justice system to the 
‘informal’ formalism of marae protocol.  The changes can be shown by contrasting the 
reaction to the first hearing by the Tribunal and then subsequent hearings that were 
altered to attract Māori claimants. 
 
The first hearing of the Tribunal was in Auckland on the 30 May 1977.  The claim was 
made by a Mr Hawke relating to fishing rights of the Ngāti Whātua (Waitangi Tribunal, 
1978).  Williams (1989) writes that the Tribunal attempted to establish the atmosphere 
of formal court proceedings, and also tried to narrow the claim to one of legal niceties.  
Williams (1989) and Sharp (1997) also note the choice of location for the hearing, the 
Ballroom of the Hotel Intercontinental, and the processes employed, were highly 
inappropriate for the hearing.  No attempt was made to use Māori customs and the 
chairperson referred to it as a Magistrates Court (Catalinac, 2004).  From this it is 
possible to see that the Tribunal in the beginning had the formality and processes of the 
formal justice system.  However, as Sharp (1997: 77) writes ‘the Māori people for whose 
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benefit it was primarily designed did not like its manner of proceeding according to 
formal, legal, Pākehā practice’. 
 
The response by claimants to the formality of Tribunal hearings and its restricted 
jurisdiction was clearly shown by the small number of claims to go before the Tribunal 
during the initial years of its operation.  Just fourteen claims were lodged in the first 
nine years of its existence to 1984.  However, this changed as the processes and 
operations of the Tribunal were altered, as shown in the Motonui claim.  Lodged in 
1982, the Te Atiawa tribe argued that the Motonui Synthetic Fuel project would pollute 
their traditional fishing grounds (Waitangi Tribunal, 1989).  Notably, the hearing was 
held on a marae, without formal legal procedures, instead using marae protocol.  Temm 
(1990) notes that Pākehā legal formality did not seem appropriate on a marae, so it was 
decided that marae kawa (protocols) would be adopted for each hearing.  It was also 
decided that legal formalities such as paper work would be kept to a minimum in order 
to ensure the Tribunal worked in an orderly and efficient manner, but also, because it 
was important that ‘the Waitangi Tribunal be in every sense a people’s court’ (Temm, 
1990: 9).  After this claim, hearings were held on home marae, replacing the appearance 
of legal formalism.   
 
In 1985, the amendment to the Treaty of Waitangi Act allowed retrospective claims 
back to 1840, and increased the membership of the Tribunal to a Chairperson plus six 
others, four of whom were to be Māori.  By using Māori custom, more fully 
incorporating Māori in its processes, and eventually being able to examine historical 
grievances, the Tribunal was able to present itself as a body able to address and resolve 
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Māori claims in an ‘appropriate manner’.  By the beginning of 1994, claims lodged with 
the Tribunal had increased to 400 (Kneebone, 1994).  Thus, in the period covering the 
late 1970s to the late 1980s, the Tribunal arguably transformed itself from a formal 
body of justice, to that of an informal justice forum that engaged with Māori on their 
terms; at least as far as protocol was concerned.  The Tribunal was able to gain 
acceptance from Māori by making decisions that not only recognised past injustices, but 
also produced tangible, albeit unintended, results.   
 
Abel (1982) writes that because the state presents itself as the only legitimate source of 
legal authority, other processes, for example communitarian justice, require its support 
to provide the necessary legitimacy for their survival.  This was demonstrated in the 
New Zealand context by the 1987 New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney General case.  
The 1987 court decision gave the Tribunal’s interpretation in favour of Māori claimants 
the orthodoxy of informed opinion.  Renwick (1993) argues that this had three 
important effects upon Māori and the Tribunal.  Firstly, the legitimacy of the Tribunal 
for Māori was enhanced by the formal recognition of the validity of the forum’s 
interpretations and deliberations.  Secondly, it demonstrated that informalist processes 
could find in favour of Māori interests, and that going to the Tribunal would not be a 
waste of time or resources.  Thirdly, arguably the decision was instrumental in changing 
the character of Māori activism by moving protests from the street to the Tribunal 
process, where many Māori began to believe that justice could now be achieved.  
Renwick (1993: 11) underlines the counter-hegemonic potentialities of the Tribunal 
when he contends that during this period in Tribunal history that “Māori advocacy… 
moved beyond protest marches to hearings of the Waitangi Tribunal, the courts, the 
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committee rooms of parliament and the offices of Ministers of the Crown... The process 
has growing legitimacy in Māori minds”.  
 
This development had a demonstrable effect on Māori protests during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.  Protests that were previously loud and visible moved from being 
confrontational to conciliatory (Sharp, 1997; see also Gagne, 2009: 42).  As a result, 
grievants (more commonly referred to by media and politicians as ‘radicals’) who did 
not use the path offered by the Tribunal had their complaints labelled illegitimate.  
Arguably then, a key outcome of the Tribunal process was State containment of Māori 
radicalism and the incorporation of Māori political discourse.  Kelsey (1992: 601) 
underlines this argument when she wrote that: 
 
…those who harbour grievances are persuaded to abandon radical measures, such 
as boycotts or militant action, in favour of orderly and peaceful resolution under 
the protection of informal state institutions.  The conflict is redefined, its 
manifestation controlled within state-prescribed limits and the demands of the 
grievants moderated... Continued resort to extra-legal tactics by other grievants 
can be discredited by reference to those who have accepted the opportunity, 
which the state has provided, to address their concerns responsibly [our 
emphasis]. 
 
In effect, Māori were directed towards a state-sanctioned process which worked as an 
informal justice body independent of the formal system.  However, while the Tribunal 
may have become the environment where the struggle over Māori claims was 
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contained, ongoing regulation of socio-political discontent was never absolute.  As 
Jessop (1991: 73) writes ‘since there are no institutional guarantees that struggles will 
always be contained within these forms and/or resolved in ways that reproduce these 
forms, the stability of an accumulation regime or mode of regulation is always relative, 
always partial, and always provisional’.  So, while Māori gained from the Tribunal 
process in terms of positive claims decisions and successful court actions to temporarily 
halt government legislation, these successes were very much unintended consequences 
of the Tribunals regulatory process and, more importantly for our argument, extremely 
rare.  
 
According to Merry (1992) state controlled informal justice institutions may provide 
indigenous peoples such as Māori, an opportunity to push the boundaries of the 
imposed regulatory ordering and mould them to better suit their needs.  However, 
despite the contestability of control over informal processes, in practice the state can 
employ a number of tactics to maintain or regain control of the regulatory environment, 
including reconstituted legislation; withdrawal of financial support and/or constructing 
new processes and strategies that divert focus away from a domain that may threaten 
state interests begin working in unintended ways.  For example, in response to the 
Tribunal recommending the return of 44 hectares of private land in the Te Roroa claim, 
the Crown passed legislation in 1992 to prevent any further recommendations on the 
return of private land, excepting only the 1988 State Enterprises Act in relation to State 
Owned Enterprises.  One reason for this has been the pressure exerted by the 
Government upon the Tribunal against employing their powers under this Act (Gibbs, 
2006).  This was demonstrated in March 1997, when the Tribunal touted the possibility 
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of this section of the Act being used in relation to the Muriwhenua claim.  The State’s 
response was to threaten that such a mandatory ruling would result in the limited 
settlement fund (set under the Fiscal Envelope, see discussion below) for all claims 
collapsing, thereby leaving a significant number of claims unresolved.  The Tribunal 
quickly backed down, recommending only that the Crown should enter into direct 
negotiations with the claimants (see, Barlow, 1997; Hubbard, 1997).   
 
Given this example, it is possible to suggest that the Tribunal formed the initial basis of a 
Post-Fordist regulation of Māori claims during the late 1970s, throughout most of 
1980s.  However, the lack of action by both the fourth Labour and the following National 
Government in acting upon the Tribunal’s recommendations throughout this period, 
resulted in rising dissatisfaction from Māori with the claims processes by the early 
1990s (Kneebone, 1994).  It is at this point that government policy was reformulated 
into a claims resolution process based on direct negotiation with iwi.  The first major 
pan-tribal Treaty settlement extinguished Māori fishing rights in exchange for a limited 
1989 settlement, and a share in fishing assets in the Sealords company in 1992, known 
as the Sealords deal33.  Iwi were then encouraged to compete for a limited land claims 
settlement fund, labelled the Fiscal Envelope.  Those iwi who chose to participate would 
have their outstanding Treaty claims extinguished in exchange for a limited financial 
settlement, while iwi that refused the envelope process were unlikely to receive 
compensation.  The regulatory environment that had been initiated through the 
Tribunal and dominated by it, was overtaken by the Fiscal Envelope process, and 
                                                          
33  Under the terms of this agreement, the government provided Māori with 150 million dollars towards 
purchasing a half share in the Sealords company, with Brierley Investments as the joint venture 
partner.  By agreeing to this deal, Māori effectively signed away their commercial fishing rights as 
guaranteed under the various articles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Webb, 1998). 
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thereafter by the Government favouring the strategy of direct negotiation with iwi 
claimants.  This change in the regulatory environment signalled the beginning of the end 
of the Tribunal as a significant process in the state’s regulation of Māori dissent, in 
particular those associated with Treaty grievances34. 
 
Conclusion 
The emergence of the Waitangi Tribunal can be explained by the development of a Post-
Fordist mode of regulation.  The historical basis of Māori Treaty grievances emanated 
largely from the alienation of land that occurred during the colonial context and 
throughout the 20th century.  Legislation supported this acquisition and throughout the 
pre-Fordist and Fordist eras, the state was able to regulate Māori protests either by 
ignoring them or channelling them towards formal, legal processes, where grievances 
were less likely to interrupt the processes of capital accumulation.   
 
The Tribunal emerged during a crumbling Fordist regime of accumulation and the rise 
of Post-Fordism in the New Zealand context.  The establishment of the Tribunal can be 
understood as a consequence of the transition to the new mode of accumulation and the 
concomitant need to ensure the continuation of a capital friendly social order.  However, 
the development of the Tribunal should not be viewed as the direct result of planning by 
certain interest groups to regulate or control Māori claims.  The analysis presented here 
shows the non-intentional development of the Tribunal into a mode of informalist 
                                                          
34  Joseph (2000, p. 61) posits another possible explanation for the eventually sidelining of the Tribunal, 
and for Government attempts to nullify its powers: ‘[t]he Tribunal’s work evolved in the midst of a 
collision between two contradictory forces: on the one hand, a genuine political will to improve the 
situation for Māori; on the other, a new commitment to neo-liberal economic policies that transformed 
state structures and undermined the capacity to fulfil the promises generated by that political will’.  
Arguably, the Tribunal’s willingness to even signal the possible use of its powers, thereby effecting 
Crown control over resource allocation, was a potential stumbling block to the neo-liberal idea (see 
also Kelsey, 1993). 
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regulation, where strategic conduct by the State may have only been used to impose 
coherence and direction on an already emergent structure.   
 
The increased use of informal procedures by the Tribunal throughout the 1980s can 
also be seen as a change in the mode of regulation from Fordist to Post-Fordist regimes, 
where dissent is channelled into an institution that defines the limits of the justice that 
can be dispensed.  The less formal procedures developed by the Tribunal attracted 
Māori claimants, which incorporated their activism within the state-controlled 
apparatus.  Thus, the Tribunal functioned as a Post-Fordist mode of regulation by 
incorporating Māori grievances in ways that nullified their potential to threaten the 
hegemonic legitimacy of the New Zealand state.  
 
The final chapter in the role of the Waitangi Tribunal as a key component in the Post-
Fordist regulation of Māori socio-political dissent is now playing out.  Since the mid-
1990s, the position of the Tribunal in the regulatory hierarchy was supplanted by the 
Fiscal Envelope (Robinson, 2002), with its cap on resourcing of Treaty claims, and more 
contemporarily by the favour shown by all participants to the strategy of direct 
negotiation.  This is not to say the Tribunal is totally irrelevant, as it remains important 
to some iwi and other Māori organisations for the role it plays in the preparation of 
Treaty claims.  However, its part in the process of regulation and control of Māori 
activism has been usurped by the recognition by senior politicians of the ideological and 
fiscal benefits to be had from taking direct control of State-iwi engagement.   
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The Politics of Gang Research in New Zealand 
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and 
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(2012) Justice and Social Democracy Proceedings of the 1st International Conference 
(vol. 2).  Brisbane: Queensland University of Technology, School of Justice, pp 26-
44.  
 
Introduction  
This paper and the research it reports on, adds to the growing number of studies that 
have explored various manifestations of Cohen’s (1972) conceptualisation of moral 
panic as it relates to processes of marginalisation of specific populations and/or 
communities (for example, Furedi, 1994; Goode and Nachman, 1994; Hall, Critcher, 
Jefferson and Roberts, 1978; Hood, 2001; Marsh and Melville, 2011; Young, 2009).  The 
issue that prompted our involvement in research on this issue was a perceived spike in 
youth gang violence in the Counties Manukau region (Great Auckland, New Zealand), a 
community that subsequently became the focus of a moral panic related to its 
supposedly ‘wayward youth’.   
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The response to supposed youth gang crime in Counties Manukau can be framed as a 
moral panic for three reasons.  First, despite enormous media attention and claims to 
the contrary, the research was unable to demonstrate the existence of an extensive 
youth gang problem.  This is an important consideration given the heightened panic that 
ensued following media and politicians’ pronouncements of escalations in youth gang-
related crime.  For instance, large public meetings were called by the Mayor of Counties 
Manukau.  In attendance were parents, church ministers, community stakeholders and 
local and central government representatives.  The highly emotive issue led to mothers 
crying, fathers waving angry fists and church ministers proclaiming the need for stricter 
parenting and an adherence to Biblical principles for child rearing.  Next, despite the 
inordinate amount of attention to the issue and dire predictions of ‘youth out of control’, 
no additional government resources were set aside and directed at the issue.  Rather, 
the central government’s response occurred within existing budgets.  Finally, the extent 
of the issue was brought into question when the so-called youth gang crime wave in 
Counties Manukau subsided as quickly as it appeared, as the following report by Police 
attests: 
 
During the period, Friday the 23 December 2005 to Monday the 9 January 2006 
there were no incidents of youth gang violence or notable activity reported to or 
dealt with by the Police in the Counties Manukau, Auckland City or North Shore 
Waitakere Police Districts (New Zealand Police, 9 January 2006). 
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Such a drastic decrease in visibility, crime and apprehension is contrary to the way in 
which this type of ‘social issue’ evolves, at least from the view of those involved in 
developing and enforcing crime control policy. 
 
The paper is made of two parts in order to provide the authors’ with the opportunity to 
discuss their personal involvement in the research and policy response to the youth 
gang ‘issue’ that occurred in Counties Manukau.  The first voice (the researcher) 
provides a contextual background to the study.  Specifically, a variety of dynamics are 
highlighted that added to the developing moral panic about youth gangs, silenced 
community voices and participation in the development of policy responses while 
furthering the authority of central government stakeholders.  The second voice provides 
a critique of the way in which policy officials responded to the primary researcher’s 
work. 
 
Voice of the researcher 
 
Background 
During Labour Weekend October 2005, Iulio Naea, a 38-year-old father of a reported 
youth gang member was murdered in Otara, Counties Manukau35.  Naea’s murder was 
                                                          
35  Manukau City is a local authority that consists of the Botany, Clevedon, Howick, Mangere, Otara, 
Pakaranga, Papatoetoe and Manurewa Wards. Counties Manukau incorporates the three territorial 
local authorities of Franklin, Manukau City and Papakura District Councils.  Historically this area has 
been known as South Auckland.  Analysis of data has been complicated by how the areas within 
Counties Manukau are configured by various agencies.  For instance, the Counties Manukau Police 
District includes the territorial authority areas of Manukau City, Papakura District, Franklin District 
and the Auckland City suburban area of Otahuhu. Counties Manukau District Health Board area 
provides health services to the people of Manukau City, Papakura and Franklin districts.  
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thought to have been responsible for triggering a series of violence retaliations, and was 
later categorised as the first youth gang-related homicides in the region (New Zealand 
Forum, 2010).  
 
Following the murder, the central government came under increasing pressure to 
provide a solution to the burgeoning youth gang problem.  Notably, substantial pressure 
came from the Counties Manukau Mayor and the New Zealand Police.  In response, the 
Ministry of Social Development (MSD) was directed to undertake research into the issue 
and coordinate an appropriate, inter-agency policy response.  The research component 
of the research resulted in one of the authors, Michael Roguski, being tasked to carry out 
a four-month ethnographic study.  The aims of the research project were to develop an 
understanding of youth gangs in Counties Manukau, assess possible factors that have 
contributed to the emergence of youth gangs, ascertain the extensiveness and impact of 
youth gangs and identify elements and features of intervention models that could be 
developed and successfully implemented in the region.   
 
The research methodology was developed to ensure a strong adherence to community 
participation and ownership of the data and subsequent research findings.  This 
approach was thought necessary to secure community participation as respondents 
were initially reluctant to engage with the research.  A number of reasons were given, 
but in the main participants felt their communities were over researched, especially by 
the public service, and they were: 
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Sick of sharing our experiences only for the government to ignore what we say and 
do what they wanted to do all along.       
             Community participant 
 
As the primary researcher I attempted to forge community participation through 
promises of community hui (meetings) where residents and research participants 
would be able to review the study’s findings and meet to discuss possible community 
identified solutions.   
 
Locating and defining youth gangs 
The research evolved with an amorphous character.  It proved exceedingly difficult to 
marry the media, Cabinet Ministers’ and the New Zealand Police’s portrayal of an 
apparent overriding presence of youth gangs in Counties Manukau with the situation as 
it was reported by community-based participants. In this sense a discursive chasm was 
evident.  On one hand government representatives spoke of the existence of criminal 
youth gangs while simultaneously stressing that all efforts would be made to quash the 
problem.  In contrast, community participants spoke of normalising the presenting 
issues; stressing that these were young people and not gang members and pleading that 
their community should not be judged and labelled as criminal: 
 
Government people say we are socio-economically deprived.  Do you realise how 
insulting and frustrating that is when you live here and you know the community 
and its beauty.  All I see are rich social connections and a vibrant community that 
is doing exceptionally well on very low incomes.  Of course, what the government 
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sees are a bunch of poor darkies.  After all isn’t that what socio-economically 
deprived really means?                                                                                           
                                                                                                                  Community participant 
 
I attended a number of government meetings about the young gang issue and quickly 
became aware that the research and the policy response resembled a particularly fast 
moving locomotive that had lost the ability to apply its brakes.  This was particularly 
troublesome because Counties Manukau has long been marginalised by policy makers 
and community members repeatedly stated their frustration at being misrepresented 
by public servants, politicians and the media.  Further, it was disturbing to note the 
growing number of young people (referred to in the report as ‘wannabes’), who over a 
three-week period proudly reported having formed some form of ‘gang’ membership 
and adopted clothing styles and physical gestures in response to the elevated media 
reporting.  While I viewed wannabe gang membership as a reflection of normal and 
expected adolescent grouping behaviour this development was concerning because 
media attention appeared to elevate gang membership (with the possibility of criminal 
activity) to an aspirational level.  Given these concerns, it was extremely frustrating to 
be confronted with governmental machinations that refused to divert attention from 
the problem of youth gangs.  A combination of media attention and the government’s 
public commitment to action meant that the public service needed to be seen to address 
the issue, even if the problem did not exist as it was framed by media and politicians. 
The following extract from my fieldwork diary outlines some of my confusion with the 
way the issues were being manipulated by officials: 
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Each of the Ministries met today to discuss the youth gang problem.  I gave a 
presentation on emerging research findings that focused on how difficult it is to define 
the problem and the shifting sands of prevalence and criminality.  Specifically I raised 
the issue it may be a misnomer to categorise the issue as youth gang and that there is a 
risk that by using such terms we may exacerbate the issue.  After the presentation I was 
met with blank stares. No one commented. We then had a 15-minute break so X and Y 
and I went outside for a smoke.  It was over the cigarette that X and Y agreed that it is 
obviously not a youth gang problem and they qualified this by outlining that they live 
and work in each of the communities in question and therefore were sufficiently 
informed.  We then discussed the need to be careful of the terms we used and then went 
back upstairs to continue with the meeting.  Within five minutes both of my ‘informed’ 
smoking buddies had referred to ‘youth gangs’ and started talking about how terrible 
the problem is (Researcher’s fieldwork diary, January 2006).   
 
Maintaining the Status Quo of Marginalisation 
At the heart of the amorphous nature of the moral panic was the divide between the 
voices of government and those of the community, with the government perspective 
eclipsing the experiences and needs of people living in the region.  To understand why 
government would marginalise the community in this way, we need to understand 
more about the people who live there.  We argue that the community’s historically 
marginalised status provided a fertile ground for the government’s position on youth 
gangs to hold centre stage while local voices and experiences were relegated to the 
margins.   
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The area’s marginalised status can be linked to the post World War II economy that 
created a significant demand for unskilled labourers.  This demand was met by Māori 
who moved in increasing numbers to the cities in search of work where they were 
generally employed in low-paid manual occupations36, and supplemented in the mid-
1950s onwards by substantial increases in migration of unskilled labourers from a 
variety of Pacific nations37. The new migrants, both Māori and Pacifica, overwhelming 
settled in a small number of Greater Auckland suburbs – initially Grey Lynn and 
Ponsonby and then Counties Manukau38. The migrant districts were characterised by 
substandard housing and crowded tenancy which contributed to negative social effects, 
becoming visible by the early 1970s.   
 
Key to the ability of policy workers and media to further the marginalisation of the 
communities of Counties Manukau is a prevalent public perception that the area has 
high rates of crime.  In actuality, an analysis of crime data (aggregated by age) provided 
no evidence of higher rates of criminal activity in Counties Manukau when compared 
with national rates. For instance, Figure 1 below shows that in the year ending June 
2005, Counties Manukau ranked fifth out of 12 Police districts with regard to recorded 
                                                          
36  The ratio of Māori living in cities and boroughs grew from 17% in 1945 to 44% in 1966, growing from 
99,000 in 1945 to over 200,000 in 1966 (Thorns and Sedgwick, 1997)36.  Migration continued so that 
by the 1990s almost 60% of Māori lived in urban areas.   
 
37  As a result, whereas in 1945 fewer than 2,000 Pacifica lived in New Zealand, by 1956 the number had 
grown to over 8,000 and by 1966 it was over 26,000 (Thorns and Sedgwick, 1997).   
 
38  The two most striking demographic features of the Counties Manukau area are a young age structure 
and a high proportion of Māori and Pacific people.  The latter feature underlies the former as Māori 
and Pacific ethnic groups have a younger age structure than European/Pākehā.  Counties Manukau has 
a young population with 39% of people under 23 years compared with 34% of the total New Zealand 
population.  In Counties Manukau 22.5% of the population were estimated to be aged 10-to-23 years 
at June 2005.  This compared with a national figure of 20.7%. Counties Manukau has a relatively high 
proportion of children aged under 10 years (estimated to be 16.7%) compared with nationally 
(14.3%). 
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crime and had one of the lowest rates (along with Canterbury and North Shore-
Waitakere) of Police apprehensions and resolved crime39 compared with other districts. 
 
Figure 1: Crime Statistics for 12 Police Districts. Year Ended June 2005 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand website. 
 
A second factor that advanced the moral panic over youth gang crime was a heightened 
international awareness of youth violence and vandalism associated with French civil 
unrest that occurred between October 27 2005 and January 4 2006.  During that period 
riots had spread through Paris and a number of other French cities, concentrated in 
                                                          
39  Recorded crime is defined as all reports of incidents, whether from victims, witnesses, third parties or 
discovered by Police, and whether crime-related or not, will result in the registration of an incident 
report by Police.  The incident is recorded as an offence if a) the circumstances as reported amount to 
a crime defined by law, b) there is no credible evidence to the contrary, c) an incident was not 
reported as an offence, but upon investigation Police determine that an offence is likely to have been 
committed.  Resolved crime is defined as recorded crime for which an offender or offenders have been 
identified and dealt with.  Apprehensions are defined by a person having been identified by Police as 
the offender and, where appropriate, dealt with in some manner, such as warned, prosecuted, referred 
to youth justice family group conference and/or diverted.  
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lower socio-economic areas with high percentage of immigrant and/or non-white 
populations.  So strong was concern arising from the riots and the possibility of unrest 
spreading to New Zealand that media reported the Prime Minister as having:  
 
. . . watched the television coverage of the riots spreading throughout the suburbs 
of French cities and saw it as a result of “the frustration and despair of 
marginalised communities with high levels of unemployment and deprivation” 
(Toli, 2005). 
 
Further evidence that gang-related issues were foremost in the public psyche is 
reflected in reports that Wellington hospital’s neurosurgery ward was under lock-down 
because of fear of inter-gang violence (Dominion Post, 2005a).  Further, fear was raised 
about the incidence of gang-constructed traps and cyanide poisoning surrounding 
marijuana plots (Dominion Post, 2005b). 
 
Associated with a growing fear of youth gangs was a fear of New Zealand’s cultural 
decline as influenced by the United States-derived hip hop and gangster rap culture and 
media associations of this form of music with criminality.  These fears arose in media 
reports and in the various public meetings called by the Mayor of Counties Manukau40 
during which hip hop music, culture and artistic expression were considered highly 
influential in youth gang membership and activity. 
 
                                                          
40  Concerns about linkages between music, youth culture and crime have arisen at various times in New 
Zealand over the past sixty years.  The concerns expressed by officials and media about the 
‘immorality’ of rap and hip hop closely mirroring the cries of immorality associated with post-war 
Bodgies and the Widgies (see Manning, 1958; Levett 1959 and Green, 1959).   
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Finally, the construction of a growing youth gang problem in New Zealand was 
reinforced by continuous media representations of gang criminality and growing 
membership (with much of the reporting going uncontested or challenged).  Within 
these media portrayals gangs were associated with firearms (Radio New Zealand 
Newswire, 2006b), drugs (Dominion Post, 2005b; Radio New Zealand Newswire, 2006d; 
New Zealand Herald, 2006a), graffiti (New Zealand Herald, 2006b) and violence 
(Cummings, 2005; New Zealand Herald, 2006b; Timaru Herald, 2006; Radio New 
Zealand Newswire, 2006f).  Further, within a three month period what was a problem in 
one geographical location had grown to encompass other areas within New Zealand.  
Suddenly gang problems had erupted in Whangarei (New Zealand Press Association, 
2005), Whanganui (Radio New Zealand Newswire, 2006f), Timaru (The Timaru Herald, 
2006a and 2006b) and Palmerston North (Cummings, 2005).  So common were reports 
about youth gang activity that it could be argued that public safety justified the 
government’s response. 
 
While these factors created an environment in which the youth gang moral panic 
flourished it is noteworthy that government representatives actively silenced 
alternative perspectives by accusing communities of apathy.  For instance, in February 
2006 a representative from the New Zealand Police criticised the Counties Manukau 
community for its high levels of apathy about youth violent crime (Radio New Zealand 
Newswire, 2006a).  In this situation, because the community was not perceived to have 
sufficiently rallied against youth gangs then the community needed to be chastised.  
Similarly, blame was laid across a variety of local bodies who were accused on 
minimising the youth gang problem.  For instance, The Police Association’s President, 
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Greg O’Connor stated that “. . . many local authorities don’t believe they have a gang 
problem because they don’t see active violence on their streets (Radio New Zealand 
Newswire, 2006c).  
 
We argue that the communities needed to be silenced because of Police agitation for 
increased resources and the public relations opportunities the youth gang crisis 
presented to that particular agency, and also to ‘tough on crime’ politicians, members of 
the public service and the media.  Throughout the youth gang research multiple 
attempts to increase Police resources were made by representatives of the New Zealand 
Police and local government (Radio New Zealand Newswire, 2006c) and to increase the 
amount of Police discretionary power to be able to appropriately and expeditiously deal 
with the burgeoning problem.  Similarly, in his first public address on the issue the 
Mayor of Counties Manukau, Sir Barry Curtis, stressed that there was a need for more 
youth workers (New Zealand Herald, 2005).  As such, multiple examples were offered 
where youth gangs were used to underscore the need for increased resourcing of 
various institutions. 
 
Aside from accusations and blame directed at the various Counties Manukau 
communities, government agencies made no effort to control the panic through the use 
of appropriate terminology.  Instead, emotive terms were employed and, despite the 
research providing evidence to the contrary, government representatives continued to 
use youth gang and gang/crime-related rhetoric when discussing the issue amongst 
themselves and with media.  In this sense, it can be argued that the potential for 
material gain for government agencies was instrumental in the consistent use of 
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inappropriate terminology to characterise the situation, and silence the community 
perspective.  
 
A final means of silencing occurred in the latter stages of the research.  Earlier promises 
of community meetings to address the research’s findings and provide an opportunity 
for public participation in jointly arriving at solution(s) were retracted without apology.  
As such, the community was once again treated in an unethical manner by public 
servants (see Tauri, 2009).  Further, those who had decided to participate in the 
research because of the promise of future participation in the policy response had their 
distrust of government affirmed.  Poor community engagement practice was so rife that 
I was chastised for having distributed copies of the draft research for peer review as 
“we can’t trust them [community representatives] not to give it to the media” 
(Government official). 
 
Sadly, the emergence of a youth gang problem in Counties Manukau provided central 
and local government with resourcing and public relations opportunities.  As such, the 
depth or extent of the youth gang issue was irrelevant as pervasive media attention 
provided government officials with an opportunity to agitate for more resources, or 
affirm already existing work programmes and funding allocations. The opportunity 
afforded the Police by this project, to potentially increase resources, and for central 
agencies to protect current spend and projects and the potential for improved public 
relations meant that strategies had to be employed to silence opposing voices and 
perspectives.  We argue that these factors, when combined, acted to maintain the 
political and policy status quo to the detriment of a historically marginalised 
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community; as maintaining the status quo required the communities in question to be 
publically constructed as deprived, apathetic and fostering criminality.   
 
Juan’s story 
 
Reflections on the Politics of Gang Research in New Zealand 
 
Sir Humphrey: The public doesn't know anything about wasting government 
money. We are the experts.  
                                       Yes Minister - The Economy Drive. 
 
The following section is written primarily from the perspective of the official given the 
task of ‘minding’ the primary researcher, Dr Michael Roguski, as he proceeded with 
analysing the data he gathered in the field.   
 
Background on my role in Michael’s project 
At the time Michael was carrying out field work on the ‘youth gang situation’ in South 
Auckland, I was employed as a Regional Policy Advisor in the same agency, the Ministry 
of Social Development (MSD).  It was not long after Michael had returned from 
fieldwork that I was contacted by a senior advisor in the agency who expressed 
concerns about the research (especially the analysis) and its implications; intimated 
that the primary researcher had little idea of what they were doing and asked if I would 
provide ‘quality assurance’ as the analysis and finding stage progressed. At this point 
the official who sought my involvement hinted at ‘broad’ issues with the researcher’s 
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work, without qualifying their concerns.  I readily agreed to assist but made it clear I 
would base my observations on a thorough reading of the research material and 
engagement with the primary researcher. 
 
After reviewing the documentation produced to this point I concluded that the 
researcher’s work was methodologically sound and his analysis and representation of 
data accurate.  In fact, some of the analysis was highly innovative and, in the context of 
previous research on the New Zealand context, ground breaking.  For example, he 
determined that the police, media and political representation of the ‘youth gang 
problem’ in Counties Manukau was greatly exaggerated, and that the political elite and 
policy industry had overreacted to wildly exaggerated and inaccurate media reports41.  
This finding was made more auspicious (and worrying, at least from a community level) 
by the fact that police had to acknowledge that their ‘data’ on youth gang membership 
was highly inaccurate, and that violent crime could not be attributed to ‘gang members’ 
to the degree that they and media representatives were claiming.  Other significant 
findings included that community members believed that imported government 
programmes/interventions were failing due to their unsuitability for those 
communities; that communities preferred to be empowered to develop their own 
solutions to social issues (such as youth crime and gangs); and that militaristic policing 
‘styles’ had contributed to poor police/community relations.  There are many other 
significant findings from the research, too many to list here, but the ones mentioned 
                                                          
41  However, it should be noted the media is not entirely at fault in this regard as much of what they 
reported on the youth gang and crime situation in South Auckland was fuelled in part by exaggerated 
comments on youth gang crime by policy workers.   
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here provide clues as to why Michael’s work meet with so much resistance at the local, 
policy and interagency levels of government.   
 
Policy workers’ issues with the research and subsequent analysis had little to do with 
the quality of Michael’s work.  Michael’s sin had been to subvert a number of unwritten 
conventions that govern policy making in the social and crime control sectors of New 
Zealand’s public service, including (but by no means exclusively): 
 try not to ask questions that enable community members to talk about their 
experiences of government policy or interventions (unless the questions focus on 
the positive or the answers can easily be presented as such); 
 never ask people of their experiences of other agencies policies or interventions, 
as this may cause ‘relationship’ difficulties prior to or post-release of the findings 
(although, if the findings are adverse they are likely to be a) altered, or b) not 
released); and 
 all research and /or evaluation is to be about the institution and not the 
community.   
 
So what was the reaction to Roguski’s research, and more particularly his analysis and 
findings?  These can be grouped into the various levels of bureaucracy the work past 
through on the way to becoming ‘policy’, namely the unit, policy and interagency levels: 
 
The Unit level -‘strategies of resistance’ employed within the research unit of MSD 
included asking me to provide ‘quality control’ over Michael’s researchers analysis and 
reporting, frequent requests for drafts of various chapters, most of which went without 
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comment.  This resulted in the primary researcher having to continuously backtrack on 
various chapters which significantly slowed his progress.  This ‘strategy’ can be blamed 
in part on the lack of sector knowledge and expertise of the senior managers involved, 
but also the fact they were continuously measuring the likely impact of the analysis and 
findings on internal, agency relationships, especially with policy workers.   
 
The Policy and Interagency levels - if resistance at the unit level was motivated by a 
concern for political relationships with internal units, then at the policy level it was 
about maintaining control of the policy parameters and the political relationships of the 
agency to other agencies and ultimately to Cabinet.  At times the policy response to 
Roguski’s research bordered on the farcical.  For example, too often the researcher 
would send material out as completed (based on the assumption that no response = 
agreement to content), only for policy workers to insist their input had not been sought 
and/or received, despite email evidence to the contrary.  Furthermore, part way 
through the analysis and reporting phase, policy representatives had organised an 
interagency committee that included most of the key social policy and crime control 
players, including, Police, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education and the Ministry of 
Youth Development.  This group had been working on a ‘plan of action’ (the Plan) to 
respond to the core issues, except the plan that was eventually released bore little 
resemblance to a) the key issues identified by the research and b) the solutions 
identified by the community itself, as well as ignoring participants’ criticisms of the 
prevailing policy and intervention paradigm currently being employed by the Policy 
Industry in their region (see further discussion below).   
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Our suspicions that a policy response was being developed without the support of 
research evidence was confirmed after a senior policy manager enquired of me as to the 
status of the research was going.  On being told we were about half way through she 
replied: 
 
‘Oh we can’t wait for the research, we have already decided on the policy levers’. 
 
This statement was confirmed when the Plan42 was finalised and released.   
 
The Plan 
The Plan provides an exemplar of a number of policy-making pitfalls in the New Zealand 
context.  First of all is the issue of retrofitting of research on to pre-determined policy 
outcomes was a significant feature of the interagency development of The Plan (see 
Tauri, 2009 for a discussion of this process in the crime control sector).  To say that 
Roguski’s research was retrofitted on to the final policy response is no exaggeration as 
the evidence is overwhelming.  In this instance Policy and the inter-agency process 
simply took Michael’s research and glued the ‘acceptable’ elements of his work on to a 
policy response that further marginalised the community. For example, the version of 
the Plan released to the public is missing two important chapters written by Michael, 1) 
analysis of the participants ‘issues’ with current policies and government initiatives and 
                                                          
42  Known as The Plan Action: Improving Outcomes For Young People In Counties Manukau, 2007: available 
on the Ministry of Social Development website. 
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2) the issues the community believes are important and how best to respond to them, 
namely through community empowerment43. 
 
Explaining the Community-Research-Policy-Intervention Disconnect 
To understand the disconnect between Michael’s research, the views of participants, 
and the actions of policy workers, we have to recognise: 
 the political nature of policy development and research in the New Zealand public 
service’s social policy sector (especially in relation to youth or adult gang-related 
issues); and 
 that the public service in New Zealand uses ritual to ensure it maintains authority 
over the policy process. 
 
The Plan and the politics of youth gang policy 
As Tauri has discussed elsewhere (2009), New Zealand’s policy industry considers itself 
to be working in an ‘evidence-based [policy] environment’ (EBP) (see Bullock et al, 
2001; Cook, 2001 and Davies, 1999). This belief is supported by a survey of a range of 
documents produced by the industry including Statements of Intent, Briefings to 
Incoming Ministers44, annual reports and high-level portfolio-specific strategies where 
much is made of the evidence-based nature of policy and decision-making by that 
particular agency.  The purpose of these instruments is to enhance the impression that: 
                                                          
43  The extent to which senior policy officials in the Ministry were divorced from the social context has 
driven home to the researcher when he was asked to explain a) what he meant by a ‘community 
action’ approach and b) why he used it in his research, and after he had done so was informed by said 
official that ‘government does not do that, it does government action’.   
 
44  Known in Industry parlance as ‘BIM’s’, these documents are generally provide a high level overview of 
an agency’s core business and provided to incoming Ministers immediately after a general election or 
if a sitting Minister is replaced at any time during the electoral cycle. 
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The advice and decisions of policy makers are based upon the best available 
evidence from a wide range of sources; all key stakeholders are involved at an 
early stage and throughout the policy’s development. All relevant evidence, 
including that from specialists, is available in an accessible and meaningful form to 
policy makers (Great Britain’s Centre for Management and Policy Studies, cited in 
Reid, 2003: 6). 
 
The response to Michael’s research and my observations of the research/policy 
intersection demonstrate that the policy industry in New Zealand’s adherence to the 
principles of EBP is often driven more by political considerations than with ensuring 
quality outcomes in the ‘real world’ (see Packwood, 2002; Parsons, 2002 and Perri 6, 
2002 for a discussion of this issue in other jurisdictions).  That policy making concerns 
itself with ‘politics’ should come as no surprise if we view the process less as an 
‘objective, scientific, rationale endeavour’, and more in line with Edelman’s (1988: 16) 
description of it as “…. a set of shifting, diverse, and contradictory responses to a 
spectrum of political interests” that take place in a social context Schon (1979; 1983) 
describes as ‘messy and unpredictable’.  To understand the policy response to Michael’s 
work we first need to suspend belief in the dominance of a ‘rational EBP environment’ 
and acknowledge policy development for what it is: an ideologically driven, political 
process that serves the interests and concerns of policy-making institutions, the 
political elite and the careers of individual policy workers (see Tauri, 2009), and not, as 
the senior policy manager mentioned earlier told Michael, to enhance community 
empowerment.    
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The policy process as an exercise in ritual and myth-maintenance 
Understanding the policy response to Michael’s research can be illuminated if we 
consider the importance of ritual and myth-making/maintenance to the public service.  
Alvesson and Billing (1997) describe three basic formulations through which corporate 
culture is expressed and reproduced, i) through artefacts - physical objects like 
furniture, logos, and dress that convey meaning within an organisation; ii) through 
metaphors – “culturally rich verbal expressions” (1997: 125), or verbal symbols, 
creating “vocabularies to facilitate and guide interpretations” (ibid: 125) of what is 
going on in an organisation, and lastly, through rituals.  In this schema rituals are 
activities that occur within and between corporate operators, corporations or 
institutions and ‘outsiders’ that include certain repetitive patterns which contain 
symbolic and expressive elements that confirm existing (or newly constituted) power 
relations, institutional values and attitudes.  Suk-Young (2009: 3) describes how 
ritual(s) serve an important function in organisational activity because of the part it can 
play in enabling officials to overcome “coordination problems” (2009: 3), such as 
external scrutiny of the policy making process or decisions about resource allocation.  
Rituals also function to ensure that individuals and agencies represent themselves, to 
each other and the public, as demonstrating (through actions and rhetoric) the core 
ethics, principles and goals that drive organisational activity.  Therefore, myth-
maintenance (supported by ritual) is particularly helpful to organisations, including the 
public service, for controlling internal coordination problems (i.e., competition within 
and between agencies for finite resources) and external one’s (i.e., nullifying the 
potentially politically damaging impact of independent, public scrutiny) “because 
myths, by their very nature, disguise and manage the emotional impact of the stories 
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they tell” (ibid: 5), and often play a useful role in hiding the ‘real story’ behind the intent 
and likely impact of specific policies. 
 
The rituals that form the basis of much of the policy industry’s activity can be grouped 
into identifiable formations that are linked to shoring up myths that sustain the 
authority of policy makers.  These groupings include:  
 
rituals of deceit - refers to activities such as carrying out research or a literature 
review that involves purposely ignoring evidence, research, etc, that contradicts 
the pre-determined political/policy platform of an agency or Ministerial directive;  
 
rituals of inactivity - are employed by agencies facing highly charged, political 
issues and can include such activities as establishing unnecessarily large 
interagency committees, overly complicated work programmes, etc, aimed at 
slowing down political/public scrutiny of previous and current agency (in)activity; 
and  
 
rituals of deception - commonly used by criminal justice officials who need to 
retrofit research or policy to a social issue for which it is unsuited, or to a pre-
determined policy work-stream (see Tauri, 2011c).   
 
Many of the rituals highlighted were brought into play by policy workers when it 
became apparent that Michael’s research posed a potential ‘coordination problem’, 
namely a) a potential loss of ‘control’ over problem definition, b) the possibility of 
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publication of community criticism of previous policy responses and c) having to engage 
with participants over the identification of solutions.  The rituals of deceit are apparent 
in policy representatives having organised the inter-agency work programme without 
the research input and ignoring key findings of the research that contradict the pre-
established policy position of various agencies.  Even more apparent was the blatant use 
of rituals of deception by officials, highlighted in the policy implementation phase where 
Roguski’s research was clipped and retrofitted onto the Plan.  Potentially annoying 
sections were ignored; those sections that demonstrated the ‘youth gang’ crime wave 
was little more than a media/politician and police induced moral panic, and 
demonstrated that the community thought little of government’s tendency to hoist upon 
it imported programmes ill-suited to the social context they lived in.  And of course 
there was the section that gave voice to participant’s desires for their communities to be 
empowered to find solutions to their issues.  What they got instead, was business as 
usual, in the form of a reallocation of existing funding to pre-established programmes 
for which agencies could offer little evidence of socio-cultural viability, or positive 
outcomes.   
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Discussion 
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Introduction 
The following section provides an overview of the main arguments and key findings 
presented in the eight papers that make up the thesis.  It also demonstrates how the 
disparate arguments and foci of the papers combine to offer a critique of the ways – the 
colonial projects - through which the settler-colonial state, in particular its crime 
control functionaries, and the discipline of criminology, interact to subjugate Indigenous 
peoples.   
 
Whether it emanates from the criminal justice sectors of settler-colonial governments 
or the discipline of criminology, much of the literature and rhetoric about the wicked 
problems of Indigenous over-representation in the criminal justice system and our 
aspirations for self-determination and resistance to the imposed justice ordering, has 
either silenced or marginalised the Indigenous experience.  As this thesis is being 
written significant effort is being made by Indigenous scholars and our critical, non-
Indigenous colleagues, to expose Indigenous experiences of settler-colonial crime 
control.  This activity includes the recent publication of a special edition on Indigenous 
counter-colonial perspective in the African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies, 
the development of an Indigenous justice journal through the University of Wollongong 
that will commence publication in 2016, and the expected launch in 2017 of an 
International Indigenous Justice Congress designed to provide intellectual, financial and 
peer support to Indigenous justice academics and students.  This thesis should be 
viewed as a minor contribution to this emerging, globalised movement in critical 
Indigenous justice scholarship.   
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What the movement will eventually be named is an issue for debate amongst its 
growing number of adherents.  Given the material included in this thesis it would be 
imprudent to presume that it will be called Indigenous Criminology.  The reason is 
straight forward: any focus on the criminal justice system by the Indigenous academy 
will involve significant critical analysis of the discipline of criminology and its impact on 
Indigenous peoples.  After all, as Biko Agozino (2010) has succinctly argued, the 
discipline is a control freak.  As Paper 2 demonstrated, the discipline has not always 
been particularly supportive of Indigenous peoples and their justice issues.  Indeed, it 
has provided the settler-colonial state with many of the nefarious policies and strategies 
that have resulted in the perpetuation of colonial violence against Indigenous peoples; 
the 3-strikes legislation and sentencing structure introduced into Australia’s Northern 
Territory in the 2000s providing a powerful, contemporary example.   
 
With this in mind, the thesis sought to answer to the following broad questions: 
1. What techniques of neutralisation and control are employed by the policy sector in 
its attempts to deal with the wicked problems of Indigenous over-representation 
and resistance? 
2. What part does criminology/the academy play, if any, in the criminal justice 
industry’s war of manoeuvre against Indigenous self-determination in the realm of 
justice? 
3. How has the settler-colonial state responded to Indigenous challenges to, and 
resistance of, its hegemony over justice? 
4. What effect, if any, is the expansion of a globalised crime control market having on 
indigenous peoples in neo-colonial jurisdictions?   
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Together, the eight papers offer some significant and original statements about the 
Indigenous experiences of criminal justice as it is practised in settler-colonial societies, 
and of the activities of criminologist, and justice entrepreneurs.  This section discusses 
how the papers link together, and how, as a body of work, they fulfil the overall aims of 
the research as expressed in the key questions.   
 
Linking the Papers to the Key Questions 
The following discussion sets out to demonstrate how individually, or collectively, the 
eight papers enable us to answer the questions that formed the focus of the thesis: 
 
1. What techniques of neutralisation and control are employed by the policy sector in 
its attempts to deal with the wicked problems of Indigenous over-representation and 
resistance? 
 
The research and papers that structured the thesis identified a range of techniques and 
strategies deployed by the policy sector in response to the wicked problems of the 
Indigenous over-representation, and resistance to the state’s hegemony over responses 
to Indigenous crime and Indigenous political activism.  Deployed at various levels of the 
web of social control that includes criminal justice institutions, are a range of colonial 
projects that simultaneously control Indigenous resistance, and enable a government to 
be seen to respond to these wicked problems.  As identified in Paper 1 (Criminal Justice 
as a Colonial Project in Contemporary Settler-Colonialism) criminal justice deploys 
projects across what Woolford (2013) described as the interconnected web of 
294 
 
governance; from the meso-level deployment of strategically targeted (over) policing, to 
the micro-level development of Indigenous-focused policies and interventions 
developed without Indigenous input described in Papers 2 (Indigenous Critique of 
Authoritarian Criminology) and 3 (A Critical Appraisal of Responses to Māori 
Offending).   
 
Papers 6 (Ritual and the Social Dynamics of Policy Development in New Zealand) and 8 
(The Politics of Gang Research in New Zealand) provide case study-informed analysis of 
the micro-strategies of neutralisation and control deployed by the policy sector.  Paper 
6 demonstrates the importance of myth and ritual to the policy making process.  Whilst 
these strategies can, and often are deployed against communities other than Indigenous 
peoples, they are particularly potent in their impact on these communities from their 
ability to silence the ‘other voice’, and shore up the policy sector’s (and as a result, 
government) ability to control both the definition of a social problem, and development 
of political responses to these issues.   
 
It can be strongly argued that mythologies were extremely powerful colonial projects 
deployed to subjugate Indigenous peoples during the colonial eras of all four settler-
colonial jurisdictions (Papers 2 and 3).  The mythologies related to ideological policy 
positions of the inherent superiority of western coloniser and their culture(s) over that 
of Indigenous peoples were essential to the development of a number of damaging 
policies, including child removals, the banning of Indigenous cultural practices and 
technique of knowledge transmission, amongst many others.  These mythologies and 
attendant rituals of disempowerment (as described in detail in Paper 6) were vital to 
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the establishment of the settler-colonial states control over the policy sector, and the 
involvement of ‘problem populations’, such as Indigenous peoples, in that process.  In 
the contemporary context, ritual and myth, as techniques of subjugation have particular 
resonance for Indigenous peoples.  As described in Papers 6 and 8, issues of significant 
importance for Māori communities, such as youth justice and gang activity, are both 
heavily impacted by the rituals of deceit, which in turn support the myths of the 
primacy of evidence and a public-focused policy sector.   
 
2. What part does criminology/the academy play, if any, in the criminal justice 
industry’s ‘war of manoeuvre’ against Indigenous self-determination in the realm of 
justice? 
 
A significant focus of a number of the papers contained in the thesis was the issue of the 
role of the discipline of criminology, and the wider academy in supporting the criminal 
justice sectors endeavours to control the realm of justice.  The entirety of Papers 2 and 3 
focused on this issue, and concluded that a particularly virulent form of contemporary 
criminology had arisen in Australasia of late, that brought with it a reinvigoration of 
administrative criminological evangelising on the ‘Indigenous problem’ in these 
jurisdictions.  This reinvigoration is built on a strategy of discrediting any/all 
Indigenous approaches to criminological research and dissemination of our knowledge, 
as unscientific, and therefore unworthy of serious consideration for the development of 
contemporary crime control policy.  This example of the criminological knowledge wars 
has at its base similar ideological foundations to the eradication of Indigenous culture 
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and knowledge that highlighted colonial projects during the initial and intermediary 
phases of colonisation.    
 
Further to the discussion above, Paper 5 (Resisting Condescending Research Ethics in 
Aotearoa New Zealand) highlights processes internal to the Academy that demonstrate 
the difficulties Indigenous peoples face when attempting to privilege their knowledge 
gathering processes when pursuing social research.  Focusing on the hegemony of REB’s 
within western academic institutions, this paper found that in both the New Zealand 
and Canadian jurisdictions, Indigenous scholars and service providers reported 
significant difficulties in developing ethics protocols that ensured the Indigenous voice 
was appropriately ‘recorded’ during the research process.   
 
Coupled with the findings in Papers 2 and 3 the research demonstrates that the 
Indigenous Academy is fighting the war on two fronts, the first is in combating the 
Eurocentric ideological bases and privilege that permeates the western academic 
institutions in which many of us work.  This conflict has the potential to derail our 
attempts to give authority to Indigenous experiences of crime control in settler-colonial 
contexts, by channelling us towards research ethics protocols and methodologies 
unsuited to the Indigenous (social) context.  The second conflict arises from attempts by 
the western academy to ‘control’ access to the Policy Industry.  In part, this leads to the 
development of strategies designed to silence research undertaken by Indigenous 
scholars and communities.  The result is the exclusion of Indigenous knowledge and 
experience of the social context of settler-colonialism from the development of 
meaningful policies and interventions aimed at alleviating the wicked problem of 
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Indigenous overrepresentation.  More pertinent, attempts to silence our experiences of, 
and approaches to, social harm have the potential to halt our rights to self-
determination in the realm of justice.   
 
3. How has the settler-colonial state responded to Indigenous challenges to, and 
resistance of, its hegemony over justice? 
 
The research carried out for this thesis highlights a number of ways in which the settler-
colonial state has resisted Indigenous opposition to its hegemony over responses to 
social harm.  The majority of papers in this thesis deal with this issue in some way or 
other.  For example, Papers 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8 all expose various strategies and colonial 
projects that are formed in response to the wicked problems of Māori offending and 
resistance; be it the rituals described earlier that insulate the policy makers from the 
external scrutiny of critics (especially those vulnerable communities against whom 
policies and interventions are often directed, such as Indigenes), or the structured 
violence of contemporary policing strategies.  However, the paper that most directly 
deals with this question is Paper 7 (The Waitangi Tribunal and the Regulation of Māori 
Protest).  The extant literature on this forum is unequivocal; it was intended to be an 
informal justice process, developed in direct response to the radicalisation of Māori 
politics, and rise of a young, confrontational Māori leadership.  But it was not intended 
to enable Māori a forum through which their political aspirations for self-determination 
in justice, social policy and economics self-sufficiency could be realised.  That it did 
result in what is now referred to as the treaty settlement process, was in the main 
unintentional; what Weber referred to as an elective affinity, in this case a powerful 
298 
 
alignment of an effective Māori utilisation of the formal court system, what the state (at 
least) believed to be a militant judiciary, and the increasing ‘Māorification’ of the 
tribunal process.   
 
The Waitangi Tribunal can also be seen as an example of what happens when Māori 
choose to participate in a state controlled forum.  As stated, it was not intended to be a 
Māori-led process; indeed the first hearing held in the late 1970s, took place in a hotel, 
with little Māori input into process.  By the late 1980s it had, at least in terms of process, 
become a forum driven by tikanga; Māori laws and protocols of formal negotiation 
between equal parties.  However, we should always remember that while tikanga 
dominated the rituals and processes of the tribunal (lore), Pakeha (white) law held it at 
bay as a process that could directly bring self-determination to Māori claimants: the 
state was, and still is not, beholden to  uphold the decisions reached by the tribunal. 
 
4. What effect, if any, is the expansion of the globalised crime control market having on 
indigenous peoples in neo-colonial jurisdictions?   
 
Lastly, a key focus of the research was the impact, if any, of the seeming increasing 
globalisation of crime control policy and interventions, with a particular focus on the RJ 
industry.  Paper 4 (An Indigenous, Critical Commentary on the Globalisation of 
Restorative Justice) focuses on this question, and was based on empirical research with 
Indigenous communities in Canada.  The research focused on the impact of the travel of 
RJ interventions on Indigenous peoples, namely the New Zealand invention, the FGC 
forum.  Re-packaged and franchised by Australian and North American policy 
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entrepreneurs, the forum has proved popular with jurisdictions in all four settler-
colonial societies.  The research (and the paper) exposed some of the reasons for this 
situation, not least of all the successful marketing of the forum as an exemplar of 
Indigenous dispute resolution, one heavily imbued with Māori justice philosophy and 
practice.  The research revealed this to be little more than marketing rhetoric: Māori 
had little direct input into the formulation of the forum, which was influenced more by 
the move across western jurisdictions towards a reinvigoration of the justice model for 
dealing with youth offending, while retaining some of the social developmental 
components of the ‘failed’ welfare approach (see Adler and Wundersitz, 1994).   
 
As the saying goes, ‘don’t let the truth get in the way of a good story’.  Discussions 
between the author and RJ advocates and practitioners on this issue have often resulted 
in comments like ‘well even if it isn’t a truly Indigenous intervention, isn’t it a good thing 
that it allows you to practice your justice’; or ‘isn’t it better that other Indigenous 
peoples get to use a programme that is at least partly based on Indigenous approaches’.  
The research provided answers to both questions is: it depends on whether you are an 
RJ practitioner, or a franchise company, or an Indigenous peoples looking to reignite 
your own, traditional-based justice processes.  As the example of the Stó:lo First Nation 
of the Fraser Valley demonstrated, the eroticisation of RJ via the marketing of the FGC as 
a Māori forum impeded the ability of this Indigenous community as it went about 
resurrecting traditional justice process.  It did not halt their move towards judicial self-
determination, but it did mean they had to utilise a process that was in fact no more 
‘indigenous’ than the interventions then prevalent in the formal Canadian justice 
system.   
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Issues with the Research 
Whilst no significant issues arose from the actual project itself, some did arise from 
activities that were peripheral to the research that made it difficult for the author to 
focus attention on the thesis.  These issues arose in response to a project the author was 
involved in, namely the development of a special edition of a journal on the topic of 
Indigenous, counter-colonial criminologies.  Conflict between the authors and senior 
members of the academy related to administrative issues resulted in the special edition 
being cancelled.  The edition was subsequently moved by the author and the 
contributors to a new journal, the African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies and 
published in early 2015.  Attempts to take ownership of the project from the author and 
the contributors to the special edition, plus ongoing breaches of accepted principles of 
ethical engagement with Indigenes, resulted in the loss of a significant amount of time 
the author had allocated to completing the thesis over the last ten months.  However, 
the issues that resulted from the conduct of a small group of senior academics, whilst 
delaying completion of the thesis, did have one positive effect, which was to reveal the 
ongoing impact of racism and unethical conduct by members of the western academy on 
Indigenous scholars (and our critical, non-Indigenous collaborators).  The Indigenous 
scholars involved in the special edition began talking to each other about similar 
experiences of racism and unethical conduct directed against them.  As we began 
sharing our experiences it became clear that this issue, the ongoing subjugation of 
Indigenous peoples by the academy, was in need of further focus, an issue picked up in 
the following section.   
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Future Directions 
This thesis was not just the culmination of six years part-time research into the issues 
contained in the eight papers; it was in effect the end-point of 18 years of research on 
and activism for, Indigenous peoples and their justice issues.  The results reported here 
reveal a number of avenues for further research.  Most urgent of all relate to the 
difficulties that beset the thesis over the last 12 months, described in detail above.  As 
the Indigenous academy expands in numbers we will as a consequence come into 
greater contact with the western academy.  As mentioned previously, some of our 
academic colleagues still cling to stereotypes of Indigenous peoples and institutional 
practices that can only be described as colonialist in orientation.  The behaviours 
experienced by the author, his Indigenous and critical non-Indigenous colleagues, 
brought home the urgency of research that exposes the depth and nature of this 
subjugating conduct.   
 
It is imperative that the impact of this behaviour on Indigenous scholars and the wider 
Indigenous community is empirically investigated, and the racism exposed and 
challenged.  If time had allowed, one more paper would have been added to the eight 
included here.  At the time of writing, the author and a colleague from the University of 
Auckland, New Zealand, have begun a project on this particular issue.  Results and 
publications are expected to be made public in the second half of 2016. 
 
While the thesis attempted to plug gaps in our knowledge, other related issues still need 
further exploration.  For example, while the paper ‘An Indigenous, Critical Commentary 
on the Globalisation of Restorative Justice’ exposed the nefarious impact of the co-
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option of Indigenous cultural artefacts by the restorative justice industry, we are yet to 
document Indigenous responses to the activities of policy entrepreneurs and RJ 
franchise justice companies to any significant extent.  This information is vitally 
important if Indigenous peoples are to offset the types of disempowering conduct 
prevalent across the academy, especially within conservative factions such as 
authoritarian criminology.  If we are to challenge the perception that our ways of 
responding to social harm are little more than quaint, traditional artefacts, then we 
need to detail in full the theoretical and conceptual bases to our responses.  We need to 
demonstrate that they are working for our communities.  We urgently need to gather, 
control and disseminate this information if we are to challenge western criminology’s 
position as the intellectual font of all relevant knowledge on crime and responses to it. 
 
Related to this issue is the gap in our knowledge of Indigenous resistance.  Indigenous 
peoples resist many things, including the bastardisation of our life-worlds by cultural 
entrepreneurs, franchise companies and the like; or the importation of western, 
globalised crime control products which we are forced to use in place of our own, more 
appropriate processes.  And of course, we continue to resist the settler-colonial state’s 
ongoing manoeuvres to frustrate our aspirations for self-determination.  This is the area 
most in need of empirical research analysis and theorising.  The importance of the issue 
of Indigenous resistance cannot be over-stated: we need to mindful of portraying 
Indigenous peoples as (more often than not) the non-responsive, passive recipients of 
White Man’s Law and the gifts of western crime control.   
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We Indigenous peoples are not without agency; and we are not always ‘as one’ in how 
we deploy it.  Sometimes we acquiesce to the activities of policy makers and 
entrepreneurs by accepting and implementing the imported, Indigenised products 
discussed in this thesis.  Some of us perform significant roles in the construction, 
dissemination and utilisation of these products.  The periphery is not simply the site of 
unchallenged reception of imported policies and interventions: it is often “a space that 
defies simplistic perceptions of chaos and social exclusion; it is marked by potential, 
innovation and creativity, organisation of new social movements and new conceptions 
of citizenship” (Aas, 2009: 415).  This we can see playing out in the Idle No More 
movement in Canada, and the South American Spring that emerged in Brazil in late June 
2013.   
 
At other times our resistance to state and criminological impositions is forceful, even 
violent, as occurred at Oka, Wounded Knee and Bastion Point.  But more often than not 
our resistance is subtle and ingenious, such as when we accept the criminological gifts 
imported from the high-crime western jurisdictions, and begin immediately to chip 
away the Eurocentric coating in order to apply a more suitable, Indigenous sheen over 
time.  To employ a powerful Foucaultian terms, our counter-conducts and creative 
strategies of resistance, are multifarious and sophisticated (Foucault, 2004).  This is no 
different when it comes to the international transfer of crime control products like 
FGCs, sentencing circles or corrections-based bicultural therapeutic programmes.  
Counter-conduct abounds and is expressed in a variety of ways, including “flight, 
deflection, ruse, attempts to overturn the situation of domination, direct confrontation 
with the dispostifs of power, etc…” (Lazzarato, 2009: 114).  However, for there to be 
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resistance of any kind, there needs to be something for us to resist in the first place.  The 
impacts of the various players on the globalised crime control market on Indigenous 
peoples is very real, and the criminological players on that team, the restorative justice 
theorists, practitioners, those making money marketing their products to state and 
Federal governments, should consider the consequences of their continued use of the 
Indigenous life-world for the benefit of themselves and the Industry they participate in, 
because they can be sure that the critical Indigenous gaze is now firmly turned towards 
them.   
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Glossary – Māori Words and Terminology 
 
Aotearoa  land of the long white cloud, Māori name for New Zealand. 
 
Hapu   sub-tribe. 
 
Hui   gathering, meeting. 
Iwi   tribe. 
 
Karakia  to recite ritual chants, say grace, pray. 
 
Kaupapa topic, policy, matter for discussion.   
 
Kawa   marae protocol - customs of the marae. 
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Marae courtyard - the open area in front of a meeting house, where formal 
greetings and discussions take place. 
 
Mihi   speech of greeting, acknowledgement, tribute. 
 
Pakeha   New Zealander of European descent. 
 
Te Puni Kokiri   Ministry of Māori Development.  
 
Tikanga correct procedure, custom, habit, lore. 
 
Whanau  extended family, family group. 
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